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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule XIV(a) of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, Article VIII Section 4 of the 
Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3)(c). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW IN 
FORMAL COMPLAINT F-519. 
a. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affirming that a client of the law firm of Jardine, 
Linebaugh, Brown, & Dunn paid Respondent a personal bonus are 
arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. (Page 4 Paragraphs 
5 and 7 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
b. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affirming that "Respondent chose to interpret this payment 
as his own personal bonus and not the property of the law firm" 
are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. (Page 4, 
Paragraph 6 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
c. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affirming that "It has not been proved by clear or 
convincing evidence that respondent's conduct in this matter rose 
to the level of misappropriation, criminal conduct, dishonesty, 
misappropriation, theft, fraud, or deceit as set forth in the 
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Applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, including 1.13(b) and 
8.4(c)" are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. (Page 
5, Paragraph 12 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures 
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
d. Whether the Hearing Panel's conclusion of law and the 
Board's Order affirming that "... the evidence has not been clear 
nor convincing that this bonus was in fact a fee" are arbitrary, 
capricious, or clearly erroneous. (Page 5, of Panel findings and 
Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
e. Whether the Hearing Panel's recommendation and the 
Board's Order affirming that "... we do not recommend sanctions 
regarding this matter" are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly 
erroneous. (Page 5, of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW IN 
FORMAL COMPLAINT F-520: 
a. Whether the Hearing Panel's implication and the Board's 
Order affirming that the default entered in this case had been 
waived or set aside are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly 
erroneous. (Page 5, of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
b. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affirming that Mr. Yagi testified that some trust account 
money was spent on stock for Mr. Cragun are arbitrary, 
capricious, or clearly erroneous. (Page 7, Paragraph 11. of 
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Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar) 
c. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affirming that "Respondent did prepare opinion letters and 
other documents to facilitate stock purchase transactions for the 
benefit of Mr. Cragun" are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly 
erroneous. (Page 8, Paragraph 15 of Panel findings and Rule XIV 
of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
d. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affilming that all of the $25,000.00 received by Respondent 
from Mr. Cragun was deposited in Respondent's trust account are 
arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. (Page 8, Paragraph 
17 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline 
of the Utah State Bar) 
e. Whether the Hearing Panel's implication and the Board's 
Order affirming that checks totaling $11,250.00 payable to Rick 
Yagi and a check in the amount of $1,250.00 payable to Randy Yagi 
from Respondent's trust account were funds spent for the benefit 
of Mr. Cragun are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. 
(Page 8, Paragraph 18 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
f. Whether the Hearing Panel's recommendation and the 
Board's Order affirming that Respondent receive no discipline 
other than probation for one year and be required to complete a 
course in ethics are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. 
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(Page 9, and page 11 of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
g. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affirming that "The duty violated in this matter ... arose 
out of inexperience and mistakes in judgment which can be 
remedied" were arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. 
(Page 9, of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
h. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affirming that "... Respondent's inadequate accounting of 
Cragun's money was a matter of incompetence" rather than 
intentional misconduct were arbitrary, capricious, or clearly 
erroneous. (Page 9 , of Panel findings and Rule XIV of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar) 
i. Whether the Hearing Panel's finding and the Board's 
Order affirming that it had not been shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that Respondent's conduct in the handling of 
Mr. Cragun's money was due to criminal conduct, dishonesty, 
intentional misappropriation, theft, fraud, or deceit, were 
arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. (Page 9, of Panel 
findings and Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar) 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 
1. Rule XIV of the Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar pertaining to the standard of review of cases 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
2. Rule 1.13 (a)(b), SAFEKEEPING OF PROPERTY, of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
3. Rule 8.4(c), MISCONDUCT, of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
4. American Bar Association Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BY THE HEARING PANEL AND 
BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS 
1. This appeal is from a final Order entered by the Board 
of Bar Commissioners of the Utah State Bar on January 28, 1993, 
wherein the Board affirmed the Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of a Hearing Panel of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the Utah State Bar. 
2. This matter involves two complaints against the same 
Respondent arising from separate instances of alleged 
professional misconduct in violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar. The Screening Panel members who 
considered the facts of these cases found that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe Respondent had violated the Rules 
of Professional Conduct as alleged and voted to issue Formal 
Complaints. 
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3. Formal Complaint F-519 alleges that Respondent 
misappropriated $4,200.00 from his law firm. The Hearing Panel 
found that Respondent was entitled to this money as a "personal 
bonus" and found no misconduct associated with Respondent's 
taking the money from his law firm. 
4. Formal Complaint F-520 alleges that Respondent 
misappropriated approximately $19,000.00 from a client. The 
evidence presented at the hearing established that Respondent 
misappropriated no less than $12,500.00 and as much as 
$19,000.00. Default was entered against the Respondent in Formal 
Complaint F-520 and was never waived or set aside. Therefore, 
the only issue before the Hearing Panel was the appropriate 
sanction to be entered. Prior to the hearing Respondent made 
restitution to his client in the amount of $13,000.00. The 
Hearing Panel recommended that Respondent be placed on probation 
for one (1) year, be ordered to take a class in ethics, and make 
restitution of an additional $13,000.00. Respondent no longer 
practices law in Utah which renders the recommendation of 
probation a nullity. Respondent promised the Hearing Panel he 
would make restitution of the remaining $13,000.00 prior to 
December 31, 1992, but has not done so. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FORMAL COMPLAINT F-519 
1. On or about July 1, 1986, Mr. Blaine W. Savage retained 
Respondent and the law firm of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn 
(hereinafter "Law Firm"), to represent him in a civil matter. 
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These facts are admitted by Respondent in his Answer (hereinafter 
"RA") filed herein. 
2. From on or about July 1, 1986, until on or about 
December 10, 1986, Respondent provided legal services to Mr. 
Savage on behalf of the Law Firm, RA. 
3. A dispute arose between Respondent and the Law Firm as 
to the terms of the fee agreement with Mr. Savage. However, 
assuming Respondent's version of the facts to be true, the fee 
agreement was at an hourly rate. Mr. Savage paid the Law Firm a 
total of $10,000.00 for legal services in four payments. 
4. On or about October 1, 1986, Mr. Savage paid the Law 
Firm the sum of $1,000.00 with check No. 1367 made payable to the 
Law Firm, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A and 
incorporated herein, RA. 
5. On or about November 5, 1986, Mr. Savage paid the Law 
Firm the sum of $500.00 with check No. 1370 made payable to the 
Law Firm, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B and 
incorporated herein, RA. 
6. On or about December 7, 1986, Mr Savage paid the Law 
Firm the sum of $3,500.00 with check No. 1374 made payable to 
William R. Shupe and delivered to Respondent. A copy of this 
check is attached hereto as Appendix C and incorporated herein. 
Respondent did not deliver the check or the proceeds of this 
check to the Law Firm. Instead, retained these funds and 
converted them to his own use. These facts were established by 
the testimony of Kent B. Linebaugh and James M. Dunn who 
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testified that Respondent confessed to them that he had 
wrongfully converted these funds to his own use. (Record of 
Hearing Pages 4 through 18) 
7. These facts were also established pursuant to Rule 8(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that 
averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
required are admitted when not denied. These facts are pleaded 
in Paragraph 5 of Section III of the Formal Complaint and no 
responsive pleading thereto was filed. These facts not being 
denied are admitted. 
8. On or about December 10, 1986, Mr. Savage paid the Law 
Firm the sum of $5,000.00 with check No. 1622. The check was 
made payable to William R. Shupe and delivered to Respondent. A 
copy of this check is attached hereto as Appendix D and 
incorporated herein. Respondent paid the Law Firm the sum of 
$4,300.00 from these funds and retained for himself the sum of 
$700.00. These facts are pleaded in Paragraphs 6 and 7, of 
Section III of the Formal Complaint. 
9. Respondent does not deny that he personally retained the 
sum of $4,200.00 from the proceeds received from Mr. Savage on 
December 7 and December 10. Respondent confessed to Kent B. 
Linebaugh and James M. Dunn that he converted these funds. 
However, when the complaint was filed with the Bar, Respondent, 
for the first time, alleged that he was entitled to these funds 
as a personal bonus from Mr. Savage. (Record of trial pages 4 
through 10, and pages 12 through 14) 
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10. On or about September 1, 1989, December 1, 1990, and 
August 1, 1990, Respondent signed promissory notes payable to the 
Law Firm in the principal sum of $4,200.00 plus interest. These 
notes were for the purpose of repaying to the Law Firm the amount 
converted from the payments received from Mr. Savage. These 
promissory notes are attached here to as Appendices E, F, & G and 
incorporated herein. These facts are pleaded in Paragraphs 9, 
10, and 11 of Section III of the Formal Complaint. Respondent 
admits in his Answer filed herein that he signed various 
promissory notes payable to the Law Firm. 
Formal Complaint F-519 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
THE FINDINGS OF THE HEARING PANEL ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS 
1. The finding of the Hearing Panel that payments to 
Respondent on December 7, and December 10, 1986, by a client of 
Respondent's law firm were personal bonuses to Respondent is 
clearly erroneous. 
2. The finding of the Hearing Panel that Respondent 
violated none of the Rules of Professional Conduct is clearly 
erroneous. 
3. The recommendation that Respondent receive no discipline 
as a result of his conduct giving rise to the charges in Formal 
Complaint F-519 is clearly erroneous. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE FINDING OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT PAYMENTS TO 
RESPONDENT ON DECEMBER 7, AND DECEMBER 10, 1986, BY 
A CLIENT OF RESPONDENT'S LAW FIRM WERE PERSONAL 
BONUSES TO RESPONDENT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Findings 5, 6, and 7 on page 4 of the Hearing Panel's 
findings are clearly erroneous. Finding 5 states "... Mr. Savage 
paid to respondent what was termed by Mr. Savage as a vbonus for 
you' arising out of what Mr. Savage believed to be a good result 
from the representation". Finding 6 states: "Respondent chose to 
interpret this payment as his own personal bonus and not the 
property of the law firm". Finding 7 states: "Mr. Savage also 
intended this payment to be a vpersonal bonus'". 
The finding that Mr. Savage intended this payment to be a 
personal bonus to Respondent is not supported by any evidence of 
record. The finding that Respondent chose to interpret this 
payment as a personal bonus is based only on the contradictory 
testimony of Respondent. This finding is contrary to 
Respondent's confession to Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Savage, is 
contrary to Respondent's confession at the hearing on this matter 
as described hereafter, and is contrary to the evidence admitted 
at the hearing. 
Blaine Savage did not testify. However, Respondent did 
submit an Affidavit from Mr. Savage. In this Affidavit Mr. 
Savage states "As I prepared to pay my final legal bill, 
(emphasis added) which would have been approximately $4,500.00 
($6,000 less the $1,500 I had already paid), I told Mr. Shupe 
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that I wanted to pay the $10,000.00 I had budgeted and he could 
consider the excess a bonus for his good work." At no time did 
Mr. Savage state to Respondent that "this is a bonus for you" or 
that "this is a personal bonus". Respondent had been practicing 
law long enough to know that money paid for representation by a 
law firm belongs to the law firm, not the individual attorney. 
Mr. Savage's Affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix H and 
incorporated herein. If Mr. Savage intended this to be a 
personal bonus to Respondent why did he not say so in his 
Affidavit? It was stipulated between the parties at trial that 
if Mr. Savage had been called as a witness he would not testify 
that he told Respondent this was a personal bonus. (Record of 
hearing page 17) 
Other evidence that shows these findings to be clearly 
erroneous consists of the testimony of Respondent during the 
hearing on this complaint. During the hearing, Respondent 
testified regarding his conversation with his client, Mr. Savage, 
and the payment of his bill to the law firm. Respondent, 
referring to Mr. Savage, states: "He didn't say the words 
'personal bonus'". Later in his testimony Respondent refers to 
his conversation with Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn wherein he 
states: "... when they confronted me with it, I admitted that I 
had done wrong". (Record of hearing page 16) 
Respondent's testimony bespeaks his state of mind when he 
took the money belonging to his law firm when he stated "The firm 
wasn't being damaged because it was receiving every cent of its 
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billing, and he was happy with me." (Record of hearing page 16) 
In other words, he is justifying taking the money from his law 
firm, with whom he has a fiduciary relationship, because the firm 
will not miss the money. Respondent then discloses what 
motivated him to take the money when he stated: 
"I think that there was some, probably, residual 
feelings of resentment for sometimes being passed over 
for things in the firm that were, perhaps, eating away 
at me that made me, that allowed the situation to 
appear proper, logical and okay." (Record of hearing 
page 16) 
This is also an admission that what he had done was not proper, 
logical and okay. Respondent later said "Believe me, I know I 
did a wrong thing". He later said "... I know that I messed up, 
and that I should have disclosed it and given it to the firm." 
(Record of hearing page 17) 
Other evidence that shows the findings of the Hearing Panel 
to be clearly erroneous consists of the testimony of Mr. 
Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn, the Affidavit of Mr. Savage, and the 
physical evidence consisting of the dates and amounts of 
payments. Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn appeared and testified, 
under oath, that when they confronted Respondent about this 
matter Respondent confessed to them that he had improperly taken 
the money. They testified that Respondent never alleged that he 
was entitled to the money or that it was a personal bonus. Upon 
being confronted by Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn, Respondent 
confessed his misappropriation and signed Promissory Notes to 
repay the funds he had taken. (Record of Hearing Pages 4 through 
ID 
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The evidence supports Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn's testimony 
that Respondent misappropriated the funds. The evidence is not 
consistent with Respondent's allegation that the funds were a 
personal bonus. In his Affidavit, Mr. Savage states that 
Respondent was informed of the payment of a bonus on the date of 
the making of the last payment. The evidence shows that the last 
payment was made on December 10, 1986, in the amount of 
$5,000.00. By this date. Respondent had already misappropriated 
$3,500.00. An interim payment of $3,500.00 was made on December 
7, 1986 and Respondent kept the entire amount. When the final 
payment was made on December 10, 1986, the one which contained 
the "bonus". Respondent kept an additional $700.00. According to 
Mr. Savage's Affidavit there was no mention to Respondent of a 
bonus in connection with the interim payment of $3,500.00 kept by 
Respondent. These facts of record were pointed out to the 
Hearing Panel. 
II 
THE FINDING OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT 
RESPONDENT VIOLATED NONE OF THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Finding 12 and the Conclusions of Law on page 5 wherein the 
Panel found no violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
are clearly erroneous based on the evidence of record described 
above. Respondent's admissions in his Answer, and in his 
admissions, his admissions to Mr. Linebaugh and Mr. Dunn, and his 
admissions before the Hearing Panel, establish the fact that he 
accepted and retained the sum of $3,500.00 from a client of the 
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Law Firm on December 7, 1986 and retained the sum of $700.00 from 
a payment made to him by a client of the Law Firm on December 10, 
1992, for a total of $4,200.00. Respondent's admissions in his 
Answer, and his admissions before the Hearing Panel, establish 
that he kept the $4,200.00 and did not pay it to the Law Firm. 
Respondent's admissions in his Answer, his confession to Kent B. 
Linebaugh and James M. Dunn, and his confession to the Hearing 
Panel. establish that he converted the sum of $4,200.00 to his 
own use. 
Respondent's admissions in his Answer, his admissions before 
the Hearing PaneL, and Appendices E, F, & G, attached hereto, 
establish that he signed several promissory notes to the Law Firm 
wherein he agreed to repay the above-described funds. The 
exhibits establish that the promissory notes were not signed 
until over two years after the funds had been taken by 
Respondent. 
James M. Dunn and Kent B. Linebaugh testified that, in the 
summer of 1989, they learned that funds paid by Mr. Savage to 
Respondent had not been paid to the Law Firm. Mr. Dunn and Mr. 
Linebaugh testified that, in the summer of 1989, they confronted 
Respondent about the missing funds and he confessed to them that 
he had improperly taken the money and agreed to make restitution. 
They further testified that Respondent admitted to them that the 
taking of the funds was wrongful and he did not claim at that 
time that the funds were a personal bonus. (Record of hearing 
pages 4 through 14) After making these admissions, he signed the 
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various promissory notes described in the Formal Complaint. If 
Respondent truly believed he was legitimately entitled to this 
money why did he confess that the money was improperly taken and 
sign promissory notes to repay it? 
Respondent's allegations that the payment of these funds was 
a personal bonus is contrary to the evidence. Respondent states 
that the money he kept was paid to him as a bonus on the day the 
case was settled. He alleges the amount of his bonus was the 
difference between the amount of the final bill from the Law Firm 
and $10,000.00 which is the amount Mr. Savage was willing to pay 
for the legal services. The documents admitted into evidence 
show that Respondent kept the money before the case was settled 
and before the "bonus" was paid. Respondent kept for himself the 
sum of $3,500.00 on December 7, 1986, which was before the case 
had been settled and before the day of the final payment to the 
Law Firm. Respondent did keep some money from the "bonus" paid 
on the day of the settlement and final payment, December 10, 
1986. However, the amount he kept on that date was only $700.00. 
Ill 
THE RECOMMENDATION THAT RESPONDENT RECEIVE NO 
DISCIPLINE AS A RESULT OF HIS CONDUCT GIVING 
RISE TO THE CHARGES IN FORMAL COMPLAINT 
F-519 IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The finding that there was no harm to the public as valid 
grounds for taking no disciplinary action against an attorney who 
misappropriates funds from a law firm is clearly erroneous. 
(Finding 11 on page 4) In the case of North Carolina State Bar 
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v. Nelson, 9110NCSB789, October 6, 1992, an attorney received 
payment for legal services which he failed to deliver to his law 
firm because he believed the firm owed him money. The Court held 
that this constituted more than a simple partnership dispute and 
amounted to dishonesty for which the lawyer was suspended for 
nine months. A copy of this opinion is attached as Appendix I 
and incorporated herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent violated Rule 1.13(b), SAFEKEEPING OF PROPERTY, 
and Rule 8.4(c), MISCONDUCT, of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Respondent converted money from the law firm with which 
he was associated and to whom he owed a duty of good faith and 
fair dealing. He violated the trust and confidence placed in him 
by his associates. Disbarment or a substantial period of 
suspension with full restitution as a condition precedent to 
reinstatement is clearly warranted for this misconduct. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FORMAL COMPLAINT F-519 
1. On or about January 1989, Bryant D. Cragun, entered into 
negotiations with Mr. Rick Yagi for the acquisition of a publicly 
held corporation. 
2. It was agreed between these parties that Mr. Cragun 
would deposit $25,000.00 into Respondent's trust account to be 
used for the sole purpose of acquiring a corporation satisfactory 
to and approved by Mr. Cragun. 
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3. On or about January 19, 1989, Mr. Cragun caused check 
No. 1021 from WAC Research, one of Mr. Cragun's companies, in the 
amount of $5,000.00, made payable to Respondent's trust account, 
to be delivered to Respondent for the purpose stated above. A 
copy of this check and Respondent's trust account deposit slip 
are attached hereto as Appendix J and incorporated herein. This 
exhibit shows that the entire $5,000.00 was deposited into the 
trust account. 
4. On or about January 30, 1989, Mr. Cragun caused check 
No. 491 from Wilmark Corporation, another of Mr. Cragun's 
companies, in the amount of $5,000.00, payable to Respondent's 
trust account, to be delivered to Respondent for the purpose 
stated above. A copy of this check and Respondent's trust 
account deposit slip are attached hereto as Appendix K and 
incorporated herein. This deposit slip shows that $4,925.00 was 
deposited into the trust account and that Respondent kept $75.00 
in cash. 
5. On or about February 2, 1989, Mr. Cragun caused check 
No. 1124 from Newcap Scientific Corp., another of Mr. Cragun's 
companies, in the amount of $12,000.00, payable to Respondent's 
trust account, to be delivered to Respondent for the purpose 
stated above. A copy of this check and Respondent's trust 
account deposit slip are attached hereto as Appendix L and 
incorporated herein. This deposit slip shows that $8,000.00 was 
deposited into the trust account and that Respondent kept 
$4,000.00 in cash. 
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6. On or about February 14, 1989, Mr. Cragun caused check 
No. 1125 from Newcap Scientific Corp. in the amount of $3,000.00, 
payable to Respondent's trust account, to be delivered to 
Respondent for the purpose stated above. A copy of this check 
and Respondent's trust account deposit slip are attached hereto 
as Appendix M and incorporated herein. This deposit slip shows 
that $2,500.00 was deposited into the trust account and that 
Respondent kept $500.00 in cash. 
7. The above-described exhibits verify that instead of 
depositing Mr. Cragun's $25,000.00 in his trust account, as he 
was required to do. Respondent deposited only $20,425.00 and kept 
cash for himself in the amount of $4,575.00. This was contrary 
to the express instructions of Mr. Cragun and contrary to 
Respondent's fiduciary duties as trustee of these funds. 
Respondent converted the sum of $4,575.00 by withholding funds 
that should have been placed in his trust account. These facts 
are unequivocally established by the record and were apparently 
ignored by the Hearing Panel. 
8. After the above-described funds were delivered to 
Respondent, Mr. Yagi failed to find a corporation satisfactory to 
Mr. Cragun. Accordingly, on or about March 7, 1989, Mr. Cragun's 
attorney directed Respondent to return the $25,000.00 he was 
holding in trust for Mr. Cragun. 
9. On or about March 16, 1989 Respondent returned to Mr. 
Cragun the sum of $6,000.00. On or about October 14, 1992, the 
day before the hearing on this complaint, Respondent refunded an 
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additional $7,000.00. Subsequently, he informed the Hearing 
Panel that he would reimburse Mr. Cragun the additional sum of 
$13,000.00 no later than December 31, 1992. Respondent did not 
keep this promise to the Hearing Panel as evidenced by the 
Affidavit of Robert J. Dale attached hereto as Appendix N and 
incorporated herein. The Board appears to have made it's 
findings and recommendation partially in reliance upon 
Respondent's promise to make this additional restitution. 
10. On or about March 2, 1990, Mr. Cragun obtained a 
Default Judgment against Respondent in the Third Judicial 
District Court for the conversion of the $19,000.00. A copy of 
this default judgment is incorporated into the Formal Complaint 
and was served on Respondent on or about December 30, 1991, in 
the above-entitled action. A copy of the civil Complaint, 
Default and Formal Complaint are attached hereto as Appendix 0 
and incorporated herein. 
11. Respondent did not respond to the Formal Complaint and, 
on February 12, 1992, he was served with a Notice of Intent to 
Default. He still did not respond to the Formal Complaint and on 
March 5, 1992, Default was entered. Copies of these documents 
are attached hereto as Appendix P and incorporated herein. 
12. The facts set forth in the Formal Complaint are 
established by Respondent's default in Civil Case No. 
890903670CV, in the Third Judicial District Court, which default 
is incorporated into the Formal Complaint, and also by 
Respondent's Default to the Formal Complaint in the above-
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entitled action. Additionally, Mr. Bryant D. Craoun testified as 
to the validity of the facts in the Formal Complaint. 
13. The bank statement, showing the status of Respondent's 
trust account at Continental Bank, now West One Bank, for the 
period of January 31, 1989 through February 28, 1989, verifies 
that by the end of February, 1989, the balance of the trust 
account was only $5,940.48. This means that of the $20,425.00, 
deposited in trust for Mr. Cragun, $14,484.52 was gone in less 
than 30 days. This is in addition to the $4,575.00 that was 
previously converted. A copy of this document is attached as 
Appendix 0 and incorporated herein. In spite of these facts the 
Hearing Panel did not find Respondent's conduct to be 
intentional. 
14. Notwithstanding that the above stated facts had been 
established by two defaults, the Office of Bar Counsel offered 
Respondent the opportunity, in or about March, 1992, to account 
for these funds as a matter in extenuation or mitigation. 
Respondent accounted for only about $5,000.00 of the missing 
funds. The facts and applicable violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct have been judicially established by default 
as well as by clear and convincing evidence admitted at the 
trial. 
15. Based on the Default, which was never set aside, 
Respondent had the burden to submit matters in extenuation, 
mitigation or explanation as to how or why these funds were 
converted. He offered no mitigation or extenuation other than 
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personal problems. The law is unequivocal that personal problems 
are not justification or excuse for theft, Matter of Bell, Infra. 
16. The facts established by the testimony of Mr. Cragun 
and Mr. Yagi were that the negotiations for the acquisition of a 
corporation were between Mr. Cragun and Mr. Yagi, that 
Respondent's involvement was that of trustee of Mr. Cragun's 
funds. Assuming Respondent's version of the facts to be true, he 
was to deposit all of those funds in his trust account and only 
disburse them for the purpose of purchasing a corporation for Mr. 
Cragun. The facts of record are that Respondent did not deposit 
the entire $25,000.00 in his trust account, but that he withheld 
$4,575.00 in cash, that Mr. Cragun never approved the purchase of 
any corporation, that no stock in any corporation was given or 
tendered to Mr. Cragun and that, when Respondent's services were 
terminated, he returned only $6,000.00 to Mr. Cragun. 
17. During the course of the trial, Respondent attempted to 
account for the missing $19,000.00 by alleging that stock had 
been purchased for Mr. Cragun. In support of that allegation, 
Respondent offered into evidence stock certificates of National 
Thoroughbred Corporation that contained nothing on their face to 
indicate when they were purchased or for whom they were 
purchased. In rebuttal, Mr. Cragun testified these stock 
certificates were not purchased for him, that he had never heard 
of National Thoroughbred Corporation, and he was never provided 
stock in this or any corporation by Respondent or Mr. Yagi. Mr 
Yagi also testified the most he had ever been given by Respondent 
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from the Cragun funds was $5,000.00 which was for expenses, not 
for the purchase of stock. 
18. Respondent also provided a letter he had written on 
September 21, 1992, wherein he lists checks from his trust 
account totaling $19,250.00. In that letter Respondent states 
that he and Mr. Yagi had together identified these checks as 
being checks that were issued on behalf of Mr. Cragun. At the 
trial Mr. Yagi refuted Respondent's letter by testifying he had 
not assisted Respondent in identifying the checks listed in his 
letter and by reaffirming his Affidavit that the most he had ever 
received from Respondent's trust account for Mr. Cragun was 
$5,000.00 and that was for expenses not for stock. 
Formal Complaint F-520 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
THE FINDINGS OF THE HEARING PANEL ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS 
1. The finding of the Hearing Panel that Respondent 
prepared opinion letters and other documents to facilitate the 
purchase of stock for his client are clearly erroneous. 
2. The finding of the Hearing Panel that Respondent 
received only $1250.00 from the funds on deposit in his trust 
account for the benefit of Mr. Cragun is clearly erroneous. 
3. The implication of the Hearing Panel that checks payable 
to Rick Yagi from his trust account in the amount of $11,250.00 
were legitimate expenses on behalf of his client Mr. Cragun is 
clearly erroneous. 
26 
4. The Hearing Panel's findings that the misappropriation 
of Mr. Cragun's funds by Respondent is explained by inexperience 
and incompetence are clearly erroneous. 
5. The matters set forth in Formal Complaint F-520 are 
established by default. The default was never set aside. 
6. The Hearing Panel's finding, and recommendation, that 
the appropriate sanction is an admonition and a class in ethics 
is clearly erroneous. 
I 
THE FINDING OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT RESPONDENT 
PREPARED OPINION LETTERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 
TO FACILITATE THE PURCHASE OF STOCK FOR HIS 
CLIENT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Finding 15 on page 8 is clearly erroneous. This finding 
states: "Respondent did prepare opinion letters and other 
documents to facilitate stock purchase transactions for the 
benefit of Mr. Cragun.'• The only testimony in support of this 
finding is the testimony of Respondent and some letters dated 
March 21, 1989, that he introduced into evidence with the 
explanation that these were opinion letters written to facilitate 
the purchase of stock for Mr. Cragun. These letters are attached 
as Appendix R. 
The evidence which shows this finding to be clearly 
erroneous consists of the testimony of Mr. Cragun, Mr. Yagi, and 
the letters themselves. The letters bear nothing on their face 
to show they were written for the benefit of Mr. Cragun. 
Further, the letters were dated March 21, 1989. Mr. Cragun 
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terminated his relationship with Respondent on or before March 
16, 1989, and demanded the return of the money being held in 
trust by Respondent in his trust account. Respondent refunded 
the balance of the money remaining in his trust account, 
$6,000.00, on March 16, 1989, before the letters were allegedly 
written for Mr. Cragun. 
It is inconceivable that Respondent would continue to 
purchase stock for Mr. Cragun after he had cancelled the 
agreement and demanded the return of his money. Additionally, 
Mr. Cragun testified that he was never informed by Respondent or 
Mr. Yagi that they had purchased any stock in any corporation on 
his behalf, they never provided him any stock and he had never 
heard of National Thoroughbred Corporation, the corporation 
allegedly purchased for Mr. Cragun. (Record of Hearing Pages 89 
through 91) Mr. Yagi testified that he only received $5,000.00 
from Respondent's trust account in connection with his dealings 
for Mr. Cragun was for expenses not for the purchase of stock. 
(Record of Hearing Pages 63 through 89) 
II 
THE FINDING OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT RESPONDENT 
RECEIVED ONLY $1250.00 FROM THE FUNDS ON 
DEPOSIT IN HIS TRUST ACCOUNT FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF MR. CRAGUN IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Portions of finding 18 on page 8 are clearly erroneous. 
This finding states: 
Yagi received approximately $5,000 for expenses. Shupe 
received a fee of $1,250. There were presented by the 
bar copies of checks totaling $11,250 all of which was 
paid to Yagi except $1,250.00 paid to Yagi's brother, 
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Randy Yagi, for expenses. Records were not kept 
documenting the reasons for these disbursements. 
Two portions of this finding are clearly erroneous. The first is 
the finding and implication that Respondent received only 
$1,250.00 of the funds entrusted to him by Mr. Cragun. The 
evidence of record shows that Respondent drafted a check payable 
to himself from his trust account in this amount on or about 
January 19, 1989. A copy of this check is attached hereto as 
Appendix S and incorporated herein. The Office of Bar Counsel 
does not dispute that Respondent paid himself this amount in 
fees. However, the evidence of record shows that, in addition 
to the $1,250.00 which Respondent paid to himself from the trust 
account, Respondent also received $4,575.00 from funds paid to 
him by Mr. Cragun that were never deposited in his trust account. 
The record showing that Respondent received $4,575.00 in 
cash consists of the trust account deposit slips relating to the 
four payments made to Respondent by Mr. Cragun. Respondent was 
given checks from Mr. Cragun totaling $25,000.00 for deposit into 
his trust account. He deposited only $20,425.00 and kept cash 
for himself in the amount of $4,575.00. These documents were 
admitted into evidence at the Hearing. At the Hearing Respondent 
was asked about this cash he had retained from the deposits. In 
each instance he claimed that he gave this cash to Mr. Yagi. 
(Record of Hearing Pages 99 through 100) 
This explanation is inconsistent with the evidence. When 
Respondent's services were terminated my Mr. Cragun, on or before 
March 16, 1989, he refunded $6,000.00 to Mr. Cragun leaving 
29 
unaccounted for the sum of $19,000.00. In his letter of 
September 21, 1992, Respondent explained that the missing 
$19,000.00 belonging to Mr. Cragun was fully accounted for by the 
checks listed in the letter. If Respondent's allegations are 
true, that the entire $19,000.00 is accounted for in the checks 
listed in his letter of September 21, 1992, then is testimony 
that he gave Mr. Yagi almost $5,000.00 in cash is false. If he 
gave Mr. Yagi almost $5,000.00 in cash then his allegation that 
the missing $19,000.00 is accounted for in the checks listed in 
his letter of September 21, 1992, is false. 
Both of Respondent's contradictory explanations conflict 
with the testimony of Mr. Yagi which was that he never got more 
than $5,000.00 from Respondent's trust account and he made no 
mention of these payments being in currency. Mr. Yagi never 
specifically stated whether he got the money in cash or checks, 
however, in reading his testimony, he said he went to Mr. Shupe 
when he needed money for the Cragun deal and Mr. Shupe gave him 
money out of his trust account. (Record of Hearing page 65) The 
plain meaning of this testimony is that he funds were paid to him 
by check from the trust account. It would indeed be a 
coincidence that Respondent happened to be depositing a check 
from Mr. Cragun each time Mr. Yagi needed money so that cash 
could be obtained from the deposit in lieu of issuing him a 
check. It is also important to note that in his letter of 
September 21, 1992, Respondent claims that all of the money paid 
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to Mr. Yagi was paid by check. He makes no mention of ever 
having given Mr. Yagi any cash. 
Respondent never provided any evidence, other than his 
unsubstantiated allegation, that the cash he took from the 
deposit of Mr. Cragun's checks was spent on behalf of Mr. Cragun. 
In fact, the record contradicts Respondent's testimony regarding 
his disposition of this cash. This misappropriation of funds was 
apparently ignored by the Hearing Panel. 
Ill 
THE IMPLICATION OF THE HEARING PANEL THAT CHECKS 
PAYABLE TO RICK YAGI FROM RESPONDENT'S TRUST 
ACCOUNT IN THE AMOUNT OF $11,250.00 WERE 
LEGITIMATE EXPENSES ON BEHALF OF 
MR. CRAGUN IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The implication that checks, totaling $11,250.00, paid to 
Rick Yagi and a check in the amount of $1,250.00 paid to Yagi's 
brother, Randy Yagi, were disbursements made on behalf of Mr. 
Cragun is clearly erroneous. Mr. Yagi testified and submitted an 
Affidavit to the effect that the most he received from Respondent 
on behalf of Mr. Cragun was $5,000.00. (Record of Hearing Page 64 
and page 76) He further testified that he did a lot of deals 
with Respondent for which he received funds from Respondent's 
trust account and that they were unrelated to this deal with Mr. 
Cragun. Many checks to Mr. Yagi from Respondent bore notations 
to indicate they were unrelated to Mr. Cragun. Therefore, it was 
clearly erroneous for the Hearing Panel to conclude or imply that 
Respondent gave Mr. Yagi more than $5,000.00 of Mr. Cragun's 
money. There is virtually no evidence that Mr. Yagi's brother 
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was ever given any funds from the trust account for the benefit 
of Mr. Cragun. 
IV 
THE HEARING PANEL'S FINDINGS THAT THE 
MISAPPROPRIATION OF MR. CRAGUN'S FUNDS 
BY RESPONDENT IS EXPLAINED BY INEXPERIENCE 
AND INCOMPETENCE ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The Hearing Panel's findings on page 9 of their Findings to 
the effect that the misappropriation of Mr. Cragun's funds is 
explained by inexperience and incompetence are clearly erroneous. 
There is no evidence of record to support a finding of negligence 
or incompetence. The evidence shows that about $5,000.00 was 
paid to Mr. Yagi, Respondent paid himself $1,250.00 by check and 
$6,000.00 was returned to Mr. Cragun on March 16, 1989. Taking 
the evidence in a light most favorable to Respondent, by assuming 
these payments to Mr. Yagi and Respondent were legitimate 
expenditures, this accounts only for $12,250.00 or less than half 
of the $25,000.00 given to Respondent. 
The evidence that shows Respondent misappropriated no less 
than $12,750.00. He did this by skimming $4,575.00 from the four 
payments given him for deposit in the trust account, as evidenced 
by his trust account deposit slips. This leaves a balance of 
$8,175.00 which was missing from the trust account. Respondent 
provided no evidence to show it was spent for the benefit of Mr. 
Cragun and there is no evidence in the record that Respondent 
spent this money through inexperience, mistake, or incompetence. 
The money was inexplicably missing. This is conversion as a 
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matter of law, Nebraska State Bar v. Veith, 470 N.W.2d 549 (Neb. 
1991). A copy of this case was provided to the Hearing Panel and 
is attached hereto as Appendix T and incorporated herein. 
V 
THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN FORMAL COMPLAINT 
F-520 WERE ESTABLISHED BY DEFAULT AND THE 
DEFAULT WAS NEVER SET ASIDE. 
The matters set forth in Formal Complaint F-520 were 
established by default. The default was never set aside by the 
Hearing Panel. The Office of Bar Counsel never waived the 
default but did give Respondent wide latitude to present matters 
in extenuation and mitigation. 
On page 5 of their findings the Hearing Panel implies that 
the Office of Bar Counsel waived the entry of the Default 
Judgment in this case. This conclusion is clearly erroneous. 
During the course of the Hearing Respondent made a verbal Motion 
to Set Aside the Default. The Hearing Panel denied the verbal 
motion and informed Respondent that if he wanted to make such a 
motion that he should do so in writing. (Record of Hearing page 
44) Respondent never submitted a written motion to set aside the 
default. The Office of Bar Counsel has always proceeded on this 
case under the belief that the allegations in the Formal 
Complaint were already established and that this was a Sanctions 
Hearing. If it was the intention of the Hearing Panel to set 
aside the default they should have specifically done so and 
afforded the Office of Bar Counsel the opportunity to try this 
case accordingly. 
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Formal Complaint F-520 incorporates by reference a default 
judgment entered against Respondent in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Appendix 0. In this judgment Respondent was 
found to have wrongfully converted the funds of Mr. Cragun which 
entitled Mr. Cragun to punitive damages in the amount of 
$100,000.00. 
VI 
THE HEARING PANEL'S FINDING, AND RECOMMENDATION, 
THAT THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION IS AN ADMONITION 
AND A CLASS IN ETHICS IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, 
AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
This recommendation of the Hearing Panel is inconsistent. 
If Respondent's misconduct is explained by incompetence and 
inexperience then why did the Hearing Panel require that he take 
a course in ethics? If the Hearing Panel really believed that 
incompetence and inexperience explains his conduct then he should 
be required to take a course in law office management. 
The appropriate sanction, considering that there were 
multiple acts of misappropriation and considering the amount of 
money involved, is disbarment absent strong mitigating or 
extenuating circumstances. With strong mitigating and 
extenuating circumstances, Respondent should receive no less than 
a substantial period of suspension with restitution as a 
condition precedent to reinstatement. There is no strong 
mitigation or extenuation. 
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The fact that Respondent made restitution of an additional 
$7,000.00 the day before the trial is not mitigation. The 
commentary in ABA Standard 9.4 states: 
Lawyers who make restitution only after a disciplinary 
proceeding has been instituted against them, however, 
cannot be regarded as acting out of a sense of 
responsibility for their misconduct, but, instead, as 
attempting to circumvent the operation of the 
disciplinary system, (emphasis added) 
The guidelines for imposing sanctions in attorney discipline 
cases are set forth in the American Bar Association Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and were adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of In Re Crandall, 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989) 
Standard 3.0 of the American Bar Association Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that the factors to be 
considered in imposing sanctions include the duty violated, the 
lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused, and 
the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Standard 
4.11 states: Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client. The least amount of discipline described in 
this section is Standard 4.14 dealing with admonitions and states 
that an admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is 
negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no 
actual or potential injury to a client. There is virtually no 
evidence that Respondent's conduct regarding the money he took 
from his law firm or the money he took from Mr. Cragun was the 
result of negligence. There is no evidence to support the 
conclusion that Respondent's failure to return or account for all 
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of Mr. Cragun's money constituted little or no actual or 
potential injury. There is no evidence to support the conclusion 
that Respondent's theft of the money from his law firm caused 
little or no harm to the firm. 
Standard 5.11(b) of the American Bar Association Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions states that disbarment is generally 
appropriate when a lawyer engages in any intentional misconduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that 
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. 
Standard 7.1 states: Disbarment is generally appropriate 
when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of 
a duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit 
for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially 
serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. 
Standard 9.22 sets forth the matters that can be considered 
in aggravation. These include, dishonest or selfish motive and a 
pattern of misconduct. The evidence in Formal Complaint F-520 
conclusively established that Respondent converted no less than 
512,750.00. Additionally, the facts in Formal Complaint F-519 
show that Respondent misappropriated funds with which he was 
entrusted that were the property of his former law firm. These 
two cases show a pattern of misconduct that demand disbarment or 
other severe sanction. 
Standard 9.22 also states that another matter to be 
considered in aggravation is a Respondent's refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. In both 
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F-519 and F-520, Respondent has refused to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his misconduct in the face of overwhelming 
evidence. A person who cannot or will not recognize that he is 
engaging in prohibited conduct will repeat that conduct if 
afforded the opportunity to do so. 
In the Matter of Bell, 596 A.2d 752 (N.J. 1991), the Supreme 
Court of the State of New Jersey found that knowing 
misappropriation of funds, even though the use of the funds was 
not for the attorney's personal gain, was grounds for disbarment 
despite severe personal problems being experienced by the 
attorney. A copy of this case is attached hereto as Appendix U 
and incorporated herein. The Supreme Court of Nebraska found 
that misappropriation of funds is grounds for disbarment. The 
court also found that the act of conversion is complete when the 
trust account balance falls below the amount that should be in 
the account for the client. Nebraska State Bar v. Veith, 470 
N.W.2d 549 (Neb. 1991). The Supreme Court of California held 
that misappropriation of client funds warrants disbarment in Grim 
v. The State Bar of California, 805 P.2d 941 (CA 1991). A copy 
of this case is attached as Appendix V and incorporated herein. 
On March 8, 1993 the Board of Bar Commissioners entered an 
Order and Recommendation for Discipline in the case of Churchy v. 
Wahlquist, F-484 wherein they recommended disbarment based upon 
two incidents of misappropriation of funds. A copy of this 
Order is attached as Appendix W and incorporated herein. The 
action taken in the Wahlcruist case was clearly appropriate. The 
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even handed administration of attorney discipline demands that 
Mr. Shupe receive substantially the same discipline as Mr. 
Wahlquist. 
These cases show that states from the east coast through the 
midwest to the west coast have adopted and follow the rule that 
misappropriation of funds warrants disbarment. The Office of Bar 
Counsel submits that the citizens of the State of Utah have every 
right to expect that attorneys in this State will be held to the 
same high standards as the attorneys in our sister states. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts and law applicable to Formal Complaints F-519 
and F-520 lead to the just and proper conclusion that the 
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Hearing Panel 
are clearly erroneous. There is also a substantial indication 
that the Hearing Panel entered its recommendation of discipline 
based upon Respondent's promise to reimburse Mr. Cragun the sum 
of $13,000.00 not later than December 31, 1992. Respondent 
failed to keep that promise. The appropriate sanction to be 
entered against Respondent is disbarment, or a substantial period 
of suspension with restitution, and payment of costs. As a 
minimum Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law 
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for not less than two (2) years with full restitution as a 
condition precedent to reinstatement. 
DATED this /jKT^&ay of $?*?/ ^ , 1993. 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
fendell K. Smith 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to William Shupe, at 333 Civic 
Center Drive West, Santa Ana, CA 92701, on this /2_£~~day of 
''<- , 1993. 
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F I L E D 
APR 2 1 1993 
CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST CO. 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, NJ 07044 
RE: DELIVERY OF STOCK CERTIFICATES AND ESCROW ACCOUNT 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
Pursuant to the ten (10) enclosed opinion letters for Mssrs. 
Goldberg; Hammond; Jacobson; Lake; Lieberman; Mauro; Pagano; 
Rinaldi; Rosenthal; and Zipern (the "Shareholders"), I will inform 
you that the share certificates you issued to the Shareholders will 
be delivered to my escrow account. As soon as the shares 
represented by the share certificates are sold, Mr. Yagi will 
arrange for payment therefor in the amount of thirty-five thousand 
dollars ($35,000). 
Your cooperation is assisting the Shareholders is greatly 
appreciated. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
March 21, 1989 
Mr, Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Bernard 
C. Zipern; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company") , you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion11) as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Bernard C. Zipern (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Bernard C. Zipern which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Zipern1s knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Zipernfs immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Zipern paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Zipern is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Zipern on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Zipern in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Zipernfs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Zipernfs immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Zipern is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Zipernfs holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Seymour 
Rosenthal; Number of Shares held: 44,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Seymour Rosenthal (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Seymour Rosenthal which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Rosenthal's knowledge, no members 
of Mr. Rosenthalfs immediate family or others have sold any 
shares of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5- That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Rosenthal paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Rosenthal is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Rosenthal on 
July 25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Rosenthal in excess of 
three (3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Rosenthal's knowledge, no members 
of Mr. Rosenthal's immediate family or others have sold any 
shares of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d)8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Rosenthal is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Rosenthalfs holding of the Shares 
meets the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07 04 4 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Frank 
Rinaldi; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Frank Rinaldi (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Frank Rinaldi which are relevant 
to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The following 
representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Rinaldifs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Rinaldifs immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company1s 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Rinaldi paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Rinaldi is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Rinaldi on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Rinaldi in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Rinaldi fs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Rinaldifs immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Rinaldi is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr- Rinaldi!s holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Frank X. 
Pagano; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Frank X. Pagano (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Frank X. Pagano which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Paganofs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Pagano!s immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Pagano paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Pagano is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Pagano on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Pagano in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Pagano's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Paganofs immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Pagano is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Paganofs holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Salvatore 
Mauro; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Salvatore Mauro (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Salvatore Mauro which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ; 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Mauro's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Mauro' s immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90)* days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5* That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Mauro paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Mauro is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Mauro on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Mauro in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ; 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Mauro's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Mauro's immediate family or others have sold any shares of 
the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
Mr- Hyman Manger 
New Jersey Transfer 
March 21, 1989 
Page 3 
8, That Mr. Mauro is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr, Maurofs holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Daniel L. 
Liberman; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Daniel L. Liberman (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Daniel L. Liberman which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Liberman's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Liberman!s immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Liberman paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Liberman is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Liberman on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Liberman in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Liberman fs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Libermanfs immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
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8. That Mr. Liberman is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr, Liberman's holding of the Shares 
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
201 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Walter J. 
Lake, Sr.; Number of Shares held: 46,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Walter J. Lake, Sr. (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Walter J. Lake, Sr. which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ; 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Lake's knowledge, no members of Mr. 
Lakefs immediate family or others have sold any shares of the 
Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company!s 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr- Lake paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 1985, 
and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date free 
and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present time; 
and 
7. That Mr. Lake is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Lake on July 25, 
1985, and have been held by Mr. Lake in excess of three (3) 
years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ; 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Lake's knowledge, no members of Mr. 
Lake's immediate family or others have sold any shares of the 
Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently onemillion 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
New Jersey Transfer 
March 21, 1989 
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8. That: Mr. Lake is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Lake's holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 07044 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Marc 
Jacobson; Number of Shares held: 50,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company") , you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Marc Jacobson (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Marc Jacobson which are relevant 
to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The following 
representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Jacobson!s knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Jacobsonfs immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
Mr- Hyman Manger 
New Jersey Transfer 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6- That Mr. Jacobson paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Jacobson is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Jacobson on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Jacobson in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Jacobsonfs knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Jacobson's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
New Jersey Transfer 
March 21, 1989 
Page 3 
8. That Mr. Jacobson is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Jacobson's holding of the Shares 
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 0704 4 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Richard 
Hammond; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Richard Hammond (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Richard Hammond which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Hammond's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Hammond's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Hammond paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr. Hammond is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Hammond on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Hammond in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Hammond's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Hammond's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
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8. That Mr. Hammond is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Hammond's holding of the Shares meets 
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9) 
March 21, 1989 
Mr- Hyman Manger 
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY 
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue 
Vernon, New Jersey 0704 4 
RE: Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Harvey M. 
Goldberg; Number of Shares held: 46,000 Shares Plus Warrants 
Dear Mr. Manger: 
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation 
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as 
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Harvey M. Goldberg (the 
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would 
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in 
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding 
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3). 
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have 
relied upon representations by Mr. Harvey M. Goldberg which are 
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The 
following representations have been made to us: 
1. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
3. That to the best of Mr. Goldberg's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Goldberg's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
4. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
Mr- Hyman Manger 
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5. That the Company has represented to you there are 
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one 
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's 
issued and outstanding common stock; 
6. That Mr. Goldberg paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date 
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present 
time; and 
7. That Mr, Goldberg is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion: 
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Goldberg on July 
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Goldberg in excess of three 
(3) years; 
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly 
available information and accessible to potential purchasers; 
3. That the Shares are restricted securities, within the 
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3); 
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any 
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office; 
5. That to the best of Mr. Goldberg's knowledge, no members of 
Mr. Goldberg's immediate family or others have sold any shares 
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years; 
6. That the Company has provided information to you establi-
shing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of 
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period 
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required 
thereunder during the preceding year; 
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of 
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million 
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued 
and outstanding common stock; and 
Mr. Hyman Manger 
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8. Tha^ t Mr. Goldberg is not an officer, director, employee or 
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director, 
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3) 
months. 
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to 
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Goldberg's holding of the Shares 
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all 
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted. 
Very truly yours, 
William R. Shupe 
WRS/bk 
(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9) 
$5,344.75 Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 September 1989 
Promissory Note 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, WILLIAM R. SHUPE, whose 
addness is 7050 Union Park Boulevard, Suite 545, Midvale, Utah 
84047 ("Maker"), promises to pay to the order of JARDINE, 
LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, and to any 
subsequent holders hereof (such parties being collectively referred 
to herein as "Holder"), at 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, or at such other place as Holder may 
designate from time to time in writing, in lawful money of the 
United States of America, the principal" amount of Five Thousand 
Three Hundred Forty-four and 75/100ths Dollars ($5,344.75), 
together with interest on the declining unpaid principal balance 
hereunder at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date 
hereof until paid, according to the terms and conditions that are 
set forth in this promissory note (this "Note"): 
1. Payments. Maker shall pay Holder (a) quarterly interest 
installments of $133.62 each on 1 December 1989, 1 March 1990 and 
1 June 1990 and (b) the total unpaid principal balance hereof, 
together with all interest that is due thereon, on or before 1 
September 1990. 
2. Penalty for Past Due Payments. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of paragraph 1 or any other provisions of this Note to 
the contrary, if Maker defaults hereunder, the entire unpaid 
principal balance of this Note, all accrued but unpaid interest 
thereon and all other amounts that are payable hereunder shall bear 
interest for the period beginning with the date of occurrence of 
such default at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum until 
the default is cured. This default rate of interest shall remain 
in effect (both before and after judgment) until the delinguent 
payments hereunder and all costs of collection have been paid in 
full. Payment of the increased interest amount, together with any 
other amounts that are due under this Note, shall be a condition 
precedent to curing the default. 
3. Application of Payments. All payments and prepayments 
that are made hereunder shall be applied first toward the payment 
and satisfaction of accrued but unpaid interest and second toward 
reduction of the principal balance. 
4. Prepayment. The outstanding principal balance hereof, 
together with accrued interest thereon, may be prepaid at any time 
before maturity, in whole or in part, without penalty. Maker's 
partial prepayment under this Note shall not relieve Maker of the 
obligation to make installment payments hereunder in their next 
obligation to make installment payments hereunder in their next 
succeeding order of due date; provided, however, that the amount 
of such installments shall be applied in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 3 of this Note. 
5. Security, This Note is unsecured. 
6. Default. Maker shall be in default under this Note if a 
payment or any part thereof that is due under this Note is not made 
within five* (5) days after the due date of such payment. If 
default does so occur then Holder, at Holder's option and without 
notice to Maker, may declare the entire unpaid principal balance 
hereunder, together with all accrued interest thereon, immediately 
due and payable, and Maker shall pay all costs and expenses that 
are incurred by Holder (including, but not limited to, a reasonable 
attorneys' fee) to collect such past due amounts, whether such 
costs and expenses are incurred with or without suit or before or 
after judgment. 
7. Assignability of Note. Maker's obligations under this Note 
shall not be assumable by any person or entity without Holder's 
prior written consent. Notwithstanding any such assumption, 
however, the original Maker shall remain fully liable to Holder for 
the performance of all of the obligations under this Note. 
8- Waiver. Holder may accept late payments or partial 
payments under this Note and may delay enforcing any of Holder's 
rights hereunder without losing or waiving any of Holder's rights 
under this Note. 
9. Liability of Parties Under Note. The makers, sureties, 
guarantors and indorsers hereof, jointly and severally: (a) waive 
presentment for payment, protest, demand and notice of dishonor and 
nonpayment of this Note and all other requirements necessary to 
hold them liable hereunder; and (b) consent to any and all 
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be 
granted by Holder with respect to the payment or other provisions 
of this Note. Holder's enforcement of any security for the payment 
of this Note shall not constitute an election by Holder of remedies 
so as to preclude Holder's exercise of any other remedy available 
to Holder. 
10. Interpretation; Jurisdiction. The provisions of this 
Note: (a) shall be interpreted and governed in accordance with the 
laws of the state of Utah; and (b) shall be deemed to be 
independent and severable. The invalidity or partial invalidity 
of any one provision or portion of this Note shall not affect the 
validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Note. 
Time is the essence of this Note. Further, in consideration of the 
financial accommodations represented by this Note and in order to 
induce Holder to extend those accommodations, the parties 
constituting Maker hereby expressly subject themselves to the 
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connection with this Note. 
11* Joint and Several Liability; Jurisdiction. All of the 
obligations of Maker under this Note shall be the joint and several 
obligations of each party that composes Maker from time to time. 
This Promissory Note replaces a Promissory Note of 1 December 
1990 in the principal amount of $5,669.42 
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$5,669.42 Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 December 19 9 0 
Promissory Note 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, WILLIAM R- SHUPE, whose 
address is 923 Executive Park Drive, #C, Salt Lake City, Utah 
841<|7 ("Maker"), promises to pay to the order of JARDINE, 
L.INERAUGH, BROWN & DUNN, A PROFESSIONAL, CORPORATION, and to any 
subsequent holders hereof (such parties being collectively referred 
to herein as "Holder"), at 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, or at such other place as Holder may 
designate from time to time in writing, in lawful money of the 
United States of America, the principal amount of Five Thousand Six 
Hundred Sixty-nine and 42/100ths Dollars ($5,669.42), together with 
interest on the declining unpaid principal balance hereunder at the 
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date hereof until 
paid, according to the terms and conditions that are set forth in 
this promissory note (this "Note"): 
1. Payments. Maker shall pay Holder monthly interest 
installments of $47.25 each on January 1, 1991 and the same day of 
each consecutive calendar month thereafter until June 1, 1991, when 
the entire"principal balance, together with all interest that is 
due thereon, shall be due and payable in full. 
2. Penalty for Past Due Payments. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of paragraph 1 or any other provisions of this Note to 
the contrary, if Maker defaults hereunder, the entire unpaid 
principal balance of this Note, all accrued but unpaid interest 
thereon and all other amounts that are payable hereunder shall bear 
interest for the period beginning with the date of occurrence of 
such default at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum until 
the default is cured. This default rate of interest shall remain 
in effect (both before and after judgment) until the delinquent 
payments hereunder and all costs of collection have been paid in 
full. Payment of the increased interest amount, together with any 
other amounts that are due under this Note, shall be a condition 
precedent to curing the default. 
3. Application of Payments. All payments and prepayments 
that are made hereunder shall be applied first toward the payment 
and satisfaction of accrued but unpaid interest and second toward 
reduction of the principal balance. 
4. Prepayment. The outstanding principal balance hereof, 
together with accrued interest thereon, may be prepaid at any time 
before maturity, in whole or in part, without penalty. Maker's 
partial prepayment under this Note shall not relieve Maker of the 
obligation to make installment payments hereunder in their next 
succeeding order of due date; provided, however, that the amount of 
such installments shall be applied in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 3 of this Note. 
5. Security. This Note is unsecured. 
6. Default, Maker shall be in default under this Note if a 
payment or any part thereof that is due under this Note is not made 
within five (5) days after the due date of such payment. if 
default does eo occur then Holder, at Holder's option and without 
notice to Maker, may declare the entire unpaid principal balance 
hereunder, together with all accrued interest thereon, immediately 
due and payable, and Maker shall pay all costs and expenses that 
are incurred by Holder (including, but not limited to, a reasonable 
attorneys' fee) to collect such past due amounts, whether such 
costs and expenses are incurred with or without suit or before or 
after judgment. 
7. Assumability of Note. Maker's obligations under this Note 
shall not be assumable by any person or entity without Holder's 
prior written consent. Notwithstanding any such assumption, 
however, the original Maker shall remain fully liable to Holder for 
the performance of all of the obligations under this Note. 
8- Waiver. Holder may accept late payments or partial 
payments under this Note and may delay enforcing any of Holder's 
rights hereunder without losing or waiving any of Holder's rights 
under this Note. 
9. Liability of Parties Under Note. The makers, sureties, 
guarantors and indorsers hereof, jointly and severally: (a) waive 
presentment for payment, protest, demand and notice of dishonor and 
nonpayment of this Note and all other requirements necessary to 
hold them liable hereunder; and (b) consent to any and all 
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be 
granted by Holder with respect to the payment or other provisions 
of this Note. Holder's enforcement of any security for the payment 
of this Note shall not constitute an election by Holder of remedies 
so as to preclude Holder's exercise of any other remedy available 
to Holder. 
10. Interpretation; Jurisdiction. The provisions of this 
Note: (a) shall be interpreted and governed in accordance with the 
laws of the state of Utah; and (b) shall be deemed to be 
independent and severable. The invalidity or partial invalidity of 
any one provision or portion of this Note shall not affect the 
validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Note. 
Time is the essence of this Note. Further, in consideration of the 
financial accommodations represented by this Note and in order to 
induce Holder to extend those accommodations, the parties 
constituting Maker hereby expressly subject themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, Utah in connection with any action arising in 
connection with this Note. 
11. Joint and Several Liability; Jurisdiction. All of the 
obligations of Maker under this Note shall be the joint and several 
obligations of each party that composes Maker from time to time. 
This Promissory Note replaces a Promissory Note of 1 September 
1989 in the principal amount of $5,344.75. 
KBL\d\0129 
WILLIAM R. $£fUPE 
Office Address: 
923 Executive Park Drive, #C 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Home Address: 
46 West 300 South, #1702 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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$5,669.42 Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 August 1991 
Promissory Note 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, WILLIAM R. SHUPE, whose 
address is 923 Executive Park Drive, #C, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84107 ("Maker"), promises to pay to the order of JARDINE, 
LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, and to any 
subsequent holders hereof (such parties being collectively referred 
to herein as "Holder"), at 370 East South Temple, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, or at such other place as Holder may 
designate from time to time in writing, in lawful money of the 
United States of America, the principal amount of Five Thousand Six 
Hundred Sixty-Nine and 42/100ths Dollars ($5,669.42), together with 
interest on the declining unpaid principal balance hereunder at the 
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date hereof until 
paid, according to the terras and conditions that are set forth in 
this promissory note (this "Note"): 
1. Payments. Maker shall pay Holder monthly interest 
installments of $47-25 each on September 1, 1991 and the same day 
of each consecutive calendar month thereafter until November 1, 
1991, when the entire principal balance, together with all interest 
that is due thereon, shall be due and payable in full. 
2. Penalty for Past Due Payments. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of paragraph 1 or any other provisions of this Note to 
the contrary, if Maker defaults hereunder, the entire unpaid 
principal balance of this Note, ^ 11 accrued -but unpaid interest 
thereon and all other amounts that are payable hereunder shall bear 
interest for the period beginning with the date of occurrence of 
such default at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum until 
the default is cured. This default rate of interest shall remain 
in effect (both before and after judgment) until the delinquent 
payments hereunder and all costs of collection have been paid in 
full. Payment of the increased interest amount, together with any 
other amounts that are due under this Note, shall be a condition 
precedent to curing the default. 
3. Application of Payments. All payments and prepayments 
that are made hereunder shall be applied first toward the payment 
and satisfaction of accrued but unpaid interest and second toward 
reduction of the principal balance. 
4. Prepayment. The outstanding principal balance hereof, 
together with accrued interest thereon, may be prepaid at any time 
before maturity, in whole or in part, without penalty. Maker's 
partial prepayment under this Note shall not relieve Maker of the 
obligation to make installment payments hereunder in their next 
succeeding order of due date; provided, however, that the amount of 
such installments shall be applied in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 3 of this Note. 
5. Security. This Note is unsecured. 
6. Default. Maker shall be in default under this Note if a 
payment or any part thereof that is due under this Note is not made 
within* five (5) days after the due date of such payment. If 
default does so occur then Holder, at Holder's option and without 
notice to Maker, may declare the entire unpaid principal balance 
hereunder, together with all accrued interest thereon, immediately 
due and payable, and Maker shall pay all costs and expenses that 
are incurred by Holder (including, but not limited to, a reasonable 
attorneys' fee) to collect such past due amounts, whether such 
costs and expenses are incurred with or without suit or before or 
after judgment. 
7. Assumability of Note. Maker's obligations under this Note 
shall not be assumable by any person or entity without Holder's 
prior written consent. Notwithstanding any such assumption, 
however, the original Maker shall remain fully liable to Holder for 
the performance of all of the obligations under this Note. 
8. Waiver. Holder may accept late payments or partial 
payments under this Note and may delay enforcing any of Holder's 
rights hereunder without losing or waiving any of Holder's rights 
under this Note. 
9. Liability of Parties Under Note. The makers, sureties, 
guarantors and indorsers hereof, jointly and severally: (a) waive 
presentment for payment, protest, demand and notice of dishonor and 
nonpayment of this Note and all other requirements necessary to 
hold them liable hereunder; and (b) consent to any and all 
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be 
granted by Holder with respect to the payment or other provisions 
of this Note. Holder's enforcement of any security for the payment 
of this Note shall not constitute an election by Holder of remedies 
so as to preclude Holder's exercise of any other remedy available 
to Holder. 
10. Interpretation; Jurisdiction. The provisions of this 
Note: (a) shall be interpreted and governed in accordance with the 
laws of the state of Utah; and (b) shall be deemed to be 
independent and severable. The invalidity or partial invalidity of 
any one provision or portion of this Note shall not affect the 
validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Note. 
Time is the essence of this Note. Further, in consideration of the 
financial accommodations represented by this Note and in order to 
induce Holder to extend those accommodations, the parties 
constituting Maker hereby expressly subject themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, Utah in connection with any action arising in 
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jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, Utah in connection with any action arising in 
connection with this Note. 
11. Joint and Several Liability; Jurisdiction. All of the 
obligations of Maker under this Note shall be the joint and several 
obligations of each party that composes Maker from time to time. 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE 
c : \ r h t \ a \ l 5 9 
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APPENDIX H 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In the Matter of 
the Complaint by 
KENT LINEBAUGH 
against 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE 
) AFFIDAVIT OF BLAINE 
) SAVAGE 
) F-519 
I, Blaine Savage, state the following of my own personal knowledge: 
1. In approximately 1986, I approached Mr. William Shupe to assist 
me in a dispute with the general partner of two partnerships with 
which I was associated. 
2. I felt that the general partner of these partnerships had 
violated numerous securities laws and that I had a chance of 
unwinding the partnership, or best case of getting my investment 
back from the partnership. 
3- In our initial conversation, I told Mr. Shupe that I had 
budgeted approximately $10,000 for legal fees. He told me that he 
would bill me on an hourly rate, which was approximately $100 per 
hour- I understood that this was an hourly case and not meant to 
be a case that paid a percentage of settlement. Other than Mr. 
Shupe, I never spoke with any other attorney in his law office 
regarding legal fees or any other substantive matter in my case. 
4. Mr. Shupe sent progress billings to me. 
5- I paid two checks of $1,000 and $500 during the course of our 
negotiations with the general partner. I realized that litigation 
could erupt in this matter, which would have drawn out the eventual 
resolution for some time at considerable expense. 
6. I knew that Mr. Shupe and other members of his firm were 
spending time on my case and I felt that we were making progress. 
7. In October of 1986 we finally reached a tentative settlement 
with the general partner. We set to close the settlement in 
December. 
8. On the day of closing, Mr. Shupe arrived with numerous 
settlement documents. Included in the settlement documents was a 
final billing for approximately $6,000, representing the amount the 
law firm billed my for my case. 
9. As I prepared to pay my final legal bill, which would have been 
approximately $4,500 ($6,000 less the $1,500 I had already paid), 
I told Mr. Shupe that I wanted to pay the $10,000 I had budgeted 
and he could consider the excess a bonus for his good work. 
10- I then paid the additional $4,000 to Mr. Shupe. 
11. 1 was aware that this payment was in excess of the billing, 
but I felt the law firm was receiving the full amount of its billed 
fees with the final $4,500 payment- I feel that I have no 
remaining obligation to either Mr. Shupe or the Jardine law firm. 
12. On or about March 15, 1989, I received a letter from Mr. 
Harold Reiser of the Jardine law firm. He set forth several 
statements in this letter relative to my association with the law 
firm and Mr. Shupe. I did not completely read this letter, but 
rather sent it to my attorney and asked him to deal with the law 
firm. I received no other correspondence from the Jardine firm. 
I do not agree with the contents of the letter sent to me since I 
did not read it. 
Dated this I (&_ day of V — ^ - ^ , 1992. 
eQ, A a v_y 
Blaine Savage 
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NORTH CAROLINA COURT OP APPEALS 
Filed: 6 October 1992 
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR 
v. 
EDWARD DANIELS NELSON 
FILED 
r.t« sfSALf 
.iV-i 
From the Disciplinary 
Hearing Commission of the 
North Carolina si-^ i-o Par-
No. 89 DHC 34 
Appeal by defendant from order filed 23 January 1991 by 
Chairman John Shaw before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission of 
the North Carolina state Bar. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 
August 1992. 
In June 1983 the appellant began practicing law with the New 
Bern law firm of Beaman, Kellum & Stallings (firm) • The 
Disciplinary Hearing Commission (DHC) found that at the time the 
appellant was hired, the firm was organized as a professional 
association" and all stocJc was held by Norman Kellum and Joseph 
Stallings. During the summer of 1984 Kellum and Stallings met with 
the appellant to discuss the possibility of the appellant becoming 
an owner in the firm. Appellant's account of what transpired there 
differed substantially from separate testimony given by Kellum, 
Stallings and Bill Hollows, an associate with the firm. 
Stallings testified that in June of 1984 Hollows approached 
him and said that he and the appellant would liKe to meet with 
Stallings and Kellum at the end of the day. Stallings agreed and 
the four men had a brief meeting later that evening. Kellum, 
Stallings and Hollows each testified that Hollows was present and 
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began the meeting by stating that he and the appellant wished to 
talk about becoming part owners in the firm. Kellum and Stallings 
voiced no objection to the idea of Hollows and the appellant 
becoming owners, but said they would need to discuss it further. 
Stallings said he would draft some documents for purposes of 
discussion and get back with the appellant and Hollows. The men 
also discussed the possibility of changing the firm's name. Upon 
conclusion of the meeting Kellum, Stallings and Hollows each 
believed that Hollows and the appellant remained employees of the 
firm. 
Stallings further testified that in late fall of 1984 
appellant asked Stallings how the paperwork was coming along. 
Stallings told the appellant that he had turned the responsibility 
for drafting the necessary documents over to Hollows and that the 
matter was in Hollows' hands. Hollows testified that the appellant 
asked him on more than one occasion whether any of the paperwork 
had been prepared. Hollows responded each time that the paperwork 
had not been prepared, Stallings also testified that sometime 
later he and Kellum met to discuss raising appellant's salary. 
After discussing the proposed raise with the appellant, appellant's 
annual salary was increased from $40,000 per year to $48,000 per 
year. 
Appellant testified that one morning in late May or early June 
of 1984 he received a phone call from Stallings asking him to meet 
with Stallings and Kellum. He agreed. At the meeting appellant 
testified that Stallings said that he and Kellum had decided to 
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make the appellant a partner. Accordingly, appellant testified that 
they agreed that the appellant would receive shares in the firm and 
an increase in salary from $40,000 per year to $48,000 per year. 
Stalling© agreed to do the necessary paperwork and appellant 
assumed that he had been made a partner in the firm. According to 
appellant, Hollows was not present at that meeting but was present 
at another meeting between Kellum, Stallings and himself. At that 
subsequent meeting the four discussed changing the name of the 
firm. Appellant testified that Kellum said he ^ "as not opposed to 
changing the name of the firm as long as Beaman was kept the first 
name in the firm name* Stallings did not voice any objection. 
The appellant also testified that after his first meeting with 
Kellum and Stallings he placed an ad in the News and observer 
announcing his addition to the firm as a partner. He did this 
because he wanted it announced and he thought it would be good for 
the firm/s business • He did not think he needed the approval of 
Kellum and stallings because, in his view, he had already been made 
a partner* The firm paid for the ad. No meeting was ever called 
to discuss the ad and no reprimand or disciplinary measures were 
taken against appellant for submitting the ad to the newspaper. 
In the fall of 1984 Kellum also changed the firm's name in the 
yellow pages of the local telephone book by adding the names of 
Hollows and the appellant* Kellum authorized the change w[b]ecause 
J he] thought the work, the paperwork would be done, and those guys 
would own some shares, have their name on the door, make them work 
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better, feel a part of it** The following year, Kellum had the 
appellants name deleted from the listing. 
In the fall of 1986 appellant began working on a rate case for 
the North Carolina Department of Insurance which required him to 
spend time in Raleigh, rather than at the firm offices in New Bern* 
During this same period of time Stallings and Kellum became 
dissatisfied with the appellant's work largely because they felt 
that the appellant was devoting too much time to the rate case and 
neglecting his other cases. 
On 22 April 1987 the appellant tendered his resignation to 
Kellum and left the firm to practice in Raleigh. On 11 May 1987 
appellant submitted a bill to the North Carolina Department of 
Insurance for work he performed in the rate case between 30 
December 1986 and 30 April 1987* On 21 May 1987 the Department of 
Insurance issued a check to the plaintiff in the amount of 
$38,646.62* The appellant received the check during May. He did 
not inform the firm that he had billed the Department of Insurance 
or received the check. Rather, he deposited the check into a 
personal account. Appellant testified that he retained the funds 
upon advice of two separate attorneys, Jim Mills and Robert Bode, 
as an offset for funds he thought the firm owed him* In June of 
1987, Kellum and Stallings found out that the Department of 
Insurance had issued the check to the appellant. 
In September of 1987 the appellant filed a suit against the 
firm and against Kellum and Stallings individually in which he 
alleged inter alia that he had been made a partner and that the 
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firm owed him money . The appellant and the firm entered into a 
settlement agreement and release effective 23 March 1989 which 
provided that the appellant could retain all but $12,500 of the 
Department of Insurance check and that the firm would pay the 
appellant $4,387.31 in full settlement of all claims the appellant 
might have* 
On 13 December 1989 appellant received a summons and complaint 
from the DHC of the North Carolina State Bar- After a full 
hearing, the Commission made the following findings of fact which 
are contested by appellant: 
17 . Prior to his departure from the 
firm, Nelson never made any statements to 
Hollows, Stallings or Kellum which indicated 
that Nelson thought he had been made an owner 
or partner in the firm, 
22* Neither Stallings nor Kellum ever 
promised that Nelson's compensation was or 
would be based on some portion of fees brought 
into the firm* Neither stallings nor Kellum 
ever promised that Nelson would be entitled to 
bonuses or any additional compensation other 
than his annual salary* 
24. Prior to this departure from the 
firm, Nelson never made any statements to 
Kellum, Hollows, Stallings or to the firm 
bookkeeper which indicated that Nelson thought 
he was entitled to any additional sums of 
money beyond his usual salary* 
35* Nelson did not have a reasonable, 
good faith belief that he was a partner in the 
firm or that he was entitled to additional 
sums of money at the time he billed the 
Department of Insurance and received and 
retained the $38,646.62.check-
40. Defendant's Ex. B contains a list of 
legal matters pending when Nelson left B, K & 
S in April 1987. Defendant's Ex. Q contains a 
list of fees which Nelson alleged he was due 
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from B, K & S. Nelson did not deliver either 
exhibit or any copies thereof to Kellum or 
Stallings at any time prior to instituting the 
civil action in September 1987. 
The DHC also made findings that the appellant acted improperly 
while handling personal injury cases for Ms* Margaret Slipsager and 
Mr* Clarence Dewberry. The DHC then concluded: 
1* By retaining the $38,646.62 Department 
of Insurance Company check when he did not 
have a reasonable, good faith belief that he 
had a legitimate claim to any funds from B, K 
& S, Nelson engaged in conduct involving 
dishonesty, in violation of Rule 1.2(C). 
2. By failing to file a notice of claim 
or lawsuit on Ms. Slipsager's behalf in a 
timely fashion, Nelson neglected a legal 
matter entrusted to him in violation of Rule 
6(B)(3) and DR 6*101(A)(3) and prejudiced a 
client in violation of Rule 7.1(A)(3) and DR 
7-101(A)(3). 
3* By failing to respond to Ms. 
Slipsager's requests for information 
respecting her case, Nelson failed to 
communicate adequately with a client, in 
violation of Rule 6(B)(1). 
4. By failing to file a notice of claim 
or lawsuit on Dewberry's behalf in a timely 
fashion, Nelson neglected a legal matter in 
violation of Rule 6(B)(3) and DR 6-101(A)(3). 
5. By falsely assuring Dewberry that a 
claim had been filed on his behalf and that 
negotiations were underway respecting 
Dewberry's claim, Nelson engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 1.2(C) 
and DR 1-102 (A) (4) and engaged in conduct 
adversely reflecting on his fitness to 
practice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(6)• 
Accordingly, the Commission entered an Order of Discipline which 
inter ftlia suspended the appellant from practicing law for nine 
months. Appellant appeals. 
JAN 13 '93 10=45 NC STATE BAR P.8 
Carolin Bakewell for the plaintiff-appellee. 
Cheshire, Parker, Hughes £ Manning, by Joseph B. Cheshire, V. 
and Alan M. Schneider for the defendant-appellant. 
EAGLES, Judge. 
I 
Initially we note that appellant raised seventeen assignments 
of error on appeal* However, appellant failed to support 
assignments 1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 or 16 with reason, 
argument or authority. Accordingly, those assignments have been 
abandoned. N.C.R. App* Pro. 28(b)(5)* 
II 
Appellant argues that findings of fact numbers 17, 22, 24, 35 
and 40 made by the DHC are not supported by clear, cogent and 
convincing evidence drawn from the whole record. We disagree and 
affirm. 
The standard of proof and the standard for judicial review for 
attorney discipline cases is set out in North Carolina State Bar v. 
Whitted, 82 N.C. App. 531, 347 S.E*2d 60 (1986), affirmed, 319 N.C. 
398, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987). 
The standard of proof in attorney discipline 
and disbarment proceedings is one of "clear, 
cogent and convincing11 evidence* Rules of the 
North Carolina State Bar, Art IX, Sec. 14(18)* 
See In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 647-48, 252 
S*E*2d784, 789-90 (1979) (adopting standard) ; 
N.C. State Bar v* Sheffield, 73 N.C. App. 349, 
354, 326 S.E*2d 320, 323, cert, denied, 314 
N.C. 117, 332 S«E*2d 482, cert, denied, 
U*S* , 88 L.Ed.2d 338, 106 S*Ct. 385 
(1985). "Clear, cogent and convincing 
describes an evidentiary standard stricter 
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than the preponderance of the evidence, but 
less stringent than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.. . • It has been defined as 'evidence 
which should fully convince. '" Sheffieldr 
supj-g (citations omitted). 
The standard for judicial review of 
attorney discipline cases is the "whole 
record" test. N.C State Bar v. DuMont, 304 
N.C. 627, 642, 286 S,E«2d 89, 98 (1982). 
"Under the whole record test there must be 
substantial evidence to support the findings, 
conclusions and result.*.. The evidence is 
substantial if, when considered as a whole, it 
is such that a reasonable person might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 
643, 286 S.E.2d at 98-99. 
* * * 
"The 'whole record' test does not allow the 
reviewing court to replace the [Committee's] 
judgment as between two reasonably conflicting 
views, even though the court could justifiably 
have reached a different result had the matter 
been before it de novo." Thompson v. Board of 
Education, 292 N.C* 406, 410 233 S.E.2d 538, 
541 (1977). 
Whitted. 82VN.C. App. at 536, 347 S.E.2d at 63 (1986). 
On appeal the appellant, both in his brief and during oral 
argument, highlighted evidence in the record which tends to 
establish facts contra to those found by the DHC However, this 
Court's task is not to replace the DHCs judgment with our own. 
Id. Rather, our task is to determine whether after applying the 
whole record test, the DHCs findings are properly supported by the 
record even though we might have reached a different result had the 
matter been before us de novo. We hold that the record before us 
contains substantial evidence to support the contested findings of 
fact. Accordingly, we find no error. 
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Appellant also argues that the DHC lacked authority to 
determine whether the firm was a partnership or a professional 
association. We are not required to address this question* If the 
firm was a partnership, the DHC found that the appellant had no 
reasonable good faith belief that he was a partner. If the firm 
was a professional association, the DHC found that neither Kellum 
nor Stallings ever promised the appellant that his compensation 
would be based on a portion of the fees he brought into the firm, 
nor did they ever promise him a bonus or additional compensation 
above his annual salary* Under either interpretation the 
appellant, according to the DHC's findings, could not have had a 
reasonable good faith belief that he was entitled to additional 
sums over his salary. This argument is overruled, 
III 
Appellant next argues that the DHC wrongfully concluded that 
appellant acted dishonestly by retaining the Department of 
Insurance check without a reasonable good faith belief that he had 
a legitimate claim to any of the funds. We disagree. 
Appellant first argues that he acted pursuant to a good faith 
belief that he was entitled to additional sums from the firm when 
he retained the Department of Insurance check. This argument is 
essentially a restatement of the argument addressed under heading 
II supra and we disagree for the reasons stated there* 
Appellant next argues that he acted reasonably because he 
acted in conformity with the advice of counsel• However, the DHC 
made the following findings of fact: On 11 May 1987 appellant 
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billed the Department of Insurance, which issued a check to the 
appellant on 21 May 1987. Appellant did not inform the firm that 
he had billed the Department of Insurance or that he had received 
the check- The DHC also found that the appellant first sought the 
advice of legal counsel, James Mills, in late June or early July, 
and that appellant did not seek the counsel of Bob Bode until 
September 1987. We note that the back of the check indicates that 
the appellant negotiated the check on 21 May 1987. DHC's findings 
are sufficient to support the conclusion that the appellant was not 
acting upon the advice of counsel when he retained and deposited 
the Department of Insurance check into his personal account. 
Accordingly, this argument fails. 
IV 
In his final assignment, appellant argues that the DHC abused 
its discretion by suspending the appellant from the practice of law 
for nine months* Me disagree. 
Appellant contends that "neither the North Carolina State Bar 
nor the Disciplinary Hearing Commission were the proper parties to 
bring or hear this case under the authority granted it in Chapter 
84 of the General Statutes of North Carolina and the Rules and 
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar." According to the 
appellant, "[tjhere is no rule in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility or the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct 
that governs accounting procedures for law firm funds and under no 
circumstances should the state Bar have involved itself in an 
intra-partnership accounting dispute*" In support of its argument 
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appellant cites Matter of Rice, 99 Wash. 2d 275, 661 P.2d 591 
(1983). During oral argument, however, the appellant conceded that 
whenever there is a question of dishonesty, beyond the rudimentary 
need for an accounting to resolve internal law firm disputes, the 
DHC has jurisdiction to hear matters involving internal law firm 
disputes. Here, the DHC specifically concluded that the appellant 
engaged in dishonest conduct toy retaining the Department of 
Insurance check without a reasonable good faith belief that he was 
entitled to any funds from the firm. This assignment is without 
merit. 
Finally/ appellant argues that the DHC abused its discretion 
by suspending him from the practice of law for nine months . "The 
discipline imposed was within the statutory limits. N,C. Gen. 
Stat, 84-28 (b), (c). This Court [has] stated that 'so long as the 
punishment imposed is within the limits allowed by the statute this 
Court does ' not have the authority to modify or change it.'11 
Whjitted, 82 N«C. App. at 539-40, 347 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting N.C. 
State Bar V. Wilson, 74 N.C. App. 777, 784, 330 S,E.2d 280, 284 
(1985)• This assignment is likewise without merit and therefore 
overruled. 
Affirmed. 
Judges JOHNSON and PARKER concur. 
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APPENDIX N 
Wendell K. Smith, #3019 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
Hearing Panel: 
Harold L. Petersen, Chair 
Barbara K. Polich 
In the Matter of the 
Complaint by 
BAR COUNSEL 
against 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE 
DOB: 08-20-54 
ADM: 10-15-84 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT J. DALE 
F-520 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
I, Robert J. Dale, being first duly sworn, affirm and 
state that: 
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice law in 
the State of Utah, a member of the law firm of McMurray, 
McMurray, Dale, & Parkinson, and counsel to Bryant D. Cragun 
2. On or about October 14, 1992, William R. Shupe 
paid to Mr. Cragun the sum of $7,000.00 by delivering a 
check in that amount, payable to Mr. Cragun, to the law firm 
of McMurray, McMurray, Dale & Parkinson. This was a refund 
of part of the $25,000.00 he was holding in trust for Mr. 
Cragun. 
3. Mr. Shupe informed me that he would refund to 
Mr. Cragun the additional amount of $13,000.00, by 
delivering the funds to the law firm of McMurray, McMurray, 
Dale & Parkinson, not later than December 31, 1992• As of 
the date of the signing of this Affidavit Mr. Shupe has not 
delivered to this law firm the additional $13,000.00. 
4. I have verified that Respondent has not made 
this payment directly to Mr. Cragun. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT, 
DATED this Aj ^ " day of:J\ &YUMW/^ , 1993. 
Subscribed and sworn before me this \^J^ day of 
^ ' , 1993 
My C o m m i s s i o n E x p i r e s : 
MySmf^ rionlxpir8« I 
October 11.1993 I 
Stateof&ah J 
2 
APPENDIX 0 
Robert J. Dale, No. 0808 
Tad D. Draper, No. 4311 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARFCINSON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5125 
^jjic^m^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR: 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF I 
BRYANT D. CRAGUN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE, individually, 
RICHARD YAGI, individually, 
and JOHN DOES I - V, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Judge 
<tcic?a^7t dH 
(Jury Demanded) 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Bryant D. Cragun, by and through 
his attorneys of record, and alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Davis 
County and doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant William R. Shupe (hereinafter "Shupe") 
is an individual residing, doing business, and practicing law as 
a licensed attorney, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Richard Yagi (hereinafter "Yagi") is an 
individual residing in and doing business in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
4. Defendants John Does I - V are all individuals or 
entities presently unknown to Plaintiff who, on information and 
belief, participated in or otherwise facilitated the misconduct 
and- omissions hereinafter alleged. Plaintiff will amend his Com-
plaint to include the actual names of Defendants John Does I - V 
when the facts and the true names of such parties are ascer-
tained . 
5. During the latter part of 1988, and prior to and 
during January, 1989, Yagi and Plaintiff discussed the 
possibility of Plaintiff purchasing from Yagi a controlling 
interest in a publicly held corporation (hereinafter the 
"Corporation"). 
6. During negotiations for the purchase of the 
controlling interest in the Corporation Plaintiff, at Yagi's 
request, deposited the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars 
($25,000.00) (the "Funds") in the trust account(s) of Shupe to be 
held by Shupe as escrow agent for Plaintiff's potential purchase 
of the stock of the Corporation and to be used and delivered to 
Yagi only in the event such purchase was -actually consummated. 
Yagi and Plaintiff agreed that the Funds would not be disbursed 
to Yagi and would be returned to Plaintiff in the event Plaintiff 
did not purchase the controlling interest in the Corporation from 
Yagi. 
7. The Funds were deposited into the trust account(s) 
of Shupe by checks issued in the following amounts: 
A. Check No. 1021, dated January 19, 1989, in 
- 2 -
the amount of $5,000.00; 
B. Check No. 491, dated January 30, 1989, in the 
amount of $5,000.00; 
C. Check No. 1124, dated February 2, 1989, in 
the amount of $12,000.00; and 
D. Check No. 1125, dated February 14, 1989, in 
the amount of $3,000.00, for a total deposit of $25,000.00. True 
and correct copies of said checks are attached hereto and incor-
porated herein by reference as Exhibits "A" through "D" , respec-
tively. 
8. In receiving Plaintiff's Funds, Shupe was informed 
that the Funds deposited into Defendant Shupe1s trust account(s) 
were Plaintiff's Funds and were to be used for the express and 
sole purpose of paying for stock of the Corporation in the event 
Plaintiff purchased the controlling interest in the Corporation. 
9. On information and belief, the Funds were in fact 
deposited in the trust account(s) of Shupe. Shupe was therefore 
serving in a fiduciary capacity and owed the highest duty of care 
and fair dealing to Plaintiff. As such, Shupe was directly and 
primarily responsible for the safe-keeping, proper receipt, and 
proper disbursement of the Funds deposited into his trust ac-
count (s) . 
10. Shupe was personally responsible for the Funds and 
was not authorized to use or disburse to Yagi any portion of the 
Funds unless and until such time as: (a) The transfer of the 
Corporation's stock to Plaintiff was made, if that transaction 
was ever consummated; and (b) express approval was given to 
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Shupe by Plaintiff to disburse the Funds to Yagi (the contents of 
subparagraphs "a" and "b" of this paragraph are hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the "Corporate Purchase"). 
11. The Corporate Purchase was never completed and 
never occurred, and Plaintiff, individually and through counsel, 
therefore requested and demanded that Shupe return the Funds to 
Plaintiff. 
12. Despite Plaintiff's repeated demands for the 
return of the Funds, and Shupefs subsequent repeated promises to 
return the same, Shupe has only returned the amount of 56,000.00 
to Plaintiff. 
13. Based upon information and belief, the balance of 
the Funds (519,000.00) were wrongfully delivered by Shupe to Yagi 
and/or otherwise diverted, comingled, misapplied, and/or improp-
erly disbursed (hereinafter separately and collectively referred 
to as the "Misappropriations)"/"Misappropriated"). 
14. On information and belief, the Misappropriation of 
the Funds was a conspiratorial act of both Defendants Shupe and 
Yagi, and done at the expense of Plaintiff for Defendants' mutual 
benefit. 
15. The circumstances surrounding the deposit of Funds 
by Plaintiff with Shupe and the Misappropriation of the Funds 
were more than sufficient to put Shupe on reasonable notice to 
make inquiry into and to prevent and/or cure the Misappro-
priation, even if the Misappropriation was not done knowingly. 
16. Shupe, through the use and exercise of reasonable 
diligence on his part, could and should have prevented and 
remedied any improper disbursement to Yagi or any other Misappro-
priation. 
17. Yagi and Shupe were agents of each other with 
respect to the receipt, deposit, and disbursement of Plaintiff's 
Funds , and as such are each charged with the knowledge and 
liability of the other regarding the receipt, deposit, and 
disbursement of Plaintiff's Funds. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conversion) 
18. Plaintiff hereby incorporates into and makes a 
part of his First Cause of Action each and every other paragraph 
In this Complaint. 
19. The escrowed Funds wrongfully Misappropriated by 
Defendants were the property of Plaintiff. 
20. Defendants, and each of them, knexv or reasonably 
should have known that the Funds being wrongfully Misappropriated 
were Funds belonging to the Plaintiff and could not be legally 
used by the Defendants. 
21. Defendants, and each of them, further knew or 
reasonably should have known that the Funds were being wrongfully 
Misappropriated. 
22. Through their conduct and omissions, as alleged 
herein, including the Misappropriation of the Funds, Defendants 
have converted to their own use and for their own benefit, 
directly or indirectly, such Funds in the remaining principal 
amount of not less than $19,000.00. 
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23. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, in the 
principal amount of not less than $19,000.00, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of not less than ten percent (101) 
per annum from the time of the Misappropriation until judgment, 
and with post-judgment interest on the whole thereof until paid 
at the rate of twelve percent (12Z) per annum. 
24. Plaintiff further is entitled to judgment against 
Defendants, jointly and severally, for any and all consequential 
damages proximately caused by Defendants' misconduct and 
omissions, as alleged herein, as a result of the Misappropriation 
and in otherwise intentionally converting such Funds to Defen-
dants' own use, directly or indirectly, including, without 
limitation, for Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs and lost 
opportunities to be shown at trial. 
25. Defendants' conversion was willful, intentional, 
and/or was undertaken in clear and reckless disregard of the 
rights of Plaintiff, and was performed with an express 
appreciation of the damages and losses that would likely result 
from the conversion, including damages and losses to Plaintiff. 
26. Defendants converted the Funds because, in part, 
they believed that liability for their tortious conduct would be 
limited to a return of the Funds. Unless punished by the Court 
herein, Defendants are likely to repeat this or similar conduct 
in the future. Defendants1 actions justify an award of exemplary 
and punitive damages to Plaintiff in an amount of not less than 
$100,000.00, to deter further instances of lawless behavior by 
- 6 -
Defendants. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breaches of Fiduciary Duties) 
27. Plaintiff incorporates into and makes a part of 
his Second Cause of Action, each and every other paragraph in 
this Complaint. 
28. Shupe, as a licensed attorney and in his capacity 
as escrow-holder of the Funds, owed the highest fiduciary duties 
and obligations to Plaintiff, and a high standard of care towards 
Plaintiff, to safeguard and properly apply the Plaintiff's Funds 
and, further, to not make disbursement of the Funds without 
Plaintiff's approval and not to make any Misappropriation of the 
Funds. 
29. Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in Shupe to 
properly safeguard and apply the Funds, and thereupon there arose 
a relationship of trust and confidence between Plaintiff and 
Shupe. 
30. In his position and capacity as attorney and 
escrow-holder of Plaintiff's Funds, Shupe,- by Misappropriating 
the Funds, has breached his fiduciary duties and obligations, and 
his high standard of care, owed to Plaintiff. 
31. As a direct result of Defendant ShupeTs aforesaid 
violations and breaches of his fiduciary duties, Plaintiff has 
suffered damages in the principal amount of at least $19,000.00, 
and will continue to suffer damages as a result of Defendants1 
Misappropriation of the Funds. 
32. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive and exemplary 
damages for and based upon Defendant Shupe's aforesaid violations 
and breaches of his fiduciary duties in an amount not less than 
$100,000.00. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breaches of Express Contract) 
33. Plaintiff incorporates into and makes a part of 
his Third Cause of Action, each and every other paragraph in this 
Complaint. 
34. Defendants have breached their express agreement 
with Plaintiff regarding the deposit, holding, disbursement, and 
safeguarding of the Funds, by Misappropriating the Funds prior to 
any completion of the Corporate Purchase. 
35. As a direct result of Defendants' breaches, 
Plaintiff has suffered damages in the principal amount of 
$19,000.00 plus legal interest. 
36. As a further direct and proximate cause of Defen-
dants' breach, Plaintiff has suffered consequential damages and 
lost opportunities in an amount to be proven at trial, including 
Plaintiff's legal fees and costs incurred herein. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breaches of Implied Contract and 
Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
37. Plaintiff incorporates into and makes a part of 
his Fourth Cause of Action, each and every other paragraph in 
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this Complaint. 
38. By Misappropriating the Funds, Defendants have 
breached their implied contract with Plaintiff to properly 
receive, hold, safeguard, and disburse Plaintiff's Funds and not 
to Misappropriate Plaintiff's Funds. 
39. By Misappropriating Plaintiff's Funds, Defendants 
further have breached their implied and express duties of good 
faith and fair dealing with Plaintiff to properly receive, hold, 
safeguard, and disburse Plaintiff's Funds. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence, Gross Negligence, and Recklessness) 
40. Plaintiff incorporates into and makes a part of 
his Fifth Cause of Action each and every other paragraph in this 
Complaint. 
41. Defendants owed certain duties of care to Plain-
tiff with respect to the Funds including properly and diligently 
safeguarding and applying the Funds. 
42. Defendants further owed duties and obligations to 
Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence, 
under the circumstances, with respect to the Funds. 
43. Due to Defendant Shupe's unique position as an 
attorney, and specifically as the attorney for Yagi, Shupe was 
intimately familiar with the proposed business transactions 
between Plaintiff and Yagi and therefore had a high duty to not 
cause or permit any Misappropriation or improper disbursement of 
the Funds. 
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44. Inspite of the information Defendants had or 
should have known, and notwithstanding the information available 
to Defendants, Defendants acted in a negligent, grossly 
negligent, and/or reckless manner m failing to properly 
safeguard, segregate, and apply the Funds, and m 
Misappropriating the Funds. 
45 Defendants breached their duties and obligations 
owed to Plaintiff with respect to the Funds by negligently, gross 
negligently and/or recklessly accomplishing, participating ±.n, 
acquiescing m , and/or ratifying the Misappropriation of the 
I-unds 
46 As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants1 
negligence, gross negligence and/or recklessness, Plaintiff has 
beer damaged m the principal amount of $19,000 00, plus accruing 
interest and other consequential damages to be shown at trial, 
including Plaintiff's legal fees and costs incurred herein. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligent Misrepresentation) 
47 Plaintiff hereby incorporates into and makes a 
part of his Sixth Cause of Action each and every other paragraph 
m this Complaint. 
48. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants 
had a pecuniary interest m promoting the Corporate Purchase and 
otherwise m receiving the Funds from Plaintiff. 
49. Defendants actually and impliedly, and carelessly, 
negligently, grossly negligently, and recklessly represented to 
Plaintiff that one or all of the following was true: 
A. That Plaintiff's Funds would be kept safe and 
returned to Plaintiff in the event the Corporate Purchase was not 
consummated; 
B. That the Funds would not be Misappropriated. 
50. The representations made by the Defendants were 
material and false when they were made. 
51. Defendants expected Plaintiff to rely and act upon 
the false representations. 
52. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the false, 
material representations of Defendants to his injury and damage. 
53. Plaintiff suffered a loss as a result of the false 
representations of the Defendants in the amount of $19,000.00, 
representing the amount of Funds not returned to Plaintiff when 
the Corporate Purchase was not consummated, and such consequen-
tial damages as shall be shown at the trial hereof, including 
Plaintiff's legal fees and costs incurred herein. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
54. Plaintiff incorporates into and makes a part of 
his Seventh Cause of Action, each and every other paragraph in 
this Complaint. 
55. By their Misappropriation of the Funds, Defen-
dants, and each of them, have been unjustly enriched at Plain-
tiff's expense, in an amount not less than $19,000.00, plus 
accrued interest and consequential damages. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defen-
dants, jointly and severally, as follows: 
1. For general damages in the sum of $19,000.00. 
2. For special damages due to lost opportunities and 
other consequential damages, including without limitation attor-
neys' fees and costs, in a sum to be determined by the Court. 
3. For pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten 
percent (10Z) per annum from January 19, 1989, through the date 
of judgment. 
4. For post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve 
percent (121) per annum. 
5. For Plaintiff's costs of suit herein incurred, 
including collection expenses and attorneys' fees. 
6. For punitive damages in an amount not less than 
$100,000.00. 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court may 
deem proper. 
DATED this j J~- /ciay of June, 1989. 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE 
& PARKINSON, P.C. 
tfob^rt/C^. Dale 
TatfD. Draper 
- 12 -
-:R ~ 
Robert J. Dale, No. 0808 v' __ 
Tad D. Draper, No. 4311 " •. : j-, r "'. 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt-Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5125 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
BRYANT D. CRAGUN, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs . 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE, individually, 
RANDY YAGI, incivicuaily, and 
JOHN DOES I - X, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT 
Civil No. 89 C 779A 
: Judge Aldon J. Anderson 
I IN TrilS ACTION, the Defendant, William R. Shupe, having 
been regularl\ served with process and having failed to appear 
and answer the Complaint filed herein, the legal time for 
answering having expired, and the Default of the said Defendant 
in the premises having been duly entered according to law, now 
upon the written application of the Plaintiff to the above 
entitled court and oral argument and presentation of evidence on 
February 1, 1990, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and enters Judgment as set forth herein: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant William R. Shupe has been duly served 
with process and the Default of the said Defendant has been duly 
entered according to law. 
2. -The Court finds that the factual allegations 
alleged, by the Plaintiff against Defendant William R Shupe, are 
correct and true based upon the written documentation m the 
court's file as well as the Affidavit of Bryan D. Cragun of 
December 23, 1989. 
3. The Court further finds that the material facts of 
Plaintiff's Complaint justify a Default Judgment ana award 
against Defendant Shupe as supported by the representations of 
counsel that Plaintiff has not received payment or reimbursement 
for funds invested m a stock offering proposed and presented by 
Defendant Shupe. 
A. The Court specifically finds the elements of 
common law fraud and securities violations to be amply supported 
and justified, with the exception of Section 17 of the Federal 
Act 
5. The Court specifically finds that Plaintiff 
initially invested the sum of $15,000.00 m this stock purchase 
transaction and that the costs of cover for a subsequently 
attempted sale of Plaintiff's stock leave Plaintiff with an out 
of pocket expenditure and loss of $187,500.00. 
6- The Court further finds the specific application 
of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22 and finds a violation of said statute, 
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resulting in trebling of Plaintiff's initial $15,000.00 
inves tment. 
7. Accordingly, the amount of $187,500.00 as an 
out-of-pocket expenditure of Plaintiff, and an additional 
$30,000.00 .awarded so as to treble the amount of Plaintiffs 
initial investment is just and proper. 
8. The Court further finds that attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred in bringing this action in the amount of $A,395.40 
is just and proper. 
9. The Court then considered the issue of punitive 
damages and finds that an award of punitive damages is supported 
by the evidence, pleadings and affidavits and documents contained 
in the file. 
10. Plaintiff1s counsel requested a $100,000.00 
punitive award but this figure was rejected inasmuch as there was 
a lack of sufficient financial information on Defendant William 
R. Shupe to justify this amount. Accordingly, based upon the 
egregious nature of Defendant Shupe1s actions, activities and 
liabilities, an award of $25,000.00 in punitive damages is 
proper. 
11. The Court further finds that it is just and proper 
to augment the amount of attorneys' fees and costs which will be 
expended in enforcing this Judgment and retains jurisdiction for 
the purpose of augmenting any additional expended amounts as part 
of this original Judgment. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reasons of the 
premises aforesaid, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
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that except for the claim under Section 17 of the Federal Act, 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded Judgment against Defendant William 
Shupe on his Complaint as follows: 
1. Actual and consequential damages for the 
replacement value of the stock in the amount of $187,500.00 (said 
amount including the initial investment of $15,000.00); 
2. An additional $30,000.00 so as to treble the 
initial investment amount pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 61-1-22; 
3. For attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing 
this action in the amount of $4,395.40; 
4. For punitive damages in the amount of $25,000.00; 
5. For interest on ail amounts awarded at the rate of 
121 per annum from the date of this Judgment until collected; 
6. It is further ordered that this Court shall retain 
jurisdiction in this matter in order to augment this Judgment to 
cover amount of reasonable costs and attorneys fees expended in 
enforcing this Judgment; any request for augmentation shall be 
established by Affidavit filed before this Court by Plaintiff or 
his counsel. ^ 
DATED this ?— day of Fjeirtruary; 1990'. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ // 
on J„ Ande Judge Ald erson 
Ccagxil 
tad21 
. 4 -
Robert J. Dale, No. 0808 
Tad D. Draper, No. 4311 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5125 
MAR ] 7 ] 9 9 3 
OFFICE OF RAQ cm .MSFi 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYANT D. CRAGUN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE, individually, 
RICHARD YAGI, individually, and 
JOHN DOES I - X, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890903670CV 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Pursuant to Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
notice is hereby given of the signing and entry of a Default 
Judgment against Defendants 
DATED this I 3 r-k day of February, 1990. 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE 
& PARKINSON 
^•U/Ml £' ^ A. V? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
this /4"&- day of February, 1990 to: 
Richard B. Yagi 
875 Donner Way, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
William R. Shupe 
7050 South Union Park Blvd., #545 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Jk-T - </ Sf£~ 
c - , l - jy 
APPENDIX P 
Wendell K. Smith, #3019 
Office of Bar Counsel 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In The Matter of the 
Complaint by 
BAR COUNSEL 
against 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE 
DOB: 08-20-54 
ADM: 10-15-84 
DEFAULT 
F-520 
The Respondent having been regularly served with 
process, and having failed to appear and answer the Formal 
Complaint on file in the above-captioned matter, and the 
time allowed by the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar and the Summons for answering having expired, the 
default of the Respondent is hereby entered, upon the 
request of the Office of Bar Counsel. 
DATED this ^ day of fl/kUJA , 1992. 
John C. Baldwin 
Executive Director 
CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFIED MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Default in the matter of Bar Counsel against 
William Shupe, F-520, was mailed certified mail, postal 
certification number / -^ ' T?J / , return receipt 
requested to William R. Shupe at 333 Civic Center Dr. West, 
Santa Ana, CA 92701 on this ^ r£7?day of / /? <1 L vf 
r ^_ 
1992. 
Wendell K. Smith, #3019 
Office of Bar Counsel 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In The Matter of the ] 
Complaint by ] 
BAR COUNSEL ] 
against ] 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE ' 
DOB: 08-20-54 
ADM: 10-15-84 ] 
I REQUEST FOR ENTRY 
| OF DEFAULT 
I F-520 
TO: John C. Baldwin 
Executive Director 
The Respondent having been regularly served with 
process, and having failed to appear and answer the Formal 
Complaint on file in the above-captioned matter, and the 
time allowed by the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar and the Summons for answering having expired, the 
Office of Bar Counsel hereby requests that you enter the 
default of the Respondent• 
DATED this P^^day of /*7S<t/? , 1992. 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
By: ^ f ^ / C ^ T 
/Wendell K. Smith 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
Wendell K. Smith, #3019 
Office of Bar Counsel 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In The Matter of the 
Complaint by 
BAR COUNSEL 
against 
WILLIAM R. SHUPE 
DOB: 08-20-54 
ADM: 10-15-84 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFAULT 
F-520 
To: William R. Shupe, Respondent 
333 Civic Center Dr. West 
Santa Ana, CA 92701 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That an Answer to the Sximmons and 
Formal Complaint not having been filed within the time fixed 
by the Summons, the Commission through the Executive 
Director, shall enter your default if saxd answer is not 
filed within five (5) days of the date hereof. 
DATED this JJ^fllay of ftfjfv/tsy, 1992. 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
^6ndell K. Smith 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Intent To Default in the matter of Bar 
Counsel against William Shupe, F-520, was mailed certified 
mail, postal certification number ^J ^f?Cf <5c/6 'KJ6 7 , 
return receipt requested to William R. Shupe at 333 Civic 
Center Dr. West, Santa Ana, CA 92701 on this /,^'^day of 
tt-K^v, , 1992. 
/ 'f>k?tc 'LCi~ 
P S7T 3M5 3b7 
Certified Mail Receipt 
" No Insurance Coverage Provided 
-^ Do not use for Internationa! Mail 
X£2gS& ( S e e Reverse) 
Sent to 
W i l l i a m R. S h u p e , Esc 
S*-^et & No. 
333 C i v i c C e n t e r Dr 
P.O., State & ZIP Code 
S a n t a Ana, UT 92701 
Postage 
Certified Fee 
Special Delivery Fee 
Restricted Delivery Fee 
Return Receipt Snowing 
to Whom & Date Delivered 
Return Receipt Showing to Whom, 
P<*te, & Address of Delivery 
TOTAL Postage 
AFees 
$ 
$ 
Postmark or Date 
2 / 1 2 / 9 2 
or • s - - «s • • • •.COI 
o j? -£-a ^ « o ® ® "fTI 
9-TJ O # _J< *»• 6> -* A 
:iY3£fc.£jk3 
•«2«56? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Request for Entry of Default in the matter of Bar 
Counsel against William Shupe, F-520, was mailed postage 
pre-paid to William R. Shupe at 333 Civic Center Dr. West, 
Santa Ana, CA 92701 on this, ^ ^ d a y of / '/
 u c A- , 
1992. 
s /¥ ~~-
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APPENDIX R 
The Office of Bar Counsel has not been provided a copy of this 
appendix. A copy has been requested from the Clerk of the Court 
but has not yet been made available. Upon receipt of the 
documents referenced in this appendix they will be forwarded to 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court and to the Respondent for 
inclusion. 
APPENDIX S 

APPENDIX T 
548 Minn 470 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES H 
every one of two or more persons or 
things composing the whole, separately 
considered 
Black's Law Dictionary 455 (5th ed 1979) 
(emphasis added) The term "each," in the 
1980 agreement, plainly refers to the sepa 
rate lifetimes of George and Phyllis The 
wills do not contradict this interpretation of 
their agreement George breached the 
1980 agreement when he added codicils to 
his 1980 will during Phyllis' lifetime, and 
also when he changed his will after Phyllis' 
death 
IV 
[9] This type of action is not based on 
wills but upon an agreement' of which the 
Will is but evidence " Mosloski v Gamble, 
191 Minn 170, 174, 253 NW 378, 381 
(1934) Here, the competing policies are 
the enforceability of the contract and 
George's right to bequeath property as he 
desired George could change his will, but 
the contract may be enforced in equity if it 
is valid and enforcement is necessary for 
the prevention of fraud See td at "17$ 
253 N W at 381 j>(3 
DECISION MlJ 
We reverse the trial court and hold that 
appellants have standing as intended bene! 
ficianes of the 1980 Agreement to bring 
this action The 1980 agreement is a valid 
contract supported by sufficient considera-
tion where George and Phyllis made mutu; 
al promises not to revoke or change then-
wills George breached the 1980 agree-' 
ment when he changed his will We re-
mand to the trial court* to address the 
breach of contract claim and to fashion any 
appropriate relief 
Reversed and remanded 
STATE EX REL STATE BAR v VEITH Neb 549 
Cite as 470 N W.2d 549 (Neb 1991) 
238 Neb 239 attorney s own use or some other improper 
use 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
j ^ 9 STATE of Nebraska ex rel 
NEBRASKA STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION, Relator, 
Douglas VEITH, Respondent 
No 90-461 
Supreme Court of Nebraska 
May 31 1991 
Attorney disciplinary proceeding was 
brought The Supreme Court held that 
commingling of trust funds with law office 
funds and willful appropriation warrant 
disbarment 
Disbarment ordered 
1 Attorney and Client <s=»57 
A proceeding to discipline an attorney 
is a trial de novo on record in which Su 
preme Court reaches conclusion indepen 
dent of findings of referee provided where 
credible evidence is in conflict on material 
issue of fact, Supreme Court considers and 
may give weight to fact that referee heard 
and observed witnesses and accepted one 
version of facts rather than another 
2 Attorney and Client «=»53(2) 
Supreme Court, in its de novo review 
of record must find that particular com 
plaint has been established by clear and 
convincing evidence in order to sustain it 
against an attorney in a disciplinary pro 
ceeding 
3 Attorney and Client c=>38 44(1) 
An attorney s violation of a discipli 
nary rule and failure to act competently by 
neglecting a matter entrusted to him or her 
is conduct violative of an attorney s oath as 
member of bar Neb Rev St § 7-104 
Code of Prof Resp DR 1-102 DR 9-102 
4 Attorney and Client <s=>44(2) 
In attorney discipline proceedings 
"conversion" refers to an attorney s misap 
propnation of a client s property to the 
5 Attorney and Client <£=*44(2) 
In attorney discipline proceedings 
misappropriation is any unauthorized use 
pf client s funds entrusted to a lawyer 
including not only stealing but also unau 
thonzed temporary use for lawyer s own 
purpose whether or not he or she derives 
any personal gain or benefit therefrom 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
6 Attorney and Client 0=14(2) 
An attorney s failure to use entrusted 
funds for purpose for which they were 
entrusted constitutes misappropriation 
for disciplinary purposes 
7 Attorney and Client C=>44(2) 
For purposes of attorney discipline 
misappropriation caused by serious mex 
cusable violation of duty to oversee en 
trusted funds is deemed willful even in 
absence of deliberate wrongdoing 
8 Attorney and Client c=44(2) 
Mere fact that an attorney s trust ac 
count balance falls below the amount de 
posited in and purportedly held in trust 
supports finding of misappropriation 
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of Prof Resp 
DR 1-102 DR 9-102 
9 Attorney and Client 044(2) 
For purposes of attorney discipline an 
act of conversion is complete when the 
clients trust account is overdrawn or 
when, through mismanagement or miscon 
duct on part of attorney balance of ac 
count is less than client s interest in it 
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of Prof Resp 
DR 1-102 DR 9-102 
10 Attorney and Client 044(2) 
An attorney s intent to defraud or lack 
thereof is irrelevant when drawing checks 
on clients trust account to pay personal 
expenses Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of 
Prof Resp DR 1-102 DR 9-102 
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11 Attorney and Client <£=>44(2) 
An attorney has a duty to keep sepa 
rate and properly account for client trust 
funds entrusted to him or her and promptly 
pay over and deliver such funds to the 
client upon request Neb Rev St § 7-104, 
Code of Prof Resp, DR 1-102, DR 9-102 
12 Attorney and Client <s=>44(2) 
An attorney may not use client trust 
funds to cover business expenses Neb 
Rev St § 7-104, Code of Prof Resp , DR 
1-102 DR 9-102 
13 Attorney and Client «=>58 
To determine whether and to what ex 
tent attorney discipline should be imposed 
it is necessary to consider the following 
factors nature of offense need for deter 
ring others maintenance of reputation of 
bar as a whole, protection of public, atti 
tude of offender generally, and offender's 
present or future fitness to continue prac 
tice of law 
14 Attorney and Client e=»58 
Misappropriation of client funds, as 
one of the most serious violations of duty 
an attorney owes to client public, and 
courts typically warrants disbarment 
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of Prof Resp , 
DR 1-102 DR 9-102 
15 Attorney and Client c=44(2) 
Receiving clients' funds and converting 
them to personal use by placing them in an 
office account without consent of client is 
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude 
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of Prof Resp 
DR 1-102 DR 9-102 
16 Attorney and Client <£=58 
Mitigating circumstances shown in 
record should be considered in determining 
appropriate discipline imposed on attorney 
violating Code of Professional Responsibih 
ty Neb Rev St § 7-104, Code of Prof 
Resp DR 1-102, DR 9-102 
17 Attorney and Client <S=>53(1) 
Intent of attorney to misappropriate 
client funds may be inferred from circum 
stantial evidence 
18 Attorney and Client <s=»58 
Cumulative acts of attorney miscon 
duct are distinguishable from isolated inci 
dents of neglect and therefore justify morj 
serious sanctions 
19 Attorney and Client <^=>58 
If misappropriation occurs through ar 
attorneys laxity rather than a wrongfu 
intent, and if this lack of intent is rein 
forced by attorney's having taken remedia 
action immediately updn discovery of prol> 
lem, less discipline than disbarment may be 
appropriate Neb Rev St § 7-104, Code di 
Prof Resp DR 1-102, DR 9-102 
20 Attorney and Client <3=>58 
Fact that no client suffered any f n W 
cial loss is no excuse for ^ lawyer to mtsaj> 
propnate clients' funds nor any reason why 
lawyer should not receive severe sanction, 
Neb Rev St § 7-104 Code of ProfRespf( 
DR 1-102 DR 9-102 
21 Attorney and Client <s=58 
To determine what sanction is appro-
priate, each case justifying discipline of an 
attorney must be evaluated individually in 
light of particular facts and circumstances 
Neb Rev St §7-104, Code of Prof Resp? 
DR 1-102 DR 9-102 
22 Attorney and Client G=>58
 w 
Commingling of trust funds with law' 
office funds and willful appropriation war 
rant disbarment despite mitigation of prior 
good standing and freedom from disciph 
nary complaint, manifestations of regret, 
counseling community reputation coopera 
tion and pro bono work 
Syllabus by the Court 
1 Disciplinary Proceedings Appeal 
and Error A proceeding to discipline an 
attorney is a trial de novo on the record, in* 
which the Supreme Court reaches a conclu 
sion independent of the findings of the 
referee, provided where credible evidence 
is m conflict on a material issue of fact, the 
Supreme Court considers and may give 
weight to the fact that the referee heard 
and observed the witnesses and accepted 
one version of the facts rather than anoth 
er i 
2 Disciplinary Proceedings Proof 
Appeal and Error The Supreme Court, in 
its de novo review of the record must find 
STATE EX REL STATE BAR v VEITH 
Cite a* 470 N W Id 549 (Neb 1991) 
Neb 551 
that the particular complaint has been es 
tabhshed by clear and convincing evidence 
m order to sustain it against an attorney in 
a disciplinary proceeding 
3 Disciplinary Proceedings Every 
attorney admitted to practice law in Ne 
braska shall take and subscribe an oath 
swearing to support the Nebraska and U S 
Constitutions and to faithfully discharge 
the duties of an attorney and counselor to 
the best of his or her abilities An attor 
ney's violation of a disciplinary rule and 
failure to act competently by neglecting a 
matter entrusted to him or her is conduct 
violative of an attorney's oath as a member 
of the bar The oath requires lawyers to 
observe the established codes of profes 
sional ethics 
4 Disciplinary Proceedings Con 
version Words and Phrases In attorney 
^discipline proceedings conversion refers 
to an attorney's misappropriation of a 
client's property to the attorney s own use 
or some other improper use 
5 Disciplinary Proceedings Words 
and Phrases Misappropriation is any un 
authorized use of clients funds entrusted 
to a lawyer including not only stealing but 
also unauthorized temporary use for the 
lawyer's own purpose whether or not he 
derives any personal gain or benefit there 
from 
6 Disciplinary Proceedings Intent 
Words and Phrases An attorney s failure 
to use entrusted funds for the purpose for 
which they were entrusted constitutes mis 
appropriation Misappropriation caused by 
serious, inexcusable violation of a duty to 
oversee entrusted funds is deemed willful 
even in the absence of a deliberate wrong 
doing 
7 Disciplinary Proceedings Proof 
The mere fact that an attorney s trust ac 
count balance falls below the amount de 
posited in and purportedly held in trust 
supports a finding of misappropriation 
8 Disciplinary Proceedings Con 
version An act of conversion is complete 
when the clients trust account is over 
drawn or when through mismanagement 
or misconduct on the part of the attorney 
the balance of the account is less than the 
clients interest in it 
9 Disciplinary Proceedings Fraud 
Intent An attorney s intent to defraud or 
lack thereof is irrelevant when drawing 
checks on clients trust account to pay per 
sonal expenses 
* 10 Disciplinary Proceedings An 
attorney has a duty to keep separate and 
properly account for client trust funds en 
trusted to the attorney and to promptly pay 
over and deliver such funds to the client 
upon request 
11 Disciplinary Proceedings An 
attorney may not use client trust funds to 
cover business expenses 
12 Disciplinary Proceedings To 
determine whether and to what extent dis 
ciphne should be imposed it is necessary 
that the following factors be considered 
(1) the nature of the offense (2) the need 
for deterring others (3) the maintenance of 
the reputation of the bar as a whole (4) the 
protection of the public, (6) the attitude of 
the offender generally and (6) his present 
or future fitness to continue in the practice 
of law 
13 Disciplinary Proceedings Mis 
appropriation of client funds as one of the 
most serious violations of duty an attorney 
owes to his client the public and the 
courts typically warrants disbarment 
14 Disciplinary Proceedings In 
the hierarchy of offenses for which law 
yers may be disciplined stealing from a 
client must be among those at the very top 
of the list 
15 Disciplinary Proceedings Mis 
appropriation affects both the bar and the 
public because it is a serious offense in 
volving moral turpitude 
16 Disciplinary Proceedings Con 
version Receiving a clients funds and 
converting them to personal use by placing 
them in an office account without consent 
of the client is illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude 
17 Disciplinary Proceedings Mis 
appropriation is more than a grievous 
breach of professional ethics It violates 
basic notions of honesty and endangers 
public confidence in the legal profession 
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18. Disciplinary Proceedings. The 
paramount purpose of the "moral turpi-
tude" standard is not to punish practition-
ers but to protect the public, the courts, 
and the profession ^ a g a i n s t unsuitable 
practitioners. 
19. Disciplinary Proceedings. Miti-
gating circumstances shown in the record 
should be considered in determining the 
appropriate discipline imposed on an attor-
ney violating the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. 
20. Disciplinary Proceedings: In-
tent: Circumstantial Evidence. Intent to 
misappropriate client funds may be in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence. 
21. Disciplinary Proceedings. Cu-
mulative acts of attorney misconduct are 
distinguishable from isolated incidents of 
neglect and therefore justify more serious 
sanctions. 
22. Disciplinary Proceedings: In-
tent. If a misappropriation occurs through 
an attorney's laxity rather than wrongful 
intent, and if this lack of intent is rein-
forced by the attorney's having taken re-
medial action immediately upon discovery 
of the problem, less discipline than disbar-
ment may be appropriate. 
23. Disciplinary Proceedings. The 
fact that no client suffered any financial 
loss is no excuse for a lawyer to misappro-
priate clients' funds nor any reason why a 
lawyer should not receive a severe sanc-
tion. 
24. Disciplinary Proceedings. To 
"determine what sanction is appropriate, 
each case justifying discipline of an attor-
ney must be evaluated individually in light 
of the particular facts and circumstances. 
Alison L. Larson, Asst. Counsel for Disci-
pline, for relator. 
Jon S. Reid and Mark E. Novotny of 
Kennedy, Holland, DeLacy & Svoboda, for 
respondent. 
HASTINGS, C.J, and BOSLAUGH, 
CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and 
FAHRNBRUCH, JJ. 
PER CURIAM. 
In this attorney disciplinary proceeding 
we find that since he knowingly and wil 
fully transferred and commingled clien 
trust funds with funds in his and his associ 
ated lawyers' law office business account 
and because he misappropriated some jp 
those funds to his own use and to othe 
improper purposes, Douglas Veith should 
be disbarred. 
Specifically, we find that the record re 
veals by clear and convincing evidence tha 
Veith violated his oath of office as an attor 
ney and Canon 1, DR 1-102, and Canon 9 
DR 9-102, of the lawyers'* Code of Profes 
sional Responsibility. We agree with th< 
relator, the Nebraska State Bar Associa 
tion (NSBA), that the 8-month suspensior 
recommended by the referee \i 
j^ inappropriate under the circumstances 
of this case. The 2-year suspension sug 
gested by the NSBA Counsel for Discipline 
is also too lenient. 
[1,2] A proceeding to discipline an at 
torney is a trial de novo on the record, ir 
which the Supreme Court reaches a conclu 
sion independent of the findings of the 
referee, provided, where credible evidence 
is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the 
Supreme Court considers and may give 
weight to the fact that the referee heard 
and observed the witnesses and accepted 
one version of the facts rather than anoth-
er. State ex ret. NSBA v. Thor, 237 Neb. 
734, 467 N.W.2d 666 (1991); State ex rel 
NSBA v. Rhodes, 234 Neb. 799, 453 
N.W.2d 73 (1990), cert, denied — U.Sl 
- ^ - , 111 S.Ct. 153, 112 L.Ed.2d 119. Th<j 
Supreme Court, in its de novo review of the 
record, must find that the particular com-
plaint has been established by clear an'cj 
convincing evidence in order to sustain'ft 
against an attorney in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding. Id. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The undisputed facts in the record here 
reveal that Veith was admitted to the prac-
tice of law in, the State of Nebraska in June 
1982. At all times relevant, Veith was the 
managing attorney in a five-attorney of-
fice-sharing arrangement in Bellevue, Ne-
STATE EX REL. STATE BAR v. VEITH 
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braska. As managing attorney, Veith re-
ceived the monthly bank statements re-
garding the general law business and client 
trust accounts. Each of the attorneys used 
the trust account for his respective clients' 
trust funds. 
In July 1988, Veith was informed by the 
bank that it had transferred funds from 
the trust account to the general law busi-
ness account to cover a shortage of funds. 
At various other times Veith transferred or 
authorized the transfer of funds to the 
business account from the client trust ac-
count. 
During the period of August 1988 
through February 1989, Veith, although he 
was generally aware of periodic deficits in 
both the trust and business accounts, failed 
to reconcile the accounts or take other ac-
tion to avoid the deficit problem. Between 
September 1988 and March 1989, the trust 
account had negative balances. At a mini-
mum, throughout this period, it should 
have contained $16,900 in client trust 
funds. Between l243July 1988 and March 
1989, Veith withdrew as income $70,000 
from the business account. On March 3, 
1989, one of the associated attorneys ques-
tioned Veith about the trust account bal-
ance. Veith acknowledged that the trust 
account had over a $3,000 negative balance. 
He secured a $10,000 personal loan from a 
bank and deposited that money into the 
trust fund that same day to cover the defi-
ciency in the client trust fund account of 
the complaining associated lawyer? Subse-
quently, Veith borrowed $25,000 from a 
friend to cover deficiencies in the other 
associated attorneys' trust funds. On 
March 27, 1989, Veith secured a loan from 
a relative in the amount of $10,600, which 
he deposited in the trust account to cover 
trust funds for which Veith was accounta-
ble to his own clients. 
Meanwhile, on March 9, 1989, all the 
attorneys in the office-sharing arrange-
ment, including Veith, made a conference 
call to the NSBA Counsel for Discipline, 
explaining the matter and setting in motion 
an investigation. 
The Committee on Inquiry of the Fourth 
Disciplinary District, after an October 16, 
1989, hearing, recommended that formal 
charges be filed against Veith. These 
charges were reviewed by the Disciplinary 
Review Board and were filed as an original 
action in this court on May 29, 1990. The 
formal charges allege that the actions of 
Veith, as set forth above, constitute a viola-
tion of his oath of office, as provided by 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 7-104 (Reissue 1987), and 
of DR 1-102 and DR 9-102. 
[31 Section 7-104 provides that every 
attorney admitted to practice law in Ne-
braska shall take and subscribe an oath 
swearing to support the Nebraska and U.S. 
Constitutions and to faithfully discharge 
the duties of an attorney and counselor to 
the best of his or her abilities. An attor-
ney's violation of a disciplinary rule and 
failure to act competently by neglecting a 
matter entrusted to him or her is conduct 
violative of an attorney's oath as a member 
of the bar. State ex rel. Nebraska State 
Bar Assn. v. Divis, 212 Neb. 699, 325 
N.W.2d 652 (1982). See State ex rel. 
NSBA v. Hahn, 218 Neb 508, 356 N.W 2d 
885 (1984) (the oath requires lawyers to 
observe the established codes of profes-
sional ethics). DR 1-102 and DR 9-102 
provide as follows: 
j£44DR 1-102 Misconduct. 
(A) A lawyer shall not: 
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule. 
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving 
moral turpitude. 
(4) Engage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion. 
(5) Engage in conduct that is preju-
dicial to the administration of justice. 
(6) Engage in any other conduct that 
adversely reflects on his fitness to prac-
tice law. 
DR 9-102 Preserving Identity of Funds 
and Property of a Client. 
(A) All funds of clients paid to a law-
yer or law firm, other than advances for 
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in 
one or more identifiable bank or savings 
and loan association accounts maintained 
in the state in which the law office is 
•S3 
here] .^ 
(B) A lawyer shall: 
(3) Maintain complete records of all 
funds, securities, and other properties of 
a client coming into the possession of the 
lawyer and render appropriate accounts 
to his client regarding time. • 
Following a formal hearing on November 
16, 1990, a referee, on December 7, 1990, 
filed her report with this court. The ref-
eree found that Veith had violated the disci-
plinary rules with which he was charged. 
The referee recommended, among five com-
ponents, that Veith be suspended from the 
practice of law for a period of 8 months. 
The NSBA filed an exception to the report, 
arguing that the referee's recommendation 
of suspension for a period of 8 months was 
too lenient under the facts and circum-
stances as established by the record of this 
case. 
In his answer to the formal charges, 
Veith admits violating DR 1-102(A)(1) and 
DR 9-102(B)(3) but none of the other enu-
merated provisions of DR 1-102 or DR 
9-102. In essencej 245Veith admits to com-
mingling the business and client trust fund 
accounts but attributes it to negligence. 
He denies attempting to intentionally or 
dishonestly convert the funds, perpetrate a 
fraud, or deceive or misrepresent matters 
to his associated counsel or clients. In 
contrast, the NSBA argues that Veith has 
gone beyond commingling and has convert-
ed or willfully misappropriated the client 
trust funds. 
COMMINGLING AND 
MISAPPROPRIATION 
[4-10] In attorney discipline proceed-
ings, conversion refers to an attorney's 
misappropriation of a client's property to 
the attorney's own use or some other im-
proper use. See ABA/BNA Lawyers' 
Manual on Professional Conduct 45:106 
(1985). Misappropriation is "any unautho-
rized use . . . of clients' funds entrusted to 
[a lawyer], including not only stealing, but 
uenves any personal gain or benefit ther? 
froh ' In re Wilson, 81 J.J. 451, 455 rijfl 
409 A.2d 1153, 1155 n. 1 (1979). See Bq% 
v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal.3d 2§jy 
801 P.2d 412, 276 Cal.Rptr. 169 (1990) gS 
attorney's failure to^use entrusted fun§« 
for the purpose for which they were.ej 
trusted constitutes misappropriation). MJai 
appropriation caused by serious, inexcusa? 
ble violation of a duty to oversee entrustef 
funds is deemed willful, even in the^ah? 
sence of a deliberate wrongdoing. Ed-
wards v. State Bar of California, £2 
Cal.3d 28, 801 P.2d 396, 276 Cal.Rptr u f 
(1990). See, Giovanazzi v. State BaVqf 
California, 28 Cal.3d 465, 619 P.2d '1005* 
169 Cal.Rptr. 581 (1980) (mere fact that ai •sag 
attorney s trust account balance falls below, 
the amount deposited in and purportedly! 
held in trust supports a finding of misajS 
propriation); Matter of Iversen, 51 A.D.2q 
422, 381 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1976) (an ac t ' S j 
conversion is complete when the clients? 
trust account is overdrawn or when? 
through mismanagement or misconduct or?j 
the part of the attorney, the balance of t h9 
account is less than the clients' i n t e r e s t ^ 
it). Thus, under DR 9-102, w r o n g f u l ^ 
improper intent is not an element of misapS 
propriation. See, In re Wilson, suprafe 
Archer v. State, 548 S.W.2d 71 (Tex.Cfv| 
App.1977) (DR 9-102 does not require, ettSj 
ments of fraud, culpability, or willfulness^ 
Stately. Stoveken, 68 Wis.2d 716," 229J 
N.W.2d 224 (1975) (attorney's intent to S g | 
fraud or lack thereof is irrelevant wherij 
drawing checks on clients' trust account &1 
.1 
[11,12] We have held that an attorneyj 
has a duty to keep separate and properly | 
account for client trust funds entrustedJto 
the attorney and to promptly pay over ahoL 
deliver such funds to the client *upon re-j 
quest. See State ex rel. NSBA v. StaV\ 
more, 218 Neb. 138, 352 N.W.2d 875 (1984)/l 
See, also, DR 9-102. An attorney may no'fj 
use client^trust funds to cover ' business* 
expenses. *See, In re Leiois, 118 I11.2d 357? 
113 Ill.Dec. 287, 515 N.E.2d 96 (1987) (pro-^ 
fessional corporation's operating account); 
pay personal expenses). 
5(1981) (business debts); Bar Assn. v. 
* Thompson 69 Ohio St.2d 667, 433 N.E.2d 
'$02 (1982) (overhead and operating ex-
penses). Based upon Veith's admissions 
and other clear and convincing evidence in 
the record, this court finds that Veith, by 
knowingly commingling and misappro-
priating trust funds, inexcusably breached 
his oath of office and his duty to his clients 
and to the clients of the lawyers sharing 
office space with him. In short, the clear 
and convincing evidence reflects that Veith 
is guilty of each of the charges brought 
against him. 
DISCIPLINE 
[13] The next step is to determine the 
appropriate sanction. To determine wheth-
er and to what extent discipline should be 
imposed it is necessary that the following 
factors be considered: (1) the nature of the 
offense, (2) the need for deterring others, 
(3) the maintenance of the reputation of the 
bar as a whole, (4) the protection of the 
public, (5) the attitude of the offender gen-
erally, and (6) his present or future fitness 
to continue in the practice of law. State ex 
rel NSBA v. Thor, 237 Neb. 734, 467 
N.W.2d 666 (1991); State ex rel. NSBA v. 
Rhodes, 234 Neb. 799, 453 N.W.2d 73 
(1990), cert denied — U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 
153, 112 L.Ed.2d 119. 
' [14] There is no question that misappro-
priation of client funds, as oneof the most 
serious violations of duty an attorney owes 
to his client, the public, and the courts, 
typically warrants disbarment. See, State, 
ex rel Hunter, v. Hatteroth, 134 Neb. 451, 
279 N.W. 153 (1938) (misappropriation by 
an attorney ofj^money belonging to his 
client is such a disregard of duty as to 
warrant disbarment); State, ex rel. Hunt-
er, v. Boe, 134 Neb. 162, 278 N.W. 144 
(1938) (an attorney is subject to disbarment 
because of delinquency in accounting to 
clients for money received in his profes-
sional capacity, in violation of his duty to 
the public); State, ex rel. Spillman, v. 
Priest, 118 Neb. 47, 223 N.W. 635 (1929) 
(delinquency in accounting for money re-
tain respect due courts). " 'In the hier-
archy of offenses for whiv.n lawyers may 
be disciplined, stealing from a client must 
be among those at the very top of the 
list.' " The Florida Bar v. McShirley, 573 
So.2d 807, 808 (Fla.1991), quoting The Flor-
ida Bar v. Tunsil, 503 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 
1986). 
[15] Misappropriation affects both the 
bar and the public because it is a serious 
offense involving moral turpitude. See, In 
re Phillips, 767 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1989) (re-
ceiving client's funds and converting them 
to personal use by placing them in office 
account without consent of client is illegal 
conduct involving moral turpitude); Bam-
bic v. State Bar of California, 40 Cal.3d 
314, 707 P.2d 862, 219 Cal.Rptr. 489 (1985) 
(misappropriation of client funds involves 
moral turpitude and undermines public con-
fidence in legal profession); In re Patt, 81 
I11.2d 447, 43 Ill.Dec. 737, 410 N.E.2d 870 
(1980) (conversion of a client's funds is an 
act involving moral turpitude). "Misappro-
priation is more than a grievous breach of 
professional ethics. It violates basic no-
tions of honesty and endangers public con-
fidence in the legal profession." Grim v. 
State Bar of California, 53 Cal.3d 21, 29, 
805 P.2d 941, 943, 278 Cal.Rptr. 682, 684 
(1991). " 'The most common definition of 
an act of moral turpitude is one that is 
"contrary to honesty and good morals." 
[citations.]' . . . ' "The paramount purpose 
of the 'moral turpitude' standard is not to 
punish practitioners but to protect the pub-
lic, the courts, and the profession against 
unsuitable practitioners " ' " In re 
Scott, 52 Cal.3d 968, 978, 802 P.2d 985, 991, 
277 Cal.Rptr. 201, 207 (1991). 
This court disagrees with Veith's assess-
ment that his violation did not involve mor-
al turpitude. At various times, by his own 
admission, Veith knowingly transferred 
money from the client trust account to the 
business account of his law office. He 
j_£48admitted that during this period 20 per-
cent of the money from the trust fund was 
used by him personally and 80 percent was 
used for salaries and other office expenses. 
new leabeu computer system mat cost 
$2,000 p - month, and upda^J his law li-
brary, all so he would appear successful. 
This court also disagrees with Veith's 
assessment that his conduct does not affect 
his present or future fitness to continue in 
the practice of law. In his new partnership 
arrangement Veith has taken steps so that 
he cannot sign checks on either the trust or 
business account. While admirable, this 
situation creates a paralogism. Veith asks 
this court and his clients to trust him, yet 
he apparently has some question as to his 
own trustworthiness. 
MITIGATING FACTORS 
[16] This court must next determine 
whether there are factors which would mit-
igate the sanction of disbarment, suggest-
ing that a lesser sanction may be more 
appropriate. Mitigating circumstances 
shown in the record should be considered in 
determining the appropriate discipline im-
posed on an attorney violating the Code of 
Professional Responsibility. State ex rel 
NSBA v. Miller, 225 Neb. 261, 404 N.W.2d 
40 (1987). 
Respondent presents an array of argu-
ments, starting with a lack of intent. "As 
the term is used in attorney discipline 
cases, 'willful misappropriation' covers a 
broad range of conduct varying significant-
ly in the degree of culpability." Edwards 
v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal.3d 28, 
38, 801 P.2d 396, 402, 276 Cal.Rptr. 153, 
159 (1990). Therefore, misconduct, al-
though technically willful, may be less cul-
pable if committed as a result of negligence 
and not as a result of a deliberate act. 
Veith's argument is that he negligently 
rather than deliberately breached his duty. 
The record does not support this conten-
tion. He was aware that the bank trans-
ferred funds from the trust account to the 
business account but he took no action. 
He also transferred or authorized some 
transfers from the client trust fund ac-
count to the business account. That Veith 
knowingly and intentionally misappropriat-
trust account to the la*" office busines 
account because he was running short jo 
money. The minister understood Vei^ 
considered the transfer to be a temporal 
"quick-fix" which he'would fix later. 
[17,18] Intent to misappropriate clien 
funds may be inferred from circumstantia 
evidence. See In re Phelps, 306 Or/ 508 
760 P.2d 1331 (1988). See, also, NJI 14.f 
("Intent is a mental process and it there 
fore generally remains hidden within thl 
mind where it is conceived. It is rarely Ij 
ever susceptible of proof by direct ev? 
dence. It may, however, be inferred froir 
the words and acts of the defendant an<3 
from the facts and circumstances surround-
ing his conduct"). Perhaps the initial 
transfer of funds was due to Veith's negli-
gence. However, the first transfer wal 
not an isolated incident. There were re; 
peated incidents in which Veith knew tha!t 
the bank was transferring funds from'the 
client trust fund account to the business 
account after the initial transaction. There 
were various times he authorized a transP 
fer or personally transferred funds from' 
the trust account to the business account? 
See State ex rel. NSBA v. Kirshen, 232 
Neb. 445, 441 N.W.2d 161 (1989) (cumuhP 
tiVe acts of attorney misconduct are distin-
guishable from isolated incidents of neglect' 
and therefore justify more serious sane-! 
tions). Veith never made an accounting1 
over the period in question. At the same 
time he received a salary of approximately} 
$70,000. 
[19] Veith's next argument is that no' 
client was injured because he made full 
restitution. He relies upon State ex rel\ 
NSBA v. Fitzgerald, 227 Neb. 90, 41^ 
N.W.2d 28 (1987), for the proposition that' 
restitution of the misused funds1 prior to 
being faced with accountability may mitP 
gate the discipline to be imposed and appar-' 
ently evidences a lack of wrongful intent..^ 
The problem for Veith is that, although he; 
was not yet faced with formal accountabili-,, 
ty, the restitution he provided was not' 
made until after he was confronted by an'/ 
fornia Si^ erne Court has re gnized the 
principle that if the misappropriation oc-
curs through the attorney's laxity rather 
than wrongful intent, and if this lack of 
intent is reinforced by the attorney's hav-
ing taken remedial p a c t i o n immediately 
upon discovery of the problem, less disci-
pline than disbarment may be appropriate. 
See Waysman v. State Bar of California, 
41 Cal.3d 452, 714 P.2d 1239, 224 Cal Rptr. 
101 (1986); Palomo v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia, 36 Cal.3d 785, 685 P.2d 1185, 205 
Cal.Rptr. 834 (1984). Even if this court 
were to accept Veith's position that he was 
merely negligent, he would not fall within 
this sound principle because over a course 
of almost 8 months, although he knew and 
participated in the transfer of funds from 
the trust account to the law office business 
account, he took no action to restore the 
trust funds. It was not until he was con-
fronted that he confessed to any wrongdo-
ing. Cf. State ex rel NSBA v Miller, 
supra (attorney made restitution of con-
verted funds more than 2 years prior to a 
complaint filed against him and without 
threat of disciplinary action). 
One of the purposes of DR 1-102 and DR 
9-102 of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is to protect innocent persons from 
suffering any financial loss because of any 
misappropriation of funds by lawyers. In 
this case, Veith's contention that any sanc-
tion should be mitigated because no law-
yer's client suffered any financial loss is 
not persuasive. Veith borrowed $10,000 
from a bank, $25,000 from a friend, and 
$10,600 from a relative to restore those 
funds in the trust account which he had 
misappropriated. On October 16, 1989, 
when asked by a member of the Committee 
on Inquiry where he stood on these loans, 
Veith replied- "Very seriously within the 
last 48 to 72 hours my wife and I have 
seriously sat down and talked about bank-
ruptcy and that's a very serious considera-
tion to the point where we've formulated a 
plan to potentially do that " 
[20] Because Veith borrowed money 
and reimbursed the funds he misappropri-
ues> rnigni not suner unanciai loss oecause 
of Vc Ji's misappropriate .> Veith filed 
bankruptcy both personally and for his 
business on January 13, 1990. His inno-
cent lenders may or may not suffer a finan-
cial loss. Regardless of whether the lend-
ers are or are not reimbursed, the fact that 
no client suffered any financial loss is no 
excuse for a [25ilawyer to misappropriate 
clients' funds nor any reason why a lawyer 
should not receive a severe sanction. See, 
In the Matter of Galloway, 278 S.C. 615, 
300 S.E.2d 479 (1983) (restitution of con-
verted funds may have little or no effect in 
mitigating the sanction); Greenbaum v. 
State Bar, 15 Cal.3d 893, 544 P.2d 921, 126 
Cal.Rptr. 785 (1976) (fact that client was 
not and would not be harmed by attorney's 
action was irrelevant); Heavey v. State 
Bar, 17 Cal.3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 131 
Cal.Rptr. 406 (1976) (fact that client suffers 
no harm is mere fortuity) But see, Louisi-
ana State Bar Ass'n v. Larre, 457 So 2d 
649 (La.1984) (repayment of funds along 
with severe depression and lack of prior 
disciplinary record may act as mitigating 
factors); The Florida Bar v. Whitlock, 426 
So.2d 955 (Fla.1982) (depositing personal 
funds into client trust accounts to bring 
them back to their proper balances will not 
excuse the lawyer of his conversion, but 
where there is no permanent financial loss 
to client a lighter sanction may be im-
posed). 
Factors which do favor mitigation are 
that Veith (1) was in good standing and 
free from disciplinary complaint or penalty, 
(2) has exhibited an attitude of regret and 
remorse, (3) has sought and received coun-
seling, (4) has a good reputation in the 
community, (5) has cooperated fully with 
the Counsel for Discipline, and (6) has ap-
parently provided many pro bono hours. 
CONCLUSION 
[21,22] Veith cites a myriad of cases 
comparing various misconduct violations 
and their resulting sanctions None of 
those are binding on this court's decision. 
To determine what sanction is appropriate, 
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each case justifying discipline of an attor-
ney must be evaluated individually in light 
of the particular facts and circumstances 
State ex rel NSBA v Miller, 225 Neb 261, 
404 NW2d 40 (1987) Disbarment has 
been, and continues to be, a viable sanction 
in cases involving serious breach of disciph 
nary rules 
There has been a trend in recent years 
toward lighter sanctions, a trend this court 
is convinced must be reversed The corre 
lation between the decline of public confi 
dence in the legal | ^ profession and the 
trend toward lighter attorney discipline 
sanctions is no coincidence 
"[Excuses such as] a 'lack of intent to 
deprive the client of his money' or 'per 
sonal hardship' stand out like an 
invitation to the lawyer who is in finan 
cial difficulty for one reason or another 
All too often he is willing to risk a slap 
on the wrist, and even a little ignominy, 
hoping he won't get caught, but knowing 
that if he is he can plead restitution, but 
[sic] duly contrite, and escape the ulti-
mate punishment The profession and 
the public suffer as a consequence The 
willful misappropriation of client funds 
should be the Bar's equivalent of a capi 
tal offense The [sic] should be no ex 
cuses " 
The Florida Bar v Breed, 378 So 2d 783, 
784 (Flal979) (Florida Supreme Court 
quoting a referee and giving notice that it 
would not be reluctant to disbar an attor 
ney for this type of offense, reversing past 
trend of suspension as only discipline) 
Notwithstanding the mitigating factors 
in Veith's favor, the facts that Veith com 
mingled trust funds with his law office 
funds and willfully misappropriated them 
lead this court to conclude that m this case 
disbarment is the only appropnate sane 
tion Veith is directed to pay costs in ac 
cordance with Neb Rev Stat §§ 7-114 and 
7-115 (Reissue 1987) 
JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT 
WHITE, J , not participating 
238 Neb 268 
J ^ S T A T E of Nebraska, Appellee, 
v 
Aaron C GIBBS, Appellant 
Nos 81-920, 82-026 and 82-027 
Supreme Court of Nebraska 
June 7, 1991 
Defendant was cdnvicted and 
tenced following guilty pleas to felon? 
charges of burglary, escape, and ' tag 
counts of receiving stolen property by tn£ 
District Court, Douglas County, John Et 
Clark and Donald J Hamilton, JJ Defeg 
dant's consolidated appeals were reinstated 
as direct appeals by decision from Unite| 
States Court of Appeals on grounds W 
ineffective assistance of counsel, raisedjn 
habeas corpus petition, 881 F 2d 1080 Thf 
Supreme Court, Colwell, District JudgV 
Retired, held that (1) photographic array 
in burglary investigation was not unduly 
suggestive, (2) trial court's failure to "Sg-
vise that guilty pleas could result in conseV 
utive sentences was not error, (3) eight^ 
month unexplained trial delay was not denl 
al of defendant's right to speedy trial, (^4£ 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel were remedied by reinstatement (ft 
direct appeal, and (5) aggregate senteiicJ 
of ten to nineteen years' imprisonment w& 
not excessive 
Affirmed 
1. Criminal Law <®=>1158(4) 
In determining correctness of trial 
court's ruling on suppression motion, Su^ 
preme Court will uphold trial court's find-
ings of fact unless those findings are clear-, 
ly erroneous 
2 CrimnTal Law <S=>1158(4) 
In reviewing trial court's findings of 
fact m its ruling on suppression motion,^  
Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence4 
C • a* 470 N WM 
^ resolve conflicts in evidence, but rather, 
recognizes trial court as finder of fact and 
takes into consideration that trial court has 
observed witness testifying in regard to 
iuch motions 
\ Criminal Law <s=339 7(1) 
** Whether photographic array identifica 
tion procedures are unduly suggestive and 
conducive to substantial likelihood of irrep 
arable mistake in identification is to be 
determined by consideration of totality of 
circumstances surrounding procedures 
4 Criminal Law <S=>339 7(4) 
^ Photographic array used to identify 
burglary defendant was not unduly sug 
gestive, even though defendant was only 
^individual depicted without facial hair 
fence array included five individuals victim 
?
 remembered defendant because of defen 
'dant's face, nose, and eyes and defendant 
twas not singled out from other four indi 
TViduals by dress height, weight age or 
khair style Neb Rev St § 28-507(1) 
5 Criminal Law <s=1169 1(5) 
, Any error in photographic array identi 
fication procedure was harmless since vie 
tim's identification of defendant at trial 
was supported independently by victim's 
observations at time of burglary, thus de 
nial of suppression motion was not error 
Neb Rev St § 28-507(1) 
6 Criminal Law <s=>273 1(4) 
' In order to support finding .that plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere has been volun 
tanly entered, trial court must inform de 
fendant concerning nature of charge, right 
to assistance of counsel, right to confront 
• witnesses against defendant, right to jury 
i trial, pnvilege against self incrimination 
and possible range of penalties for each 
-crime U S C A Const Amend 6 
7. Criminal Law «=>273 1(4) 
Trial court's failure to inform defen 
dant that sentences for escape and theft 
guilty pleas might run consecutively did 
not make defendant's guilty pleas involun 
tary, explanation of possible range of pen 
alties for each crime was sufficient Neb 
£evSt §§ 28-517 28-518 28-912(1) 
558 (Neb 1991) 
8 Criminal Law <fc=»577 \$W 
Failure to move for discharge prior to 
trial or entry of guilty plea or nolo conten 
dere constitutes waiver of right to speedy 
trial Neb Rev St § 29-1209 U S C A 
Const Amend 6, Const Art 1 § 13 
9 Criminal Law <S=>228 
Right to speedy preliminary hearing in 
trial is relative and depends upon existing 
circumstances right is not denied where 
delay is satisfactorily explained by govern 
ment and defendant is brought to trial as 
soon* as reasonably possible U S C A 
Const Amend 6 Const Art 1 § 13 
10 Criminal Law «=>228, 264 
Unexplained delay between arrest and 
arraignment or preliminary hearing does 
not demonstrate violation of right to 
speedy trial in absence of prejudice U S 
CA Const Amend 6 Const Art 1 § 13 
11 Criminal Law <s=>577 10(3) 577 15(1) 
Eight month delay between date of 
burglary defendant s preliminary hearing 
and trial did not violate right to speedy 
trial where there was no showing that de 
lay was purposeful or oppressive and de 
fendant made no showing that pretrial de 
lay caused substantial prejudice to right to 
fair trial Neb Rev St § 29-1207 U S 
CA Const Amend 6 Const Art 1 § 13 
12 Criminal Law <a>641 13(1) 
To sustain claim of ineffective assist 
ance of counsel defendant must show that 
counsel's performance was deficient and 
that such deficient performance prejudiced 
defendant, prejudice requires demonstra 
tion of reasonable probability that but for 
counsel's deficient performance result of 
proceedings would have been different 
U S C A Const Amend 6 Const Art 1 
§ 11 
13 Criminal Law <fc=1131(7) 
Claims that defendant received ineffec 
tive assistance of counsel at time of direct 
appeals from four felony convictions were 
remedied by reinstatement of appeals 
U S C A Const Amend 6 Const Art 1 
§ 11 
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would be excused for his naivete, but 
whether he must be disbarred in spite of i t 
To the extent Wilson precludes us from 
considering the entire record in misappro-
priation cases, I am no longer satisfied that 
it is necessary for the Court to follow its 
mandate unreservedly. I believe the Wil-
son rule should continue to guide the Court 
in determining the discipline to be imposed 
in the vast majority of misappropriation 
cases. Those determinations, however, 
would in my view better reflect the collec-
tive wisdom of the Court and better serve 
the interests of the bar and the public if 
they were tempered by a recognition that 
under special circumstances discipline short 
of disbarment may occasionally be appro-
priate in knowing misappropriation cases. 
All of this Court's resources—its experi-
ence, discretion, compassion, insight, and 
judgment—are brought to bear in deciding 
the wide variety of cases on its docket. 
We need not limit our available resources 
when we decide attorney-discipline cases 
involving the alleged misappropriation of 
clients' funds. 
Justices O'HERN and GARIBALDI join 
in this opinion. 
\2wF0r suspension—Chief Justice 
WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, 
HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, 
GARIBALDI and STEIN—7. 
Opposed—None. 
ORDER 
It is ORDERED that MICHAEL A. KO-
NOPKA of PASSAIC, who was admitted to 
the bar of this State in 1971, is hereby 
suspended for six months, effective Octo-
ber 28, 1991, and until the further Order of 
the Court; and it is further 
ORDERED that respondent shall be re-
strained and enjoined from practicing law 
during the period of his suspension and 
that he shall comply with Administrative 
Guideline 23 of the Office of Attorney Eth-
ics, which governs suspended attorneys; 
and it is further 
ORDERED that all funds, if any,* 
rently existing in any New Jersey fixM 
institution maintained by MICHAM 
KONOPKA, pursuant to Rule 1:21-6, u 
be restrained from disbursement exS 
upon application to this Court, for^ji 
cause shown, pending the further OrdeY 
this Court, and it is further " ' 
ORDERED that respondent shall reg 
burse the Ethics Financial Committee^ 
appropriate administrative costs incurred 
the prosecution of this matter. 
126 NJ. 261 
J26iln the Matter of Michael J. BELL^jj 
an Attorney-at-Law. 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
Argued Sept. 26, 1989. 
Decided Oct. 4, 1991. 
In attorney disciplinary proceeding^ 
the Supreme Court held that knowing mis-
appropriation of client funds, even if not 
for personal gain, warrants disbarment^! 
Disbarment ordered. 
Stein, J., filed opinion concurr ing^ 
part and dissenting in part, with .whicjj 
O'Hern and Garibaldi, JJ., joined. 
Attorney and Client <s=*58 
Knowing misappropriation of clienrt" 
funds warrants disbarment, even though 
use of funds is not for personal gain, ancf 
despite personal problems. Code of Pro?." 
Resp., DR 9-102. 
John J. Janasie, Deputy Ethics Counsel/ 
Westfield, argued the cause on behalf of' 
Office of Attorney Ethics. 
MATTER 
ate •* 596 kJA 
,, Matthew Boylan, for respondent (Lowen-
jtein, Sandler, Kohl, Fisher & Boylan, 
Roseland, attorneys). 
PER CURIAM. 
This matter stems from three complaints 
filed against respondent following an audit 
iof his books and records. The District VI 
Ethics Committee (Ethics Committee) 
found that respondent had engaged in con-
duct involving dishonesty and misrepresen-
tation, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4); had 
overreached clients in charging excessive 
fees, in violation of DR 2-106(D); had vio-
^lated record keeping regulations, R. 1:21-6 
and DR 9-l02(B)(3) and (C); had failed to 
'preserve the identity of client funds, in 
violation of DR 1-102(A); and had engaged 
in otherj^activities adversely reflecting 
on his fitness to practice law, in violation of 
DR 1-102(A)(6). Although it found that 
'respondent had misused trust funds, the 
Ethics Committee did not determine wheth-
e r the misuse was knowing. 
The Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) 
agreed substantially with the Ethics Com-
mittee's findings. In addition, the DRB 
found that respondent knowingly misappro-
priated client funds in three separate mat-
ters. Accordingly, the DRB recommended 
that respondent be disbarred. Three dis-
senting members of the DRB found respon-
dent's misuse of client funds to be negli-
gent and recommended a three-year sus-
pension. 
Our independent review of the record 
leads us to conclude that respondent know-
ingly misappropriated client funds and that 
he must be disbarred. Because of that 
-conclusion, this opinion is concerned, to the 
exclusion of other allegations of attorney 
misconduct, solely with the issue of know-
ing misappropriation. Within that context, 
we further limit the opinion to the acts of 
misappropriation that occurred after the 
publication of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 
409 A2d 1153 (1979). 
I 
The record clearly and convincingly es-
tablishes that respondent knowingly misap-
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propriated trust funds in two post-Wilson 
matters. In the first, his clients were 
James and Maryann Maguire, and in the 
second, his client was his cousin, Maurice 
Spagnoletti. 
The DRB summarized the facts in these 
two matters: 
In the Maguire matter, for instance, 
respondent deposited two checks in his 
trust account, one for $9,300 and the 
other for $1,000, representing the deposit 
tendered by the purchasers of the Ma-
guires' property Those deposits were 
made on December 1, 1979, and January 
9, 1980, respectively. Notwithstanding 
the fact that no disbursements were 
made on the Maguires' behalf until 
March 31, 1980, the trust account bal-
ance was only $1,697 12 on December 31, 
1979, $968.98 on January 7, 1980, 
$1,053.07 on January 31, 1980, and $12 98 
on February 29, 1980 However, respon-
dent should have held $10,300 in trust 
for the Maguires until March 31, 1980 
Thus, the trust account shortage in Ma-
guire ranged from more than $8,000 to 
more than $10,000 $8,000 of that 
l2638hortage resulted from two payments 
to respondent in December one check 
for $3,000 which cleared on December 12, 
1979, and a second check for $5,000 pay-
able to respondent, which cleared on De 
cember 17, 1979 
At the ethics hearing of January 14, 
1987, respondent conceded that there 
was a trust account shortage in connec-
tion with the Maguire transaction. He 
testified that he was unable to explain 
the reason for the shortage as a result of 
the destruction of all his records by a fire 
in his office in late 1979 He recalled, 
however, that "there were monies that 
were supposed to come from (client) Mai 
fettone which did not come which caused 
a shortage. And I believe the same day, 
I made a loan . which satisfied the 
overdraft." Indeed, the record shows— 
and respondent so admitted—that m 
April 1980 he obtained a $35,000 loan 
which he deposited in his trust account to 
cover a shortage in connection with "one 
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of the two real estate transactions." l 
Similarly, in the Spagnoletti matter, 
on June 18, 1980, respondent's trust lia-
bility to his client consisted of $20,074.64. 
On that date, however, the trust account 
balance was only $18,137.68. From June 
23 through July 7, 1980, respondent's 
trust liability to Spagnoletti amounted to 
$15,051.44. On June 23, however, the 
trust account balance was only $12,-
022.04 and, by July 7, 1980, it had de-
clined to $1,903.60. The three largest 
decreases in the trust account balance 
were the result of three checks of $3,000 
each made payable to respondent. Those 
' checks were dated July 1, July 2, and 
July 5, 1980. (Exhibit P-9 attached to 
the complaint). The July 1 and July 2 
checks were cashed on those same days; 
the July 5 check was cashed on July 7, 
1980 (Exhibit P-8 attached to the com-
plaint). 
[Footnote and transcript references 
omitted.] 
From these facts, the DRB concluded: 
It matters not that respondent might not 
have utilized those funds for his own 
gain, as he contends. In re Wilson, su-
pra, 81 NJ at 455 n. 1 [409 A2d 1153]; 
In re Noonan, [102 NJ. 157, 160, 506 
A.2& 722 (1986).] 
The record is replete with clear in-
stances of knowing misappropriation of 
trust funds. In the absence of an out-
right admission, circumstantial evidence 
can lead to the conclusion that a lawyer 
knew or had to know clients' funds were 
being invaded. Matter of Johnson, 105 
N.J. 249, 258 [520 A2d 3] (1987). 
By respondent's own admission, begin-
ning in December, when he had a coro-
nary bypass operation, and during the 
relevant times mentioned in the com-
plaint, 1978 through 1980, "I really didn't 
feel I was practicing law." I had no 
"outside office. I was using my home. 
I wasn't listed. I (did not) believe I had 
an office phone. I didn't have a secre-
1. Respondent admitted to allegations of the Eth-
ics Committee complaint that on April 19, 1980, 
he was out-of-trust to the Maguires by over 
$21,000. The Ethics Committee established the 
deficit by deducting from the proceeds of the 
tary I had no sign; and-
j^sol ic i t any business. The' only 
was doing was for people I had a 
al relationship with." According 
spondent cannot argue that t h e * 
of his practice, combined with 
that he was a sole practitioner, p 
him from closely examining his' 
count records and that, consei 
any misuse of client funds was ne 
• not intentional. As the Court V 
Matter of Johnson, supra, 105 
260 [520 A.2d 3] (1987): ' 
[W]e do not intend to sugges 
henceforth a respondent wjidj 
walks away from his fiducia 
gation as safekeeper of clienv 
can expect this Court to take an 
gent view of any misapprppi 
We will view "defensive igno: 
with a jaundiced eye. The intei 
and purposeful avoidance of JOK 
what is going on in one s trust ac 
will not be deemed a shield^ a 
proof of what would otherwise 
"knowing misappropriation." *X 
may be semantical inconsistencies 
we are confident that within our j 
system, there is sufficient diffe_ 
between intentional ignorance r^ihji 
gitimate lack of knowledge. "A 
[Transcript references omitted.] 
. In Wilson, we declared, in now fai 
language, that a misappropriation is . 
unauthorized use by the lawyer of ch 
funds entrusted to him, including not 
stealing, but also unauthorized tern, 
use for the lawyer's own purpose, *wh 
or not he derives any personal f£a| 
benefit therefrom." 81 N.J. at 455'~ 
409 A2d 1153. Knowing misappropriaj 
"consists simply of a lawyer's takinj 
client's money entrusted to him, kn( 
that it is the client's money and knt 
that the client has not authorized the 
ing." In re Noonan, 102 NJ 157,160, 
AM 722 (1986). In both the Maguire^ 
Spagnoletti matters, as the DRB cohclu 
sale of the Maguire's existing home the coi 
that sale and of the purchase of their new fijj 
On April 14, respondent brought the ac^ ji 
into balance by depositing the above-descr 
$35,000 loan. • !i!W 
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^record is replete with clear instances 
ftfjoiowing misappropriation of trust 
§>ur examination of the record reveals 
Jt'during the period he handled the Ma-
JJrV and Spagnoletti matters, respondent 
R£i his trust account both as a business 
Kount and as a personal account to ac-
$8modate some of his friends, generally 
Sefly acquaintances whose bills respon-
Ktspaid. Respondent regularly paid 
tese bills regardless of whether sufficient 
$fds were in his trust account to cover the 
S&nditures. The practice began before 
^publication of Wilson and continued 
Jereafter. Respondent described his use 
trust funds for his friends in the late 
fOs: 
fJl&A. Well, at the time, I know I had a 
Mot of personal problems; and, quite hon-
estly, I don't think I was putting in the 
ittention to the accounts that probably 
lormally I would have had before 1976. 
ajBut I had records. I knew who had 
Jnoney in the account, and who had to 
fgive me money, you know, at all times. 
„.';' Well, would it ever come an occasion 
where you made an advance for [your 
Jriend], and he owed the money, and you 
jjpaid out money on his behalf despite the 
fact that you didn't have it? 
(No response.) 
tQ. ' You didn't have it from him to make 
he disbursement? 
Oh, yeah. That happened a number 
p't imes-
3$. . And would that be the reason that 
your trust account might have been defi-
c i en t in those areas by virtue of doing 
iphe work you were doing for these partic-
ular [friends]? 
Well, at certain times, yeah, I would 
assume it would. 
^Respondent justifies his misuse of 
Rents' funds because of his personal prob-
lems. In 1975, respondent's father died, 
*fid in the following year, respondent un-
derwent double bypass heart surgery. Af-
ter this operation, respondent essentially 
S^sed accepting clients. He completed 
pending matters and accepted new matters 
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from friends only. In 1977, respondent's 
brother committed suicide. The following 
year respondent developed a nervous condi-
tion and impotency due to a diabetic condi-
tion. In 1979, because of an automobile 
accident, he was hospitalized for one month 
with two herniated discs and related back 
ailments. In December of that year, his 
residence, in which his office was located, 
burned down. Finally, in May 1980, his 
mother suffered a stroke. 
The thrust of respondent's argument is 
that his personal problems so distracted 
him that he could not diligently manage his 
trust account. He admitted, however, that 
he knew that it was unethical to use client 
funds without authorization. Furthermore, 
contrary to his asserted inability to manage 
his trust account from 1978 to 1980, re-
spondent perceived himself during this pe-
riod as possessing sufficient financial ex-
pertise to manage the affairs of others. In 
this regard, he testified: 
Q. Now, going back to the Maguire real 
estate transactions with Burch [the pre-
Wilson matter], could you, as an attor-
ney since 1960—did you understand 
1266that when you received the funds of 
$9300 and $1000, that these funds were 
to be held by you and not to be disbursed 
until the closing? 
A. As a lawyer, as a matter of general 
knowledge, of course, I know that I have 
to say, though, my state of mind was 
such that whatever you want to call it, 
neglect, lack of concern, whatever * * V 
I was not conducting a law practice, 
although I may have filed a tax return 
listing myself as a lawyer; but I certain-
ly was not the same lawyer I was * * *. 
Q. I won't argue with you; but despite 
the fact that you might not have been 
the same lawyer that you were, you did 
know even at that time that this is what 
was supposed to be done with the mon-
ey? 
A. I admit that, yes. 
Q. Mr. Bell, other than your practice as 
an attorney at law, would you consider 
yourself to have any expertise in any 
other area. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. What area would that be? 
A. Financial. 
Q. During the years 1978, 1979, and 
1980, would you still have considered 
yourself to be an expert in the area of 
finances? 
A. Yes. 
Respondent does not deny that using his 
business account as a trust account was 
improper or that his record keeping was 
shoddy and haphazard. Lawyers, as we 
have said, "have a duty to assure that their 
accounting practices are sufficient to pre-
vent misappropriation of trust funds." In 
re Fleischer, 102 NJ. 440, 447, 508 A 2d 
1115 (1986). As fiduciaries, lawyers are 
obliged to know whether their trust ac-
counts are in balance. Here, the conclu-
sion is inescapable that respondent knew 
he was using client funds without authori-
zation. It makes no difference that respon-
dent did not use any of the funds for his 
own purposes or that no client suffered 
from his misappropriation. In re Noonan, 
supra, 102 NJ. at 160, 506 A2d 722. 
Respondent's claim that his physical and 
mental problems excuse or mitigate his 
misappropriations are likewise unavailing. 
Nothing in the record establishes that his 
problems caused his misappropriations. In 
re Jacob, 95 NJ. 132, 137, 469 A. 2d 498 
(1984). Absent a "demonstration by com-
petent medical proofs that respondent suf-
fered a loss of competency, comprehension 
or will of a magnitude that could excuse 
egregious ^misconduct," his physical or 
mental condition will not excuse the know-
ing misuse of client funds. Ibid. 
II 
Although respondent may have endured 
more grief within several years than many 
endure in a lifetime, his suffering did not 
prevent him from knowing what he was 
doing when he misused client funds. Ac-
cordingly, we find that respondent know-
ingly misappropriated funds in violation of 
DR 9-102 and must be disbarred. 
Respondent shall reimburse the Ethics 
Financial Committee for appropriate admin-
istrative costs, including the costsjfij 
scripts. r lixmffl 
STEIN, J., concurring in par$Ji9 
dissenting in part. **J<?9 
I expressed the view in In re Kan 
126 NJ 225, 596 A.2d 733 (l&ffl 
although the Wilson rule i s „3 j j 
rule for the vast^majority of misajra 
ation cases, the inflexibility with wr 
can be applied runs the risk of $ 3 
within our attorney-discipline syste 
almost reflexive approach to s u d y 
obscuring and ignoring the indivjdiB 
cumstances to an intolerable "me 
[Id. at 241, 596 AM 733.] .jjgffl 
I observed that the Court's disposltio 
misappropriation cases "would in 'myS 
better reflect the collective wisdonH? 
Court and better serve the interests B 
bar and the public if they were teml 
by a recognition that under special cir 
stances discipline short of disbarra^n? 
occasionally be appropriate in knowing 
appropriation cases." Id. at 259, §96i 
The Court's opinion cites two insja 
of respondent's knowing misapproprk 
both of which allegedly occurred4afte] 
spondent had undergone double, Jyg 
heart surgery and had ceased ,accep 
new matters other than for friends.\At 
District Ethics Committee hearing uvT 
.respondent was unable to justify'thejr 
account shortage in one client's funay 
concededly had existed in 1980, explaB 
that a fire J26shad destroyed his^'w 
records in 1979. The evidence of knew 
misappropriation was sufficiently &mt5 
ous that three members of the DiscipMJ 
Review Board concluded that respondS 
conduct was negligent, not knowing. % 
record also reflects that any funds'vw 
drawn improperly were replaced, no'cli 
having sustained any financial loss; ^ s 
note that respondent voluntarily place-gj 
name on the inactive list in 1980, and! 
not practiced law since then. ,UM 
The most distinctive aspect of this reoc 
is that respondent attributes his matteng 
to his practice and the resultant misuse] 
clients' funds to a devastating sequence] 
MATTER 
Cite m* 596 KJA 
[its affecting respondent and his family, 
nowledging that "respondent may have 
Sured more grief within several years 
'many endure in a lifetime," ante at 
^696 A 2d 752, the Court's opinion enu-
>rates the personal tragedies that respon-
nl' sustained during the period preceding 
; alleged misappropriation: 
jjjjil975, respondent's father died, and in 
he following year, respondent under-
went double by-pass heart surgery. Af-
Ser this operation, respondent essentially 
jjceased accepting clients. He completed 
spending matters and accepted new mat-
' en for friends only. In 1977, respon-
dent's brother committed suicide. The 
following year respondent developed a 
niervous condition and impotency due to a 
[[diabetic condition. In 1979, because of 
Pan automobile accident, he was hospital-
Fized for one month with two herniated 
rdiscs and related back ailments. In De-
jcember of that year, his residence, in 
Iwhich his office was located, burned 
[down. Finally, in May 1980, his mother 
|suffered a stroke. [Ante at 265, 596 
jpi.2d 752. 
g|ln its application of the Wilson rule the 
'"tourt has ignored instances of personal 
Eragedy in determining discipline for know-
jmg misappropriation, see In re Noonan, 
|02 NJ. 157, 160, 506 A2d 722 (1986), in 
|he absence of proof that the lawyer's 
problems actually caused the misappropria-
tion of clients' funds. See In re Jacob, 95 
fyj. 132, 137, 469 A.2d 498 (1984). That 
Standard of proof heretofore has been 
Unattainable by lawyers whose misappro-
priation of funds has occurred during peri-
gxls of alcohol or drug impairment or in the 
yTourse of personal or family tragedy, 
jplffiln my view, insistence on proof that 
jjhis respondent's personal suffering 
.'caused him to misappropriate funds is both 
^unrealistic and pointless. Our human expe-
rience is sufficient to infer a relationship 
between severe personal stress and acts of 
imprudence or even desperation. The 
question should not be one of causation, 
but rather whether our disciplinary system 
is sufficiently flexible in unique circum-
stances to temper the imposition of disci-
pline by taking into account the influence 
OF BELL N.J. 757 
752 (NJ. 1991) 
of extraordinary events. It should be in 
this case. 
Accordingly, I would not vote to disbar. 
In my view, respondent should be suspend-
ed indefinitely from the practice of law, 
with leave to apply for reinstatement at 
such time as respondent is able to demon-
strate his fitness to resume practice 
* For disbarment—Chief Justice 
WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, 
HANDLER and POLLOCK—4 
Concurring in part, dissenting in 
poW—Justices O'HERN, GARIBALDI and 
STEIN—3. 
ORDER 
It is ORDERED that MICHAEL J 
BELL of JERSEY CITY, who was admitted 
to the bar of this State in 1960, be dis-
barred and that his name be stricken from 
the roll of attorneys of this State, effective 
immediately; and it is further 
ORDERED that MICHAEL J BELL be 
and hereby is permanently restrained and 
enjoined from practicing law, and it is fur-
ther 
ORDERED that all funds, if any, cur-
rently existing in any New Jersey financial 
institution maintained by MICHAEL J 
BELL, pursuant to Rule 1 21-6, shall be 
restrained from disbursement except upon 
application to this Court, for good cause 
shown, and shall be transferred by the 
financial institution to the Clerk of the 
Superior Court who is directed to deposit 
the funds in the Superior Court Trust 
Fund, pending further Order of this Court, 
and it is further 
j^oORDERED that MICHAEL J. BELL 
comply with Administrative Guideline No 
23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing 
with disbarred attorneys, and it is further 
ORDERED that MICHAEL J. BELL re-
imburse the Ethics Financial Committee for 
appropriate administrative costs. 
APPENDIX V 
940 Cal 
is denied The finding as to the torture 
murder special circumstance is reversed 
In all other respects we affirm the judg 
ment and the penalty imposed by the supe 
nor court 
LUCAS, C J , PANELLI, KENNARD 
and ARABIAN, J J , and EAGLESON J 
Assigned * 
MOSK, Associate Justice, concurring 
I concur in the judgment 
I am much disturbed by the fact that the 
People considered it desirable to call three 
jailhouse informants to testify against de 
fendant at his trial Common experience 
teaches that such persons "may have good 
reason to he " (United States v Gar 
eta (5th Cir 1976) 528 F 2d 580, 588, cf On 
Lee v United States (1952) 343 U S 747, 
757, 72 S Ct 967 973 96 L Ed 1270 [stat 
mg that [t]he use of informers accesso 
nes, accomplices false friends or any of 
the other betrayals which are dirty busi 
ness may raise serious questions of credi 
bihty ]) Recent events reveal that they 
may also have effective means—sometimes 
supplied by governmental authorities 
sometimes not—to make their falsehoods 
appear rational and persuasive (See Rep 
of the 1989-90 Los Angeles County Grand 
Jury Investigation of the Involvement of 
Jail House Informants in the Cnminal Jus 
tice System in Los Angeles County) 
In spite of the foregoing review of the 
record convinces me that the majority s 
disposition is sound Therefore I agree 
with the result 
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PEOPLE, Respondent, 
v 
Jose Martinez RAZO et al Appellants 
No S014126 
Supreme Court of California 
In Bank ^ 
Feb 28 1991' 
Prior Report Cal App 266 Cal Rptr 
158 
Pursuant to rule 29 4(c), California Rules 
of Court the above entitled review is DIS-
MISSED and cause is remanded to the 
Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District, 
Division Two 
LUCAS CJ and MOSK 
BROUSSARD PANELLI KENNARD, 
ARABIAN and BAXTER JJ concur 
onorable David N Eagleson retired Associate 
ustice of the Supreme Court sitting under as 
DONALD SCHRIVER 
INCORPORATED 
Respondent 
v 
CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT 
AND HOUSING COMMISSION, 
Appellant 
No LA 32294 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank 
Feb 28 1991 
Prior Report Cal App 230 Cal Rptr 
620 
Pursuant to rule 29 4(c) California Rules 
of Court the above entitled review is DIS 
MISSED and cause is remanded to the 
Court of Appeal Second Appellate District, 
Division Four Pursuant to rule 978 of the 
California Rules of Court the Reporter of 
Decisions is directed to publish the opinion 
in the above entitled case in the Official 
Appellate Reports See Subdivision (c) of 
Rule 978 California Rules of Court 
signmenl by the Chairperson of the Judicial 
Council 
GRIM v STATE 
CUe as 805 
LUCAS CJ and MOSK 
BROUSSARD PANELLI KENNARD 
and BAXTER JJ concur 
ARABIAN J did not participate 
[O | KlY NUMBtft SYSUM^ 
53 Cal 3d 21 
Douglas Paul GRIM, Petitioner, 
v 
The STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent 
No S014192 
Supreme Court of California 
In Bank 
March 14 1991 
Disciplinary action was brought 
against attorney The review department 
of the State Bar Court recommended that 
the respondent be disbarred The Supreme 
Court held that misappropriation of client 
funds warrants disbarment 
Disbarred 
Mosk J filed a dissenting opinion 
1 Attorney and Client 0 5 7 
The rule that culpability in state bar 
proceedings must be established by con 
vincing proof to reasonable certainty and 
that reasonable doubts must be resolved in 
favor of the attorney is inapplicable to the 
issue of appropriate discipline attorney 
bears burden of demonstrating that recom 
mended discipline is erroneous or lawful 
West s Ann Cal Bus & Prof Code 
§ 6083(c) 
2 Attorney and Client c=>58 
Although financial problems can be a 
mitigating factor in appropriate state bar 
disciplinary cases they are given signifi 
cant weight as a mitigating factor in client 
fund misappropriation cases only if the fi 
nancial problems are extreme and result 
from circumstances that are not reasonably 
foreseeable or are beyond the attorney s 
control 
BAR OF CALIFORNIA Cal 941 
V2A 941 (Cal 1991) 
3 Attorney and Client c=>58 
Restitution of client funds paid after 
commencement of disciplinary proceedings 
was not a proper mitigating circumstance 
4 Attorney and Client c=r>l(2) 
Fact that character witnesses in attor 
ney disciplinary proceeding do not know 
full extent of misconduct diminishes weight 
to be accorded to witnesses testimony 
5 Attorney and Client c=>58 
Willful misappropriation of client 
funds particularly considered with prior 
disciplinary sanction for commingling client 
funds warrants disbarment 
Douglas Paul Grim in pro per 
Arthur L Margohs Margohs L Margol 
is Los Angeles for petitioner 
Diane C Yu Richard J Zanassi Sandra 
T Larson and Gael T Infande-Weiss Of 
fice of Gen Counsel State Bar of Cahfor 
ma San Francisco for respondent 
THE COURT 
We review the recommendation of the 
Review Department of the State Bar Court 
(review department) that petitioner Doug 
las Paul Grim be disbarred from the prac 
tice of law for having wilfully misippropn 
ated $5 500 of client funds 
Petitioner contends that disbarment is 
excessive He argues that the reviev> de 
partment s conclusions of law are unsup 
ported by the evidence that it failed to 
properly weigh the evidence and that it 
failed to appropriately weigh mitigating 
and aggravating circumstances He main 
tains that the interests of the public and 
the profession can be adequately safe 
guarded by the imposition of a suspension 
with probationary monitoring 
We conclude that the review depart 
ment s recommendation is supported b> the 
record that compelling mitigating circum 
stances do not clearly predominate and 
that disbarment is warranted 
I FACTS 
Petitioner was admitted to the practice of 
law in California in January 1966 In a 
prior disciplinary proceeding in 1980 he 
was privately reproved for depositing 
942 Cal 805 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
$960 30 of a client's funds m his general 
account instead of in his client trust ac 
count, and for failing to perform services 
for the client Petitioner did not return the 
funds to the client until after the initiation 
of State Bar disciplinary proceedings 
A Evidence of Misconduct 
Before 1984, petitioner represented Dr 
Cabrera and his wife in various legal mat 
ters In 1984, following the death of Dr 
Cabrera, his widow retained petitioner to 
represent the estate of her husband in an 
action for breach of contract While the 
action was pending, Mrs Cabrera moved to 
Tennessee 
In March 1986, a judgment for $7,021 
was entered in favor of the estate Peti 
tioner received payment of the judgment in 
April, deposited the funds in his client trust 
account, and notified Mrs Cabrera of the 
receipt of the funds Of the $7,021 re-
ceived, petitioner was entitled to $1,432 57 
for fees and costs, but he used all of the 
funds for his own purposes 
Beginning in 1986, petitioner was con-
tacted on various occasions by Mrs Cabre-
ra's Tennessee attorneys, who were at 
tempting to obtain her funds from petition 
er Petitioner did not pay Mrs Cabrera 
until April 1989, after the State Bar had 
initiated disciplinary proceedings and held 
an evidentiary hearing Petitioner paid 
Mrs Cabrera a total of $6,546 ($5,546 as 
principal and $1,000 as interest) 
In addition to the evidence relating to 
Mrs Cabrera, the State Bar introduced into 
evidence the bank records of petitioner's 
trust account for the period February 1986 
to February 1988 The records showed 
that the account was overdrawn on several 
occasions Petitioner testified that he did 
not reconcile the bank statements, that in 
dividuals whom he had hired to reconcile 
his bank statements were unable to do so 
and that he relied on his banker to recon 
cile his eight to fifteen bank accounts 
1 As we have previously noted (Aromn v State 
Bar (1990) 52 Cal 3d 276 290 fn 4 276 Cal 
Rptr 160 801 P2d 403) canon 2B of the Call 
forma Code of Judicial Conduct states that 
B Evidence in Mitigation 
Petitioner's mitigating evidence centers 
on his assertion that he was under extreme 
stress because of financial problems at the 
time of his misconduct He also cites as 
mitigating circumstances his cooperation 
with the State Bar and the favorable char-
acter evidence presented at the heanng 
Petitioner's financial distress arose out 
of a troubled business venture Petitioner 
became involved in a business enterprise, 
Agri-Feeds Inc, to produce animal food 
from waste agncultural cellulose He was 
and still is the president, the chairman of 
the board of directors, and a 98 percent 
shareholder of Agri-Feeds In February 
1981, petitioner borrowed $731,000, secured 
by his personal real estate holdings, to 
construct an Agri-Feeds factory near 
Stockton In 1982, he borrowed another 
$50,000 to complete construction of the fac 
tory That same year, however, the facto 
ry was ordered closed because of air pollu 
tion problems 
In 1983, after petitioner had raised an 
additional $150,000, Agri-Feeds resumed 
operations In 1984, petitioner raised an-
other $300,000 Agri-Feeds remained in 
business until 1985, when it was closed for 
lack of operating capital In 1986, when 
the misconduct occurred, petitioner was at-
tempting to refinance Agri-Feeds while 
also practicing law His efforts to obtain 
$6 million in additional financing were un 
successful During this same period, peti 
tioner was representing clients in 10 "ma 
jor pieces of litigation," was running a car 
pool for his 2 young children (who lived 
with his ex wife), and was making child 
support and other payments to benefit his 
children ^ 
Ten character witnesses, including two 
superior court judges,' testified to petition 
er's good moral character All of them had 
known petitioner for a significant period of 
time They described petitioner as a hard 
working competent attorney who had 
been under significant financial stress as &j 
result of the problems with Agri-Feeds At 
number of the vwtnesses described petition ^ 
Judges should not testify voluntarily as charac 
ter witnesses (Cal Code Jud Conduct canon 
2B In re Rivas (1989) 49 Cal 3d 794 798 fn 6 
263 Cal Rptr 654 781 P 2d 946) 
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er's misappropriation as aberrational Sev 
en of the witnesses testified that they were 
not aware of petitioner's prior discipline 
until shortly before the hearing Four of 
these seven witnesses did not learn of peti 
tioner's failure to make restitution until 
they were questioned at the hearing All 
oft these witnesses however, maintained 
that in their opinion petitioner was of good 
moral character 
Petitioner also presented three letters 
from former clients attesting to his good 
character 
C State Bar Proceedings and Recom 
mendations 
The hearing panel, consisting of a single 
referee, cited petitioner's prior discipline as 
an aggravating factor In mitigation the 
referee listed these eight circumstances 
(1) petitioner's candor with the State Bar 
(2) petitioner s stipulation to having violat 
ed former Rules of Professional Conduct, 
rule 8-101(B)(4) (duty to promptly pay or 
deliver client funds), and Business and Pro 
fessions Code sections 6068 (duties of attor 
neys) and 6103 (violation of oath), (3) peti 
tioner's restitution to Mrs Cabrera, (4) the 
aberrational nature of petitioner's conduct, 
(5) the absence of other complaints against 
petitioner, (6) the severe financial stress to 
which petitioner was subjected as a result 
of the near failure of Agri-Feeds, (7) the 
testimony of the ten character witnesses, 
and (8) the three client letters The referee 
recommended that petitioner be suspended 
from the practice of law for tm-ee years, 
that the suspension be stayed and that 
petitioner be placed on probation for five 
years subject to conditions that included 
actual suspension for six months 
The review department, by a vote of 12 
to 2, adopted the referee's findings with 
certain modifications It deleted the ref 
eree's conclusions with respect to aggrava 
tion, and substituted a brief recitation of 
the facts relating to petitioner s prior disci 
phne The review department also deter 
mined that "[i]n misappropriating the 
funds of Ms Cabrera, [petitioner] took ad 
vantage of a family friend who was resid 
ing m Tennessee and who accordingly was 
at a disadvantage with respect to protect 
mg her interests ' The review department 
deleted the referee s second third, fourth 
fifth, sixth, and eighth factors in mitiga 
tion, and stated that most of petitioner s 
character witnesses were surprised to learn 
at the hearing that the funds had not been 
repaid It added a finding that petitioner 
had candidly admitted the misappropriation 
to his client and a finding that petitioner 
was guilty of gross neglect in the manage 
ment of his client trust funds 
In recommending disbarment the review 
department relied on the Standards for At 
torney Sanctions for Professional Miscon 
duct (Transitional Rules Proc of State Bar 
div V all further references to stand irds 
are to these provisions) The review dt 
partment concluded that compelling miti 
gating circumstances did not clearly pre 
dominate and it disregarded petitioner s 
restitution as a mitigating factor because 
the restitution was not made until after the 
hearing in this case It gave little weight 
to petitioner's character witnesses because 
of their "mistaken belief that [petitioner] 
had promptly returned Ms Cabrera s 
funds " It rejected petitioner s defense of 
financial stress because the defense did not 
meet the criteria of standard 1 2(e)(iv) for 
extreme emotional difficulty and because 
the defense was "very questionable as an 
acceptable factor in mitigation It did 
however consider petitioner s candor as a 
mitigating consideration 
II DISCUSSION 
Petitioner wilfully misappropriated his 
client's funds Misappropriation is more 
than a grievous breach of professional eth 
ICS It violates basic notions of honesty 
and endangers public confidence in the le 
gal profession {Chang v State Bar (1989) 
49 Cal 3d 114 128 260 Cal Rptr 280 775 
P2d 1049, Kelly v State Bar (1988) 45 
Cal 3d 649, 656 247 Cal Rptr 608 754 P 2d 
1104) In all but the most exceptional of 
cases, it requires the imposition of the 
harshest discipline {Chang v State Bar 
supra, 49 Cal 3d at p 128 260 Cal Rptr 
280, 775 P2d 1049 Gordon v State Bar 
(1982) 31 Cal 3d 748 757, 183 Cal Rptr 861 
647 P 2d 137 ) The seriousness of the of 
fense and the propriety of disbarment as 
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the appropriate discipline have long been 
recognized by this court (In re Ford (1988) 
44 Cal 3d 810, 816, 244 Cal Rptr 476, 749 
P2d 1331, and cases cited) and are re 
fleeted in the standards Standard 2 2(a) 
provides that wilful misappropriation of en 
trusted funds shall result in disbarment 
unless the amounts are insignificant or the 
most compelling mitigating circumstances 
clearly predominate 
We recently observed that the term wil 
ful misappropriation ' as used in attorney 
discipline cases, "covers a broad range of 
conduct varying significantly in the degree 
of culpability ' and that [djisbarment 
would rarely, if ever be an appropriate 
discipline for an attorney whose only mis 
conduct was a single act of negligent mis 
appropnation, unaccompanied by acts of 
deceit or other aggravating factors ' (Ed 
wards v State Bar (1990) 52 Cal 3d 28, 38 
276 Cal Rptr 153, 801 P 2d 396 ) The mis 
appropriation in this case, however, was 
not the result of carelessness or mistake, 
petitioner acted deliberately and with full 
knowledge that the funds belonged to his 
client Moreover, the evidence supports an 
inference that petitioner intended to perma 
nently deprive his client of her funds peti 
tioner repaid the funds only after the pas 
sage of almost three years and then only 
under the pressure of these disciplinary 
proceedings Standard 2 2(a) is properly 
applied to such grave misconduct 
[1J The standards and the recommenda 
tion of the review department are entitled 
to great weight (In re Naney (1990) 51 
Cal 3d 186, 190, 270 Cal Rptr 848, 793 P 2d 
54) When, as here, the review depart 
ment's recommendation is consistent with 
the standards, we generally will not reject 
the recommendation unless we entertain 
grave doubts about its propriety (See 
e g , Hawes v State Bar (1990) 51 Cal 3d 
2 Petitioners argument that in determining dis 
cipline we must resolve all reasonable doubts in 
his favor is incorrect The rule that culpability 
in State Bar proceedings must be established by 
convincing proof to a reasonable certainty and 
that reasonable doubts must be resolved in fa 
vor of the attorney (Price v Stare Bar (1982) 30 
Cal 3d 537 547 179 Cai Rptr 914 638 P 2d 
1311 Emslie v State Bar (1974) 11 Cal 3d 210 
226 113 Cal Rptr 175 520 P 2d 991) is inapph 
587, 595, 274 Cal Rptr 2, 797 P 2d 1180, In 
re Rivas, supra, 49 Cal 3d 794, 800, 263 
Cal Rptr 654, 781 P 2d 946) The attorney 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
recommendation is erroneous or unlawful 
(Bus & Prof Code § 6083, subd (c))2 
Petitioner does not contend that the 
amount he misappropnated>($5 546) was in 
significant (See Lawhorn v State Bar 
(1987) 43 Cal 3d 1357, 1361, 1368, 240 Cal 
Rptr 848 743 P 2d 908 [$1,355 75 held to 
be a significant amount]) Yet he asserts 
that the recommended discipline of disbar 
ment is excessive Thus the issue before 
us is whether petitioner has* shown that 
'the most compelling mitigating circum 
stances clearly predominate " (Std 
2 2(a)) 
In challenging the review department's 
recommendation of disbarment, petitioner 
argues that it deleted from the referee's 
decision certain findings in mitigation that 
were supported by sufficient evidence, and 
that it made conclusions regarding aggra 
vating circumstances that were not sup-
ported by the evidence A discussion of 
petitioner's contentions follows 
A Mitigating Circumstances 
Petitioner contends the review depart 
ment failed to accord appropriate weight in 
mitigation to his severe financial stress, the 
absence «of complaints or misconduct re 
ported to the State Bar other than his prior 
discipline, the aberrational nature of his 
misconduct his restitution to Mrs Cabrera, 
his cooperation in the State Bar proceed 
mgs, and the testimony of his character 
witnesses 
In rejecting petitioner's financial stress 
as a mitigating factor, the review depart 
ment cited standard 1 2(e)(iv)3 and, inde 
pendent of the reference to this standard 
cable to the issue of appropriate discipline 
Culpability is not in issue in this case 
3 Standard 1 2(e)(iv) says that severe emotional 
difficulties may be a mitigating circumstance if 
it is established by expert testimony and the 
attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing 
evidence that he no longer suffers from the 
difficulties 
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questioned the propriety of financial stress 
as a factor in mitigation Petitioner cites 
certain decisions by this court for the prop 
osition that financial stress may be con 
sidered in mitigation, and he argues that 
standard 1 2(e)(iv) is inapplicable here 
[2] Financial problems can be a mitigat 
ing factor in appropriate State Bar disciph 
nary cases (See e g Amante v State 
Bar (1990) 50 Cal 3d 247 254, 266 Cal Rptr 
648 786 P 2d 375, Bradpiece v State Bar 
(1974) 10 Cal 3d 742 747 111 Cal Rptr 905 
518 P 2d 337 ) In misappropriation cases 
financial problems are given significant 
weight in mitigation only if they are ex 
treme and result from circumstances *hat 
are not reasonably foreseeable or that are 
beyond the attorney s control (In re Na 
ney supra 51 Cal 3d at p 196 270 Cal 
Rptr 848 793 P 2d 54 ) Financial difficul 
ties exist in virtually all misappropriation 
cases for the simple reason that it is usual 
ly the attorney s need or desire for money 
that is the motivation for stealing client 
funds Unless our consideration of an at 
torney's financial pressures as a mitigating 
factor is confined to circumstances not rea 
sonably foreseeable or beyond the attor 
ney s control the rule prohibiting misap 
propnation and the substantial protection 
it affords the public, will be largely nulli 
fied It is precisely when the attorney s 
need or desire for funds is greatest that 
the need for the public protection afforded 
by the rule prohibiting misappropriation is 
greatest (See e g Amante v State Bar 
supra, 50 Cal 3d at p 255 266 Cal Rptr 
648 786 P2d 375, Smith v State Bar 
(1985) 38 Cal 3d 525 540-541 213 Cal Rptr 
236 698 P 2d 139 ) 
Petitioner s reliance on financial stress 
as a mitigating factor is misplaced His 
financial difficulties were neither unfore 
seeable nor beyond his control It was the 
near failure of Agri-Feeds petitioner s 
business venture that was primarily re 
sponsible for petitioner s stress As men 
tioned earlier the purpose of Agri-Feeds 
of which petitioner owns 98 percent of the 
4 Because petitioner has not shown that finan 
cial stress should be considered as a mitigating 
factor in this case a discussion of the review 
stock, is to convert waste agricultural eel 
lulose into animal food It is a novel enter 
prise using untested technology The risk 
of financial failure was reasonably foresee 
able by petitioner Indeed Agri-Feeds hid 
closed twice once in 1983 and once in 1985 
before petitioner misappropriated Mrs Ca 
brera s money Petitioner controlled his 
business venture Petitioner fin inced 
Agri-Feeds through loans secured by his 
real estate holdings and personal guaran 
ties Under these circumstances petition 
er s financial problems are not entitled to 
significant weight in mitigation ' 
Petitioner argues that except for the 
1980 prior discipline and the present disci 
phnary matter he has committed no mis 
conduct since his admission to the State 
Bar in 1966 and that this should be con 
sidered a mitigating circumstance He also 
points out that a number of his chiracter 
witnesses testified that his misippropni 
tion in this case was aberrational I t h m o r 
Petitioners private rtproval in 19S0 w is 
based on a stipulation as to facts and disci 
pline The stipulation cited as a mitigating 
circumstance the fact that petitioner had 
practiced law since 1966 without prior disci 
pline Thus before these proceedings the 
length of petitioner s practice and the ab 
sence of complaints from clients art cir 
cumstances that have alreadv been relied 
on to justify the imposition of a lesser 
degree of discipline The prior discipline 
was imposed for petitioner s commingling 
of client funds and his failure to perform 
services Commingling like misappropm 
tion (the misconduct involved here) is a 
serious offense involving funds entrusted 
to an attorney (Std 2 2(a) & (b)) Al 
though petitioner minimizes the signifi 
cance of his prior discipline it is an aggra 
vating factor (Stds 1 2(b)(i) 17) Be 
cause of the similarity between and the 
seriousness of petitioner s 1980 misconduct 
and the present misconduct we reject peti 
tioner s contention 
[3] Petitioner also contends his restitu 
tion of Mrs Cabrera s funds should be 
departments conclusion that pet t o u r s c\ 
dence did not satisfy the requ rements of stan 
dard 1 2(e)(iv) is unnecessary 
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considered as mitigating Petitioner, how-
ever, did not make the payment until after 
he had been contacted by Mrs Cabrera's 
Tennessee attorneys and after the State 
Bar had commenced disciplinary proceed-
ings Restitution paid under the force or 
threat of disciplinary proceedings is not a 
proper mitigating circumstance {Hitch-
cock v State Bar (1989) 48 Cal 3d 690, 709, 
257 CalRptr 696, 771 P 2d 394) 
Petitioner correctly argues that the re 
view department erred in deleting the ref-
eree's finding that petitioner's admission of 
violation of the former Rules of Profession 
al Conduct and Business and Professions 
Code sections constituted a mitigating cir 
cumstance It is true that cooperation with 
the State Bar during its investigation and 
proceedings is a mitigating factor (Std 
12(e)(v)) 
As noted earlier, 10 character witnesses 
testified on behalf of petitioner at the hear 
mg Among them were two superior court 
judges and one lawyer The remaining 
seven witnesses were business associates 
or business people who had known petition 
er for some time Several of the witnesses 
testified that petitioner had performed le 
gal work for them The referee cited the 
testimony of the character witnesses in 
mitigation The review department, how-
ever, gave little weight to the testimony in 
light of the witnesses' "mistaken belief 
that petitioner had promptly returned Mrs 
Cabrera's funds 
Petitioner contends the review depart-
ment failed to give sufficient weight to the 
testimony of his character witnesses We 
agree that the review department appears 
to have discounted this testimony too 
much But we do not agree that the testi-
mony established mitigation of a most com-
pelling nature 
[4] The record shows that four of the 
ten character witnesses, including one of 
the two judges, were unaware that petition 
er had failed to make restitution to Mrs 
Cabrera by the time of the hearing Thus, 
an appreciable number of petitioner's wit 
nesses did not know the full extent of 
petitioner's misconduct (Std 12(e)(vi)) 
Petitioner's failure to make full disclosure 
to these witnesses before the heanng di-
minishes the weight to be accorded the 
testimony of these witnesses The testimo-
ny is, nevertheless, entitled to considerable 
weight because even after learning of peti-
tioner's failure to restore the misappropri-
ated funds, the character witnesses main-
tained that petitioner possessed good moral 
character 
B Aggravating Circumstances 
Petitioner challenges the review depart-
ment's finding, in aggravation, that he took 
advantage of a family friend who was re-
siding in another state and thus was at a 
disadvantage with respect to protecting her 
interests Petitioner also challenges the 
review department's finding that he was 
guilty of gross neglect m the management 
of his trust funds and office accounts Pe-
titioner maintains that the review depart-
ment's findings are not within the charges 
set forth in the notice to show cause and 
are not supported by the findings of the 
hearing panel 
1 Notice to Show Cause 
An attorney cannot be disciplined for a 
violation not alleged in the notice to show 
cause If the evidence shows an ethical 
violation not charged in the notice, the 
State Bar must amend the notice to con 
form to proof A slight variance in the 
evidence that relates to the noticed charge, 
however, does not require an amendment 
unless the attorney demonstrates that the 
defense was actually compromised (Van 
Sloten v State Bar (1989) 48 Cal 3d 921, 
928-929, 258 Cal Rptr 235, 771 P 2d 1323) 
Furthermore, although evidence of un-
charged misconduct cannot be used as an 
independent ground of discipline, it may be 
considered when it is otherwise relevant to 
an issue in the proceeding {Arm v State 
Bar (1990) 50 Cal 3d 763, 775, 268 Cal Rptr 
741, 789 P 2d 922 ) 
The review department's finding that pe 
titioner took advantage of Mrs Cabrera as 
a family friend residing in another state 
and its finding that he mismanaged his 
trust account were not used as independent 
grounds of discipline but as circumstances 
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Factors in aggravation in not support the review department s find in aggravation 
elude indifference toward rectifying the 
consequences of the misconduct (Std 
1 2(b)(v)) and lack of cooperation with the 
victim of the misconduct (Std 1 2(b)(vi)) 
The evidence of petitioner's mismanage 
ment of his trust account was also relevant 
to a factor in aggravation Standard 
1 2(b)(u) provides that it shall be considered 
an aggravating factor "that the current 
misconduct found or acknowledged by the 
member evidences multiple acts of wrong 
doing or demonstrates a pattern of miscon 
duct " Petitioner was charged with misap 
propnating client funds from his trust ac 
count He stipulated that he took Mrs 
Cabrera's money for his own use He also 
testified at the hearing that his trust ac 
count was overdrawn on several occasions 
And he testified that neither he nor mdivid 
uals whom he had hired were able to recon 
cile his bank statements The review de 
partment properly considered this evidence 
2 Heanng Panel Findings and Suffi 
ciency of Evidence 
Petitioner asserts that the review depart 
ment's findings in aggravation are not sup 
ported by the findings of the hearing panel 
The argument is without merit The re 
view department has the authority to 
"adopt findings, conclusions and a decision 
or recommendation at variance with the 
hearing department " (Transitional Rules 
Proc of State Bar, rule 453(a)) Because 
the review department has such authority, 
we will deem petitioner's assertion to be a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the review department's find 
mgs in aggravation 
We agree with petitioner that the record 
does not support the review department's 
finding that Mrs Cabrera was a family 
friend of petitioner The record merely 
shows that before the misconduct in this 
case petitioner represented Dr and Mrs 
Cabrera in some legal matters that Mrs 
Cabrera would inquire about petitioner s 
children, and that she invited petitioner to 
see her in Tennessee if he happened to be 
in that state for a visit These instances do 
mg that Mrs Cabrera was a family friend 
The record does, however, support the 
review department's finding that petitioner 
took advantage of Mrs Cabrera s move to 
Tennessee after her husband s death The 
record discloses that attorneys from Ten 
nessee representing Mrs Cabrera contact 
ed petitioner on various occasions in an 
effort to obtain her funds from petitioner 
Although petitioner told the attorneys he 
would pay Mrs Cabrera he did not do so 
until after the State Bar heanng in this 
case We conclude that the review depart 
ment properly considered these circum 
stances as aggravating factors (Std 
1 2(b)(m)) 
Contrary to petitioner s assertion the re 
view department properlv found that peti 
tioner had exhibited gross neglect in the 
management of his trust funds and office 
accounts The record shows that petition 
er's trust account was overdrawn on sever 
al occasions and that his bink statements 
could not be reconciled 
C Propriety of Discipline 
[5] Petitioner contends that the recom 
mended discipline of disbarment is exces 
sive, unduly harsh and unnecessary He 
argues that disbarment exceeds the le\el of 
discipline that this court h is imposed in 
comparable cases and that monitored pro 
bation will adequately protect the public 
interest 
The extent of discipline is determined by 
a balanced consideration of the rele\ant 
factors (McCray v State Bar (1985) 38 
Cal 3d 257, 273, 211 Cal Rptr 691 696 P 2d 
83) The imposition of discipline less than 
disbarment in other cases involving differ 
ent facts (see, e g Lawhom v State Bar 
supra, 43 Cal 3d 1357 1368 240 Cal Rptr 
848, 743 P2d 908 [compelling mitigating 
factors in a case falling between wilful 
misappropriation and simple comming 
ling"], Chasteen v State Bar (1985) 40 
Cal 3d 586 592-593 220 Cal Rptr 842 709 
P 2d 861 [recommended discipline in 
creased]) does not lead to the conclusion 
that disbarment m this case is unwarrant 
ed (See, e g Chang v State Bar supra 
948 Cal. 
49 Cal.3d at pp. 128-129, 260 Cal.Rptr. 280, 
775 P.2d 1049 [disbarment based on single 
misappropriation]; In re Demergian (1989) 
48 Cal.3d 284, 289, 298, 256 Cal.Rptr. 392, 
768 P.2d 1069 [disbarment based on theft 
of client funds]; In re Abbott (1977) 19 
Cal.3d 249, 251, 254, 137 Cal.Rptr. 195, 561 
P.2d 285 [same].) 
Petitioner has not shown that the review 
department's recommendation of disbar-
ment is erroneous or unlawful. Petition-
er's cooperation with the State Bar and 
evidence of his good character do not con-
stitute compelling mitigation in view of the 
various circumstances in aggravation. Pe-
titioner misappropriated Mrs. Cabrera's 
$5,546. He has a prior disciplinary record. 
He did not make restitution, despite the 
efforts of Mrs. Cabrera's Tennessee attor-
neys to obtain her funds, until after the 
State Bar's evidentiary hearing. He took 
advantage of the fact that Mrs. Cabrera 
resided in another state and placed his in-
terests over those of his client. 
Because disbarment is warranted, it is 
not necessary to address the possibility of 
prophylactic measures, such as the imposi-
tion of a probation monitor, that may be 
appropriate when lesser forms of discipline 
are warranted. 
DISPOSITION 
It is ordered that Douglas Paul Grim be 
disbarred from the practice of law in Cali-
fornia, that his name be stricken from the 
roll of attorneys, that he comply with rule 
955 of the California Rules of Court, and 
that he perform the acts specified in subdi-
visions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 
40 days, respectively, after the effective 
date of this order. Failure to comply with 
rule 955 may result in imprisonment. (Bus. 
& Prof.Code, § 6126, subd. (c).) This order 
is effective upon the finality of this deci-
sion in this court. (See Cal.Rules of Court, 
rule 953(a).) 
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referee recommended five years' probatior 
that included six months' actual suspension 
and other conditions. 
The petitioner was guilty of one actf6f 
misappropriation. Unquestionably it was 
serious and caused inconvenience to .the 
client affected thereby. However this was' 
one isolated incident and jn no way indi-
cates a course of conduct. Since a private' 
reproval 11 years ago the petitioner has 
been free of improper or unprofessional 
practice. 
Under these circumstances disbarment 
impresses me as excessive punishment un-
necessary for the protection of the public. 
CO I KEV NUMBER $YST[M> 
53 Ca!.3d 1 
In re Ralph J. LEARDO on 
Disbarment. 
No. S013350. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
March 14, 1991. 
MOSK, Justice, dissenting. 
I dissent. 
I would adopt the recommendation of the 
referee who heard the evidence and had an 
opportunity to evaluate the witnesses. The 
Attorney disciplinary proceeding was 
brought. The Review Department of the 
State Bar Court recommended disbarment, 
but the Supreme Court held that convic-
tions of possessing controlled substances 
with intent to distribute warrant five-year 
suspension from practice of law, with order 
stayed on stringent conditions of probation, 
m light of mitigating evidence and evidence 
of rehabilitation. 
Suspended, stayed on conditions of 
probation. 
1. Attorney and Client <s=>57 
While Supreme Court gives great 
weight to review department's recommen-
dation of attorney discipline, Court exercis-
IN RE L 
Cite a* 805 ?2d 
es its independent judgment in determining 
proper discipline to impose. 
2. Attorney and Client <£=>58 
Convictions of possession of controlled 
substances with intent to distribute involve 
moral turpitude and serious misconduct, 
warranting disbarment in the absence of 
compelling mitigating circumstances. 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and1 Control Act of 1970, § 401(a)(1), 21 
U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1); West's Ann.Cal.Bus. 
& Prof.Code § 6101(a). 
3. Attorney and Client <S=>58 
Compelling mitigating circumstances 
and evidence of rehabilitation would pre-
vent convictions of possessing controlled 
substances with intent to distribute from 
warranting disbarment; initial addiction to 
opiates resulted from legitimate medical 
treatment, rehabilitation began promptly 
upon incarceration, and drug-free and alco-
hol-free periods following incarceration ex-
ceeded four years. Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 
§ 401(a)(1), 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1); West's 
Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 6101(a). 
4. Attorney and Client <s=>58, 60 
Conviction of two counts of possessing 
controlled substances with intent to distrib-
ute warrants suspension from practice of 
law for five years, stayed only on stringent 
conditions of probation, with no actual sus-
pension required, in light of service of four 
and one-half years on noncustodial interim 
suspension and lack of financial profit from 
drug sales made to undercover agent who 
proposed and urged transactions."'Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970, § 401(a)(1), 21 U.S.C.A. 
§ 841(a)(1); West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 6101(a); Cal.Rules of Court, Rule 
953(a). 
5. Attorney and Client <S=*57, 58 
Disciplinary standard providing that, 
even when there are compelling mitigating 
circumstances, discipline for conviction of 
crime of moral turpitude shall not be less 
than two year actual suspension, prospec-
,EARDO Cal. 949 
948 (Cal. 1991) 
tive to any interim suspension, is simply 
guideline for use by State Bar, and wheth-
er recommended discipline is appropriate is 
still matter for Supreme Court's indepen-
dent review. State Bar Procedure Rule 
611; West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code 
§ 6002.1. 
George V. Denny, III, Sherman Oaks, for 
petitioner. 
Edwin T. Caldwell, San Francisco, Theo-
dore A. Cohen, Beverly Hills, David B. 
Johnson and Quattrin, Johnson, Campora 
and England, Sacramento, as amici curiae 
on behalf of petitioner. 
Diane C. Yu, Richard J. Zanassi, Starr 
Babcock and Mara Mamet, San Francisco, 
for respondent. 
THE COURT: 
We review the recommendation of the 
Review Department of the State Bar Court 
(hereafter review department) that petition-
er be disbarred from the practice of law in 
California because of his 1985 conviction in 
the Virgin Islands on two counts of pos-
sessing controlled substances with intent to 
distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). As will 
appear, we conclude that a less severe form 
of discipline will better recognize the com-
pelling evidence of mitigation and rehabili-
tation in this record, will amply protect 
the public and the profession, and will pro-
mote consistency with a recent decision of 
this court on very similar facts (In re Mad-
rich (1988) 44 Cal.3d 271, 243 Cal.Rptr 218, 
747 P.2d 1146). 
In March 1986 petitioner voluntarily initi-
ated these proceedings by informing the 
State Bar of his conviction in the Virgin 
Islands and asking that he be placed on 
interim suspension. Accordingly, we 
placed him on such suspension effective 
May 30, 1986, and referred the matter to 
the State Bar for a hearing and recommen-
dation as to discipline.1 During the years 
1987 and 1988 petitioner and the State Bar 
1. Petitioner and the State Bar stipulated that the 
case would be heard by a single referee sitting 
as a hearing panel (hereafter the referee). 
APPENDIX W 
Wendell K. Smith, #3019 
Assistant Bar Counsel 
Office of Bar Counsel 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3834 
801-531-9110 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In The Matter of 
Complaint by 
DONNA CHURCHEY 
against 
the ] 
DOUGLAS E. WAHLQUIST ] 
DOB: 05-20-46 
ADM: 04-18-78 
| ORDER AFFIRMING 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND | MODIFIED RECOMMENDATION | OF DISCIPLINE 
i F-484 
Pursuant to Rule XII(e) of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, the Board has reviewed 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline of the Disciplinary Hearing 
Panel. It hereby affirms the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, adopts them as its own, and 
incorporates them by reference into this Order. 
The Recommendation of the Hearing Panel that 
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two 
(2) years is disaffirmed. The Board recommends 
Respondent be disbarred. 
The following Recommendations of the Hearing Panel, 
as modified, are affirmed: 
Respondent shall not act or hold himself out as 
an attorney, paralegal or law clerk following his 
disbarment. 
Respondent shall be permitted to be employed as 
a secretary and office manager in the law firm of George 
H. Searle. 
George H. Searle shall make annual reports to 
the Office of Bar Counsel verifying that Respondent is 
employed in his law firm and that he is not acting or 
holding himself out as an attorney, paralegal or law 
clerk. Mr. Searle shall also notify the Office of Bar 
Counsel when Respondent's employment with his office is 
terminated. Future employment by Respondent in any 
office where the practice of law is conducted shall be 
subject to the same terms and conditions. 
Respondent, as a condition precedent to 
readmission to practice law, shall make full restitution 
to Lincoln National Corporation in the amount of 
$22,500.00, plus interest, at the rate of twelve percent 
(12%) per annum. 
Respondent shall make full restitution to 
Unigard in Formal Complaint F-268 in an amount 
satisfactory to Unigard as a condition precedent to 
readmission to practice law. 
PAGE - 2 
Respondent should pay the reasonable costs 
incurred to the Office of Bar Counsel for prosecuting 
this action in the amount of $118.32. 
Formal Complaint F-485 is dismissed per 
agreement of the parties. 
The grounds for this modification of the 
recommendations of the Disciplinary Hearing Panel are set 
forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities. 
DATED this g"fu day of HA-ecf/ , 1993. 
BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS 
By: 
Randy p. \Dryer 
Presld 
CA . J W Q 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order Affirming Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Modified Recommendation of Discipline was 
mailed certified mail return receipt requested, postal 
certificate number , to George Searle, 
Attorney for Respondent, at 2805 So. State, S.L.C., UT 
84115 on this l~2 day of fYla^^—, 1993. 
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